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Introduction
Šverceri, people like you and me
It was July 2012,1 and I was about to return to Novi Pazar, Serbia, illustrated in 
Figure 0.1.2 Once on the public bus, I stowed away my luggage, settled into my 
seat, and awaited the bus ride ahead of me. By now, I was familiar with this route. 
I knew the bus would take about six hours to get from Belgrade to Novi Pazar and 
how to time the bathroom breaks according to the drivers’ preferred places of rest. 
No surprises – until Čačak,3 that is. After we had left the bus station, a burly man 
ran after the bus and motioned the driver to stop with a plastic bag. I guessed the 
man was middle-aged. He wore a blue tracksuit, a gray T-shirt, and house shoes. 
Heavy set, though quick on his feet, he got on the bus in a swoop, trailed by strong 
body odor. After sitting beside me and behind the bus driver, the man immediately 
apologized for smelling bad. “Sorry guys, I stink,” he said. “I was just released 
from prison. They don’t even let you take a shower there. They locked me up, 
čoveče [man]! Can you believe it?” he said to no one in particular. In all, there 
were about five other people on the bus, a couple of elderly men, a young woman, 
an even younger man, and an elderly lady. The heat felt suffocating. I looked 
around the bus to gauge the reaction among the other passengers; no one bat-
ted an eye. Nobody seemed to care, and neither did the man who had just been 
released from prison. He was not concerned with the other passengers, or if any-
body had listened to his vociferous protest about his detention. After apologizing, 
he explained that someone had ratted him out. “I know the man who sold me out 
to the cops, too!” He then leaned over to the bus driver and asked:
Do you remember how easy it was during the war? There was no red tape, we 
stuck together! Nobody sold you out to save their own skin. Now, they would 
sell their grandmother to save themselves! And I only trade legal goods, 
unlike the crook who sold me to the police – I only smuggle cigarettes, coffee 
and other legal stuff, not guns and drugs like that ‘stoka’!4
After venting, the man borrowed the bus driver’s mobile phone. “I need to 
make a phone call,” the man said. He was obviously agitated when he spoke to 
the person on the other end of the receiver. “What do you mean you are calling 
a lawyer? Why?” he asked over and over. “It’s not as if I murdered someone! 
Čoveče božiji!”5 He paused and replied, “I am going to see that guy right away as 
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soon as I get back to Raška! That guy owes me some answers!” He repeated the 
last sentence after hanging up and sunk into silence.
Eventually, the bus ground to a halt. It was one of the bus driver’s habitual rest-
ing spots. When the driver motioned the end of the break, all of us returned to our 
seats, except the man who had just been released from jail. “Gdje je ovaj?”6 the 
bus driver asked. “The guy with the plastic bag and the house shoes? He hitched 
a ride on some guy’s truck,” someone in the back answered.
The burly man did not care one bit about who was on the bus, and the people on 












Figure 0.1 Sandžak region
Source: Map created by Lyubomyr Oliynyk, siteGist.co.
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words, was (is) not uncommon in Serbia; the people of Novi Pazar call the busi-
ness of šverc a javna tajna – a public secret.7
Context and research setting
Novi Pazar was a hub of smuggling activities between 1991 and 1995. Tucked in 
between the southern hills of Serbia that border Montenegro and Kosovo, Novi 
Pazar was a thoroughfare for goods, and attracted shoppers, traders, and work-
ers from nearby villages, as well as the greater area around Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Serbia, and Montenegro.
Due to the busy market activities, residents of Novi Pazar had at once a com-
monplace and yet distinct experience of the 1990s war years compared to other 
citizens of Serbia and those Bosniak and/or Muslim citizens who lived through 
the siege in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Like other citizens of Serbia, resi-
dents of Novi Pazar endured the internationally imposed sanctions. Living within 
Serbian state borders, however, spared this population from the hardship that Bos-
niaks of BiH experienced. At the same time, locals in Novi Pazar became benefac-
tors of Turkish charity and development projects during the conflict and after the 
Yugoslav Succession Wars had ended, as was the case with citizens of Bosnia. 
This unique in- and out-of-state experience of the local community in Novi Pazar 
is at the core of this book. Smuggling – or šverc, as the practice is known locally – 
illustrates this in- and out-of-state experience. Because the informal market con-
nects Novi Pazar to Bosnia, Turkey, and also to Serbia proper, I examine how 
informal transnational practices between 1991 and 1995 shaped this community’s 
collective sense of belonging and social relations locally following the Yugoslav 
Succession Wars.
Throughout the first half of the 1990s, Novi Pazar experienced an economic 
boom for two reasons. First, Novi Pazar’s state sponsored industry and biggest 
employer, the Tekstilni Kombinat Raška (Raška Textile Factory, TKS), collapsed 
due to the economic downturn and subsequent war in the Socialist Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Second, in order to safeguard their continued income, 
Bosniaks traveled between Turkey and Novi Pazar and utilized diaspora family 
connections to acquire material and fabrics for the production of jeans and other 
apparel with which they set up makeshift clothing factories in their homes, often 
hidden from officials. As a result, locals who had been employed by the TKS put 
their skills to use in the informal production of counterfeited clothing. Locals also 
sold food items, coffee, and cigarettes on the Novi Pazar market, also known as 
buvljak, to other Yugoslavs who traveled to the city in search of commodities that 
were in short supply and/or altogether inexistent elsewhere.
The twin processes of existing transnational relations with the local and dias-
pora community in Turkey, together with the internationally imposed sanctions, 
created a new class of successful traders in Novi Pazar. At the same time, employ-
ment and goods were difficult to come by in other areas of Serbia. Both Serbs and 
Bosniaks initially profited from this trade. James Lyon noted that “overnight, a 
new class of wealthy – both Serb and Bosniak – entrepreneurs sprang up, although 
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many Serbs remained in low-paying state sector jobs.”8 In Novi Pazar, factories 
produced up to 30,000 pairs of counterfeit jeans a day that included brands such 
as Levi’s, Diesel, and Reply.9 Because of low wages and the relative ease of tax 
evasion, the cost of textile production dropped considerably. Residents of Sandžak 
thus started to capitalize on these advantages to set up textile, shoe, and leather 
manufacturing companies. Because of the general chaos of the war years, how-
ever, no reliable figures exist that could illustrate the exact revenue and production 
output. Be that as it may, analysts and scholars figure that “several hundred thou-
sand pairs of jeans” and other apparel items were produced in the region while 
annual revenues were “between $50 and $100 million.”10 Sandžak, specifically 
Novi Pazar, attracted thousands of individuals that sought to work in the sprouting 
textile industry with its up to 500 factories by the end of the 1990s, according to 
Lyon.11 Belgrade, too, capitalized on these relations by sending ‘tax collectors’ – 
commonly referred to as racketeers among the local population – to Novi Pazar.
Ironically, the end of the international sanctions regime also heralded the end 
of the booming market in Novi Pazar. In 2008, there were only some 50 firms 
left that produced up to 1 million pairs of jeans a year, and revenues dropped 
sharply, barely reaching 50,000 euros annually.12 With the exception of the local 
fish hatchery Vojin Popov,13 Novi Pazar’s formative industries of cement, textile, 
and battery manufacturing have not revitalized markedly at the time of writing. 
Since then, Novi Pazar has slowly sunk into economic ruin. However, the infor-
mal market, meanwhile, continues to this day, albeit on a comparatively small 
scale. While the end of the Yugoslav conflicts foreshadowed the end of the boom-
ing market, existing transnational networks continue to connect Bosniaks in Ser-
bia and present-day Turkey.
Aims and contributions
How do economic transnational practices shape one’s sense of belonging in times 
of crisis/precarity? Specifically, how does the collapse of the Ottoman Empire – 
and the subsequent migration of the Muslim Slav population to Turkey – relate 
to the Yugoslav Succession Wars during the 1990s? These questions form the 
core aim of this book, which examines how the Yugoslav Succession Wars influ-
enced transnational relations between the émigré Bosniak community of Turkey 
and those Bosniaks who remained in Southeastern Europe. Bereft of acceptance 
among their co-denizens of different religions at the turn of the century, and again 
in 1991, some Bosniaks turned to Turkey for refuge and then for material aid. In 
order to show this mechanism, I analyze the case study of Novi Pazar, Serbia, 
where informal trading practices flourished between 1991/92 and 1995. This book 
therefore focuses on Novi Pazar’s informal market economy during the Yugoslav 
Succession Wars as a prism through which to analyze the strengthening of exist-
ing relations between the émigré community in Turkey and the local Bosniak 
population in the Sandžak region, specifically its urban center that is Novi Pazar. 
The goal of this book is to demonstrate the interactive nature of relations between 
the state and local and émigré communities.
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Researching the Sandžak region of the former SFRY is particularly valuable 
because this corner of the Balkans has received scant attention, not least because 
this cross-border region remained largely untouched by the armed conflicts dur-
ing the Yugoslav Succession Wars.14 Kenneth Morrison and Elizabeth Roberts 
published a much-needed and excellent history of the Sandžak region that allowed 
me to situate my findings in a historic frame,15 and I was fortunate to meet and 
discuss my research with James Lyon, who has published an article on the infor-
mal market in Novi Pazar.16 Empirically driven, however, this book is the first 
longitudinal analysis that examines how the Bosniak community of Novi Pazar in 
Serbia traded as a means to endure the Yugoslav Succession Wars of the 1990s. 
The relative peace that characterized the Sandžak during this decade makes it 
all the more critical that we try to understand how its ethnically and religiously 
diverse population negotiated this trying period.
The focus on informality and on ‘making do’ in Sandžak, an ambiguous border 
region situated between Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 
is not an isolated case study of an informal market in Novi Pazar. Informal prac-
tices are spread across the globe and have been examined in a variety of projects17 
and publications before.18 By looking closely at smuggling and other informal 
practices without prejudice and without being judgmental, I hope to contribute a 
better understanding about the mechanisms behind the establishment of such mar-
kets. The question of how communities frame reconnecting with diaspora popula-
tions to re-create belonging in light of crisis and/or precarity through the prism of 
informality that arrives in the form of aid is of specific interest here.
For a migration scholar, the Western Balkans are a fertile ground to examine 
the movement of people across lands so as to learn about the social, cultural, and 
political effects thereof. Sandžak epitomizes this transitory and border charac-
teristic of the Balkan region. As such, this book provides an outlook on migra-
tion as it spans questions of identification, informal trade practices, memory, and 
social space and investigates how these phenomena come together in times of 
precarity. By using a conceptual framework that spans history, sociology, social 
anthropology, and geography, I hope to go beyond grand narratives of geopoliti-
cal alignments between states to uncover a complex web of personal and intimate 
relationships that suffuse the on-the-ground struggles of ‘making do’. In doing 
so, this book contributes to our understanding of how national and transnational 
communities are forged in times of uncertainty and crisis. At the same time, this 
book reshapes preconceived notions of ethnicity, nationality, and the state in the 
Balkan region. Drawing on the field of human geography was particularly fruitful 
in my effort to understand the region through the very networks in which people 
operate as opposed to emphasizing ethnicity. Discarding the ethnic frame, to put 
it in Tim Hall’s words, forced me “to think of space not in Euclidian terms, but 
rather in networked or relational terms.”19
Politicians, residents, journalists, pundits, and academics alike considered eth-
nicity as a lens through which to understand the collapse of social values during 
the Yugoslav wars, the reconciliation thereafter, and subsequent questions revolv-
ing around minority rights in the newly created states. I, too, traveled to Novi 
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Pazar with the initial intention of researching interethnic relations and upward 
social mobility in Southern Serbia. Taking to heart Clifford Geertz, and his advice 
to “see(ing) things from the native’s” point of view, I abandoned this approach 
upon arriving in the field in May 2012.20 As I moved from a text-based under-
standing of the region to the field site of Novi Pazar, I realized that the ethnic lens 
was a mental straitjacket I sought to discard. Moving away from the ethnic-lens 
approach opened fresh possibilities for my understanding of the social experi-
ences of a community as opposed to those of Bosniaks, Serbs, Roma, and so forth. 
To be sure, I analyze transnational relations between the Bosniak diaspora in Tur-
key and local Bosniaks, and how social relations in Novi Pazar changed in view of 
the informal market that flourished there in the first half of the 1990s. Important, 
however, is that the market benefited and affected the social experience of all 
individuals in Novi Pazar, not merely the Bosniak community. Aspiring to Jerome 
Kirk and Marc L. Miller, I sought to “represent the natives’ way of making sense 
of their experience in a language that transcends the culture-specific experience of 
the world of either the natives or the readers.”21 Looking beyond ethnicity, in other 
words, encouraged me to observe a community that lived under the tutelage of a 
nationalist and an international sanctions regime. Local attitudes do not exist in a 
vacuum. They are shaped by events from within and outside politically imposed 
boundaries.
International sanctions did not materialize out of thin air but were a direct 
result of the proxy war Belgrade had waged in Croatia and Bosnia. As Bel-
grade engaged in a violent surrogate war to enlarge its political territory, the 
government in Belgrade alienated the population within its borders. In light 
of the prewar propaganda barrage against Muslims of SFRY and the mounting 
violence in BiH, politicians and representatives from the cultural and religious 
sphere in Novi Pazar, the urban center of the Sandžak region, sought to gain 
autonomy from Serbia. Organized by Sulejman Ugljanin, head of the Demo-
cratic Action Party (SDA),22 together with the umbrella organization under the 
name of Bosniak National Council of Sandžak (BNVS), the Muslim enclave 
of Sandžak adopted a referendum demanding autonomy from SFRY in 1991. 
The referendum was put to a vote and accepted by 187,473 (70.19 percent) of 
all 264,156 eligible voters in the Sandžak region. Belgrade, meanwhile, denied 
the validity of the referendum and charged Ugljanin with an attempt to over-
throw the Serbian constitutional order and terrorism.23 Besides indicting Ugl-
janin, 25 additional members of the Bosniak community were imprisoned and 
charged on the grounds of violating the territorial integrity of SRFY.24 Uglja-
nin fled to Turkey, while the trial against these individuals has been  postponed 
108 times.25
In short, I argue that the foundation of the once existing social solidarity among 
the former Yugoslav peoples disintegrated by way of the economic crisis, the 
Yugoslav Succession Wars, and subsequent sanctions. While the social disintegra-
tion affected all citizens of the former state, Bosniaks of Novi Pazar had a valve to 
relieve this pressure. And yet, trading with the diaspora community in Turkey was 
not only a means to an economic end but a practice that forged new and renewed 
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social ties with the Muslim Slav diaspora community in Turkey and the Turkish 
state writ large.
Europe in the head, Turkey in the heart
Turkish involvement in the Western Balkans received much attention since Ahmet 
Davutoğlu devised the ‘Zero Problems with Neighbors’ doctrine.26 According to 
Davutoğlu, formerly the minister for foreign affairs and member of the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP), Turkey was prone to assume greater geopolitical 
responsibilities in world affairs, in part due to its history and geographic loca-
tion. The Balkans, too, fall into the former category owing to the Western Balkan 
inclusion in the former Ottoman Empire, especially since the Yugoslav Succes-
sion Wars during the 1990s. Since then, a number of Turkish state-sponsored and 
non-state actors finance a variety of projects in the Western Balkans, including 
the Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA),27 the presidency for religious 
affairs called Diyanet,28 and the Yunus Emre language institute.29 Bahar Baser, 
Erdi Öztürk, Samim Akgönül, and Kerem Ötkem examined these cultural and 
political institutions and the encroaching authoritarian tendencies under the AKP 
presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan30 and its support of cultural and educational 
institutions in the region extensively.31 Simon P. Watmough and Öztürk exam-
ined the Gulen Movement as a ‘transnational network’ that utilizes diaspora com-
munities to strengthen its ‘parapolitical organization’.32 These authors provide us 
with much-needed and critical insight regarding not only the transformation of 
the Turkish state under the AKP but also a fundamental understanding about how 
the AKP utilizes diaspora communities to proliferate its geopolitical relevance.
Turkish investments in the region loom large, to be sure, but appear trifling 
compared to the involvement of the European Union. To put it in the words of 
one interlocutor, “Turkey is in people’s hearts while Europe is in their heads.” 
Indeed, financial, cultural, and political investments dwarf those of Turkey when 
compared with those of the European Union, as illustrated by Matteo Bonomi and 
Milica Uvalić.33 Moreover, Turkey is not the sole investor in the Western Balkans. 
Instead, Florian Bieber and Nikolaos Tzifakis,34 and Dimitar Bechev35 examine 
myriad state and non-state sponsored actors that variously engage with the West-
ern Balkans. Their respective research builds an important frame for the present 
study in which I situate my question of how transnational practices shape one’s 
sense of belonging in times of crisis/precarity.
John F. Freie makes an intriguing argument regarding the human desire for 
genuine communities and social relations in Counterfeit Community – The 
 Exploitation of Our Longing for Connectedness.36 Counterfeit communities, 
according to Freie,
appeal to real needs and concerns of people and their desires for association, 
but instead of creating environments and relationships that meaningfully sat-
isfy those desires, they provide only the appearance of community and are, 
therefore, never fully satisfying.37
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Freie posed the question of community-building in an American context that he 
perceived as rampant with selfish individualism and greed. Instead of partaking 
in a consensus-making, participatory democracy, US citizens gather at shopping 
malls or other community-like places that are void of communal experiences. 
As a result, Americans no longer associate the necessity of governance in their 
everyday lives, with the consequence that “citizens (who) claim to be a part of a 
community [but] feel no sense of social responsibility other than paying dues.”38 
Freie’s contemplations on community-building are compelling, with a view 
toward the social disruption brought about by the Yugoslav Succession wars and 
local desire for a continued sense of community in all of Serbia, particularly in 
Novi Pazar. Did the local buvljak (‘flea market’, colloquially understood as a mar-
ket containing smuggled goods) in Novi Pazar create a renewed sense of commu-
nity with the émigré community in Turkey in retrospect of the Ottoman Empire? 
Freie compels us to consider this question regarding this community’s real and/or 
desired connection with the Turkish state.
Local connections with the diaspora, as well as the Turkish state, are undisputed 
and very real. Interviewees repeatedly asserted that Novi Pazar belonged to a 
Turkish sphere of influence based on the historically constituted cultural realm of 
the former Ottoman Empire and filial relations. Yet does a common religion, kin 
relations, and historic memory suffice the act of forging a common bond across 
time and space, as is the case of Novi Pazar and Turkey?
Magnus Marsden sheds light on this question and invites us to assess narra-
tives with an overt historic dimension with caution in Trading Worlds – Afghan 
Merchants Across Modern Frontiers.39 Trading Worlds is a supreme examination 
of Afghan merchants because Marsden analyzes ordinary material encounters and 
their significance for social encounters in Central Asia, the Black Sea region, and 
Europe. I build on Marsden’s idea, and most of all, I heed his advice on ethnic 
historic determinism. In Marsden’s words:
Such images of the present’s relationship to the past are embedded in and 
arise out of political economies; they are actively constructed by both local 
and global actors. It is important, therefore, that scholarship is critical of the 
ways in which such images of pre-modern forms of trade are deployed in 
order to understand contemporary realities. By rendering the region’s modern 
history as inauthentic to its historic cultural composition and wider global 
significance, these images foreclose any attempt to explore the unique ways 
in which people are forging relations across cold war boundaries.
The present study follows Marsden’s cautionary note in its exploration of how 
locals construct and reconstruct the past based on the present in a fixed geographic 
space. Revisiting Fry’s argument on the human desire for community in light of 
Marsden’s advice then directs our attention toward the possibility that locals con-
struct historicized narratives to cope with the present.
The question that arises is how locals navigated and experienced this two-tiered 
pressure of living within a nationalist-dominated government and internationally 
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imposed sanctions. The gray and informal market itself thus serves as a prism that 
highlights the narrative accounts of locals and their proximity to Turkey.
During my time spent in the field of Novi Pazar, I filtered out two story lines that 
dominate the narrative sense-making process of locals in retrospect of the 1990s 
and the second market. As such, locals transpose a two-dimensional tale about 
šverc and transnational family relations onto a historical plane. At the core of the 
primary narrative lies an emphasis on the close-knit connections between Novi 
Pazar and the diaspora community in Turkey. “Without the diaspora,” I heard time 
and again, “we would not have made it.” On the surface of this first narrative is the 
diaspora community that saved Novi Pazar from descending into the economic 
chaos that people in other towns of Serbia experienced. Yet this narrative also 
serves as a ‘sense-making tool’ that provides locals with a chronological continu-
ity that bypasses the cruel experience of the war years.40 Trade with the Bosniak 
diaspora created an atmosphere that allowed locals to make sense of their new 
situation in economic and social terms by which they were able to “anticipate the 
future based on retrospection,” to frame it in Paul Ricoeur’s words.41
Repeated probing over the course of four years in and out of the field slowly 
revealed a second narrative, namely a local deterioration of values and a deep-
seated feeling of anomie because of this market. It is crucial, however, that locals 
might not have reconnected with the Bosniak diaspora in Turkey, the Turkish 
state, and their history to the extent they did in the absence of this war. The Yugo-
slav Succession Wars that enabled this market, one may thus pose, permitted the 
creation of the primary narrative. Only by illuminating the 1990s in general and 
the market that created and/or strengthened these links between the local and the 
diaspora community specifically, in other words, can one understand the process 
of revitalized relations between the local and diaspora community.
The significance of this question goes far beyond the limited space of Novi 
Pazar, exactly because locals repeatedly associate(d) the gray market with the 
Bosniak diaspora in Turkey.
It is important to emphasize that I do not examine transnational actors as dan-
gerous, criminal, and/or intentionally malicious traders, even though they enabled 
the initial practice of šverc. I conceptualize transnational networks as a solidar-
ity chain that enabled locals to make a living but also as a system of connec-
tions within which locals cohere the transmutation of their existence in the former 
Yugoslav state.
Methodological considerations and data
Upon arriving in Novi Pazar in 2012, I first took up residence in an informal 
‘student dorm’ that was located in a private residence. I have since chosen to stay 
at the hotel, each time in the same place. Staying at the hotel allowed for a dis-
tance between me and the field to evaluate my daily impressions in private. Both 
options constituted considerable drawbacks and/or advantages as I preserved my 
freedom of movement by staying at the hotel. On the contrary, the proximity to 
residents in the informal student dorms allowed for instant contact with residents 
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and, significantly, the host family. And yet, having established relations with the 
hosts of the informal dorm during the pilot project in 2012 meant I was able to 
approach family members whenever I returned to Novi Pazar and surrounding 
areas. In Istanbul, I talked with merchants in the Kapalıçarşı (Grand Bazaar) in 
2016, and met with interlocutors in Sarajevo in 2014 and 2016. In 2017, I resided 
in Belgrade to view newspaper collections and archival material at the National 
Library and the Yugoslav Archive, respectively.
Much of my time was spent in social and professional areas including cafes, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), beauty parlors, indoor shops, out-
door markets, churches, mosques, downtown streets, and other “third places 
that host regular, voluntary, and informal gatherings of individuals beyond 
home and work.”42 “Third places,” according to Ramon Oldenburg and Dennis 
Brissett,
exist outside the home and beyond the ‘work lots’ of modern economic pro-
duction. They are places where people gather primarily to enjoy each other’s 
company.43
Indoor shops, beauty parlors, and outdoor market stalls to be sure, too, are 
places of work. Yet, individuals also visit these places to meet and chat with 
acquaintances.
Beauty parlors are, for instance, a wonderful example of third places that com-
bine work with the voluntary gathering of friends. Tucked away in a back street 
off the main drag in Novi Pazar, women of all walks of life, age, religion, and/or 
national affiliation – self-imposed and otherwise – readily shared experiences and 
gossip with their beauticians and co-patrons, out of earshot from male compan-
ionship. Seeing that Serbia is still a patriarchal, male-dominated society, beauty 
parlors presented a valuable research site in which to gain insight into a female 
perspective on the informal economy in Novi Pazar and the greater Sandžak 
region during the 1990s, and often beyond. I further increased female participa-
tion by way of questionnaires, as illustrated in Figure 0.6.
Residents also gathered frequently at NGOs to discuss local and national poli-
tics. There was often an air of surreptitious camaraderie as staff members and 
visitors alike – young, old, female, and male of all backgrounds – exchanged 
views on the current state of affairs in Serbia and the Western Balkans in general. 
NGOs were an ideal site of entry to the field and practical places to meet further 
interlocutors. Individuals who frequented these organizations not only had a point 
of view on informal market activities and the Bosniak diaspora in Turkey, but they 
also were eager to share their insights.
Downtown streets and cafes were ideal for informal conversations with estab-
lished as well as potential informants, and strolls during which I was able to 
observe the goings-on in town through the eyes of locals. Meandering through 
downtown Novi Pazar with interlocutors taught me about local details of the 
town, including the projects paid for by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination 
Agency (TIKA) that invested in schools, hospital equipment, and the renovation 
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of mosques, for instance. As such, local cafés, NGOs, and beauty parlors are 
places of work. Yet these places are, as Oldenburg and Brissett described them,
modest business establishments where concern over image has not yet 
replaced the delights of ‘shooting the bull’, those merely hanging out will be 
found, most often, to outnumber the customers.44
Life indeed takes place in these third places in Novi Pazar, and I was able to learn 
about the local code of conduct in these various settings.
Restrictions and limiting conditions
How does one study the practice of šverc? Felia Allum and Stan Gilmour provide 
a practical note as regards data collection on transnational organized crime (TOC):
Often, there exists very little data which could help from the basis of an in-
depth analysis. We must not forget that getting primary data is difficult and 
dangerous. Some researchers have undertaken participant observation (for 
example, Ianni and Reuss-Ianni 1972; Ianni 1974; Chambliss 1971) but this 
is difficult to organize. Therefore, there is often a necessity to rely on police 
figures and data. . . . Thus, fieldwork is the key to a realistic account of organ-
ized crime but also the main stumbling block: “field work depends to a great 
extent on complicated continuous concerns, the most central of which is how 
one is seen by others.”45
Primary data is indeed very difficult to come by considering the volume of šverc 
between 1991 and 1995, who participated, and the quality of goods that were 
shipped from and through Serbia. Finding specific data to quantify the informal 
trade in Novi Pazar, moreover, was even more difficult. To be sure, the UN states:
The links between the state and organized crime were strengthened during the 
1990s following the collapse of the socialist regimes and during the violent 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. After international sanctions were imposed, great 
fortunes were made smuggling weapons, oil, and other commodities needed 
by the warring parties. These were paid for, in part, through other forms of 
trafficking, including the smuggling of drugs and untaxed cigarettes, made 
possible by the chaos of the war and fledgling democratic institutions. Wars 
and the new relationship with the West also led to large scale emigration and 
human trafficking.46
One can thus only deduce, together with reports and the oral testimonies, that 
TOC was present in Novi Pazar, too, though I was unable to quantify the volume 
thereof.
In my effort to learn about the quantity and exact nature of the market during 
the 1990s, I arranged an informal conversation with a former police official in 
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Novi Pazar, though was unable to retrieve primary documentation thereof. As 
such, I rely on the secondary sources. Primary sources from the UN, Europol, and 
Eulex, for instance, figure especially relevant about the legacy of the informal 
market.
Due to the difficulty of finding primary documentation, participant observation 
and the collection of semi-structured interviews became a necessary choice to 
learn about the smuggling activities of the 1990s. Doing so, however, inevitably 
shifted my focus toward the question of how locals coped with this situation of 
living under a nationalist regime and international sanctions. The focus, in other 
words, shifted from studying organized crime to that of researching how locals 
experienced the war years within Serbian state borders, and how social relations 
transformed as a result of this transnational trade.
And yet, participant observation bears its own problem, as I chose not to cross 
borders with anyone who alleged to smuggle or indeed did smuggle goods. This 
created a strange dynamic at times, as I asked personal questions and yet pur-
ported to show no interest in traveling with a person as they went about their busi-
ness. In a late stage of my fieldwork in 2015, for instance, I received a WhatsApp 
message with a request to drive a car from Germany to Serbia, which I denied. 
The conversation went as follows
SALIM:  We got this car in Germany, and it needs to be driven here to Serbia, 
aren’t you coming to Serbia, soon? You could drive the car here?
ME: I’m not doing that. What kind of car anyway, and why? I thought your brother 
lives in Germany, why doesn’t he drive the car there?
SALIM:  He does not want to do it.
My contact with this informant broke off shortly thereafter. Because I did not par-
ticipate in cross-border trading myself and did not sell any goods on the market 
together with interlocutors, I do not have an empirical account of how wares are 
traded.
Another difficulty inherent to participant observation and semi-structured inter-
views stems from the personal situation of the informant and his or her inclina-
tion to divulge personal information. I enjoyed excellent rapport with Asem, for 
instance, with whom I had regular contact in the field between 2012 and 2016 and 
beyond. At the beginning of our meetings, he was good-natured and an excellent 
source of reliable information as regarded his personal family history and his 
expert opinion on the 1990s. In due course of these four years, however, I detected 
an increased detachment that went hand in hand with his worsening socioeco-
nomic condition, to the point where he once asked me to turn off the recorder 
during an interview. Though my contact to Asem stayed intact, it was necessary 
that I realize how personal circumstances influence the data informants provide.
These brief insights highlight that participant observation and the collection 
of oral data depend on people, most of whom may or may not carry a personal 
burden. Shifting circumstances in an individual’s life will thus influence the rap-
port with informants. Given these restrictions and limiting conditions, it was 
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paramount to triangulate my data with additional situational interviews, question-
naires, and newspaper articles.
Who speaks
The completion of this study would have been impossible without the collabo-
ration of individuals in the Sandžak region. The following table describes the 
individuals who agreed to sit with me for a recorded interview. It is important 
to iterate here that casual conversations, participant observation, and field notes 
are not quantified and included in this list, though they nevertheless contribute 
significantly to the data set.
Amer  Amer visited Bosnia and Herzegovina as a tourist at the time of our 
(25–30, M) first meeting, during which we spent the day by walking through the 
streets of a city in BiH before settling into a quiet restaurant for our 
recorded, semi-structured interview in 2016. Amer and I have kept in 
touch since then via social media channels.
Asem Asem was one of the key informants, especially during the early phase 
(55–60, M) of this research. Asem had worked for an international not-for-profit 
organization and is deeply rooted in the greater Sandžak region. 
A wealth of information, Asem’s first recorded interview with me took 
place in 2012. Two follow-up interviews took place in 2014 and 2015. 
We continue to have sporadic interactions via social media channels. 
All interviews took place in the greater Sandžak region.
Bojana Bojana, a native of the greater Sandžak region, worked for an 
(60–65, F) international organization when we first met to record a semi-
structured interview in her office in 2012. Several in-person, 
unrecorded meetings followed between then and 2015.
Burhan Burhan and I met for our first and only interview in 2012. Burhan 
(55–60, M) invited me to his office in the greater Sandžak region. The building 
seemed modern, though abandoned, and looked like it had once been 
a shopping mall.
Chip Chip was a gatekeeper concerning my access and introduction 
(45–50, M) to individuals of the local and international non-governmental 
community who worked on questions related to the greater Sandžak 
region. Our e-mail contact started as early as 2011. Our first in-person 
meeting took place in 2015. The e-mail contact continued thereafter.
Daud Daud, a merchant in the greater Sandžak region, agreed to a semi-
(35–40, M) structured interview in 2012. We had two follow-up interviews in 
2014 and 2015. Daud and I met for various in-person and unrecorded 
meetings between 2012 and 2015. Most of our meetings took place in 
his store in the market.
Dragan Dragan served as a public official and was an individual with a great 
(60–65, M) wealth of information about informal activities in the greater Sandžak 
region. We met in May 2012 when he agreed to sit with me for an 
interview.
Dubravko Dubravko works for a local aid agency. He invited me to his office in the 
(35–40, M) greater Sandžak region to record a semi-structured interview in 2012.
(Continued)
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Ekrem Ekrem and I met in 2012 when he invited me to his office in the 
(40–45, M) greater Sandžak region for our scheduled, semi-structured interview. 
Unhappy with how the sociopolitical situation developed in the 
aftermath of the Succession Wars, he signaled his desire to leave the 
greater Sandžak region early on. A professional in the international 
not-for-profit sector, he left the greater Sandžak region soon after our 
interview. After our first interview, we met up occasionally until he 
left the greater Sandžak region.
Emela Emela is employed in the public sector. We first met in 2012 and have 
(35–40, F) since met in person on a regular basis upon my arrival in the greater 
Sandžak region. In 2015, we conducted a semi-structured interview 
in the presence of her sister and scheduled a follow-up interview in 
2016.
Erol Like many in his age group, Erol was unemployed when I first met 
(25–30, M) him in May 2012. While being unemployed, however, a great 
majority of young people in the greater Sandžak region work odd 
jobs here and there, as was the case with Erol. Our first interview on 
record took place in 2012. We conducted two follow-up interviews 
in 2014 and 2016. Erol and I met regularly whenever I returned to 
the greater Sandžak region, and we continue to talk via social media 
channels.
James James is a civil servant. James and I were in contact before our first 
(M) in-person meeting in Serbia 2012, where he provided me with 
important background information on the Sandžak region.
Jim Jim used to work as a civil servant, and he introduced me to the 
(40–45, M) Sandžak region as I traveled through Serbia, Macedonia, and 
Montenegro during February and March 2011. By way of numerous 
discussions about the Yugoslav Succession Wars, the drawing 
and redrawing of borders, and ethnic entrepreneurs, questions of 
belonging crystallized, as examined in this book. Our conversation 
continues into the present.
Jon Jon works in higher education and is also active in the not-for-profit 
(50–55, M) sector. A wealth of information regarding the historiography of 
political events in the Sandžak region, Jon and I first met in Bosnia 
and Hercegovina in 2014 where we recorded one interview.
Leijla I met Leijla by way of having lived in the informal student dormitory 
(93–98, F) in 2012. I conducted the semi-structured interview with Leijla in the 
presence of her two daughters in June 2014, and I saw her daughters, 
as well as other family members, whenever I returned to the greater 
Sandžak region between 2012 and 2016.
Mirijam An acquaintance introduced me to Mirijam before we recorded a 
(50–55, F) semi-structured interview in the presence of a daughter and one of 
Mirijam’s friends in 2014. Mirijam provided me with important 
background reading. She collects and records oral histories related to 
the Muslim migration to interior Ottoman lands.
Omar Omar was just about to be retired from the public sector when we met in 
(60–65, M) Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014. Like Mirijam, he has been interested 
in and researches the Muslim migration to interior Ottoman lands.
Saleh Saleh is a self-described trader. We first met in the greater Sandžak 
(25–30, M) region in 2014 and recorded our semi-structured interview in 2015. 
We met at various times in person and talked via social network 
channels between 2014 and 2016 and beyond.
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Salim Salim is a self-described švercer, a smuggler. I met Salim in the 
(40–45, M) Kapalıçarşı in Istanbul in 2015. We stayed in touch via social media 
and set up a semi-structured interview in 2016 in Serbia.
Semina Semina is active in the non-governmental sector in the greater Sandžak 
(F) region. I was introduced to Semina in 2015 before we recorded a 
semi-structured interview, which took place in the presence of one 
male and two female bystanders.
Senad Senad is a local gatekeeper who introduced me to residents of all walks 
(45–50, M) of life. He works at an NGO and invited me to his office for our first 
semi-structured interview in the greater Sandžak region in 2012. Two 
follow-up interviews took place in 2015 and 2016. Many unrecorded 
meetings, in person and online, took place between 2012 and 2016 
and beyond.
Siniša Siniša works at a not-for-profit organization and spent much of his 
35–40, M) life in the greater Sandžak region. We first met in Serbia for a 
semi-structured interview in 2012. The interview was followed by 
many unrecorded in-person meetings and conversations via social 
media channels until 2016 and beyond. Another recorded follow-up 
interview took place in 2015.
Zarifa Zarifa is an ardent supporter of the AKP and a young woman who had 
(F) just taken up the practice of wearing a hijab when we met in the greater 
Sandžak region. We recorded one semi-structured interview in 2012.
Semi-structured interviews as narratives
Over the course of the four years I spent in and out of the field, I came to interpret 
the informal trade as a narrative sense-making tool – a prism – that highlighted 
the social transformation locals experienced as a result of the Yugoslav crisis. 
Seen from this perspective, then, narrating is an activity, as highlighted by Elinor 
Ochs and Lisa Capps, that emphasizes the “sense-making process” as opposed to 
“a finished product in which loose ends knot together into a single story-line.”47 
There is, in other words, no unifying, chronological historiography. “Instead, the 
stories that people tell about themselves are about many selves, each situated in 
particular contexts, and working strategically to resist those contexts,” as Corinne 
Squire noted.48
Building on Bakhtin’s paradigm of heteroglossia, Andrea Smith interpreted 
the multiplicity of voices by distinguishing those situations according to which 
informants convey stories to a general audience from contexts in which individ-
uals narrate personal experiences.49 Interlocutors in Novi Pazar, too, replicated 
official histories in their narration of ‘the general history’, though they tended 
to use singular first-person pronouns ‘when speaking of personal experiences’. 
This approach fits the two-tiered narrative because interlocutors often used the 
plural ‘we’ (nas, mi smo, naše, etc.) when speaking about the Bosniak communi-
ties’ being connected to the greater historical processes in view of the Porte, the 
Ottoman Empire’s collapse, and the subsequent migration processes. Individu-
als, concurrently, often used the singular pronoun ‘I’ (ja, moj/a, mene, etc.) when 
relating personal opinions about and accounts of the market in the 1990s. It is 
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interesting to note here that ‘I’ narratives most often concurred between Serbian, 
Roma, and Bosniak informants, whereas ‘we’ narratives conveyed a Bosniak-
centered interpretation of events. This two-tiered narrative approach illustrates 
the at once historic perception among locals in the greater Sandžak region and 
individualized accounts of living in a nationalist and mafia-like state under inter-
national sanctions.
Understanding life stories as narratives means that I concede the claim to rep-
resent one true version of the world as I saw it. To be sure, I adjusted my initial 
research upon repeated entry to the field to more closely reflect local circum-
stances as seen by locals, as noted earlier. And yet, I am the author of this text, 
and thus created a narrative by having chosen interview partners. History and the 
narration of life events, as previously argued by Hayden White, does not illustrate 
an innocent reconstruction of the truth that is free of ideology.50 John Van Maanen, 
too, advises that institutions and academic traditions shape ethnographers as much 
as the “narrative and rhetorical conventions” a writer assumes.51 I thus not only 
selected characters but also specific narrative representations. I chose a topic – in 
this case the informal market as a prism – encoded facets of the interview, and 
selected an angle – in this case the social relations – by which I approached the 
narratives and informants. Acknowledging this fact is necessary because doing so 
allows for a critical assessment of the multiplicity of voices in the field – includ-
ing my own.
Questionnaire
Questionnaires substantiate claims about the extent of the informal market, cor-
relations between individual tradesman, and the nature of their connection to 
Turkey, family relations, or otherwise. The first round of questionnaires was con-
ceptualized as a pilot study that I administered in 2012. Upon evaluating the first 
round of interviews, casual conversations, and participant observation, I adjusted 
the questionnaires thereafter. In 2015, I arranged for a local NGO to administer 
the 500 questionnaires.
The N = 500 of participants were set to reflect the census data as illustrated 
in Figure 0.2, and a rough parity between male and female participants. For 
reasons outlined earlier, however, more males than females participated in the 
questionnaire.
Participants were free to choose between having the questionnaire read to them 
or completing their questionnaire independently in the company of the inter-
viewer. This was important, in case participants had questions about specific sec-
tions of the questionnaire.
More than half of the participants (55 percent) were between the ages of 36 
and 65 at the time of filling out the questionnaire (Figure 0.7). Participants who 
were older than 36 at the time are more like to remember the market. Conversely, 
participants younger than 36 have a presumably obscure memory of the mar-
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Figure 0.2 National affiliation
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Figure 0.4 National identification
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questionnaire were brought up during the sanctions and thus socialized in a sys-
tem during which šverc was a mundane activity.
Most of the participants (83.2 percent) in this study have lived in Novi Pazar 
since before 1995 (Figure 0.8). This is important, because these participants expe-
rienced social rupture brought about the Yugoslav Succession Wars and the sub-
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Newspaper articles
The local population in Serbia was virtually and quite literally isolated between 
1991 and 1995, which also pertains to the news that Serbian citizens variously read 
in the print media, viewed on television, and listened to through the radio waves. 
Determinations to silence dissenting voices within the media began as early as 
1990. In their effort to quash anticipated dissent among journalists, the Serbian 
regime purged the media staff following the electoral victory of the Socialist Party 
in 1993. The Independent (London) reported the sacking of 1,500 journalists in 
January 1993, calling it the “single biggest purge of political opponents in Ser-
bia.”52 By 1994, Borba (resistance) was the only reliably independent newspaper, 
which too was purged by regime-loyal individuals in December 1994.53
Instead of starving the local population of news, however, the regime obscured 
fact and fiction to render Serbian citizens pliable. Inga Saffron, staff writer at The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, for instance, stated “the rule of Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic, propaganda is a subtle art form. People aren’t so much denied informa-
tion as confused by too much of it. Fact, fiction and rumor are intermingled.”54 To 
be sure, Milošević’s stranglehold over the television and radio media was much 
stronger compared to the print media, though the information flow in the papers 
was far from free. Protest and dissent, too, were difficult given the heavy police 
presence in Serbia – a “one policemen per every seventh individual” ratio by 
1993.55 Besides, the internationally imposed sanctions increased the power of the 
regime. Susan Woodward said it best when she explained:
But the imposition of economic sanctions against Serbia, beginning with the 
EC and the United States in November 1991 and then the UN (Security Coun-
cil Resolution 757) on May 30, 1992, worked to restore (his) [Milošević’s] 
control by cutting alternative sources of information and communication 
with the outside world and making subscriptions to print media prohibitively 
expensive. The sanctions also prevented his opposition from obtaining the 
foreign financial support and imported equipment (such as a transmitter with 
enough power to beam the one truly independent television station, Studio B, 
beyond Belgrade) that was necessary to compete with Milošević’s domestic 
control through police and customs officials.56
Due to this virtual and literal isolation of the Serbian population within Serbia 
proper, it is not only necessary to deconstruct the overarching narrative of a 
purportedly homogenous Serbian nation-state during the war years; it is vital to 
reconstruct a version of a ‘reality’ that governed this state between 1991 and 1995.
To reconstruct a version of events as they transpired between 1991 and 1995, 
I viewed the daily Večernje Novosti newspaper issues at the National Library in 
Belgrade, Serbia, that were published between 1993 and 1995. In a first viewing, 
I selected articles pertaining to šverc in all its forms, including the various buvl-
jaci, the black-market currency exchange, and topics connected to the establish-
ment of fri šopovi (a version of duty-free shops set up in the wake of international 
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sanctions). Building on my interviews and casual conversations with locals in 
Novi Pazar, I also selected articles that portrayed the financial insecurity as well 
as the loss of safety as seen through the increasingly habitual crime and violence 
that transpired on the streets of Serbia.
The Večernje Novosti newspaper is an ideal daily paper by which to reconstruct 
a version of the reality as it existed in Serbia between 1991 and 1995. Večernje 
Novosti served governing forces to shape the nationalizing discourse during the 
1990s, and it continues to do so at present.57 Večerne Novosti was, at the same 
time, less overtly political compared to Politika, seeing that Večerne Novosti 
included gossip sections, nude pictures, and the television guide, for instance. 
Večerne Novosti may, in other words, be characterized as a tabloid, and thus it 
reached a broader audience.
Following Ruth Wodak, I analyzed the newspaper articles through the lens of 
a discourse historical approach (DHA). As such, I am not examining the Večerne 
Novosti articles as a ‘linguistic unit’. Instead, to put it in Wodak’s words, I 
“study(ing) social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a 
multidisciplinary and multi-methodological approach.”58 I thus view the paper as 
an additional tool by which to understand how the public discourse as generated 
and shaped by the government in turn shaped the social practice of citizens in 
Serbia.
Structure
Novi Pazar lends itself as a geographic location from which to study transnational 
practices because doing so allows for the examination of relations across time 
and space. Not only was Novi Pazar an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, but 
the town also served as a transitory space for migrants who left alongside the 
retreating empire and again for goods in the 1990s. During interviews and casual 
conversations, locals often referred to their history as integral to their economic 
and to an extent social persistence during the 1990s and beyond. The practice of 
transnational trade relations in Novi Pazar illustrates this community’s physically 
entrenched (in-state) experience in this mafia-like state structure that engulfed all 
areas of the Serbian state. Transnational šverc practices simultaneously produced 
an alternative connotation for the local population – one in which Bosniaks invig-
orated communal bonds with Turkey by way of material encounters. Performa-
tive acts illustrate how locals view the present in terms of the past. The 1990s 
thus serve as an emotive bridge that connects local Novo Pazarci with the three 
protracted migratory waves that left Southeastern Europe since the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire.
My approach toward the question of how social relations changed in Novi Pazar 
during the Yugoslav Succession Wars is characterized by the assumption that the 
Bosniak diaspora in Turkey supported local Bosniaks in Novi Pazar during the 
international sanctions regime on Serbia between 1991 and 1995. Because infor-
mal trading practices materialized by way of cross-border trade between Turkey 
and Serbia, I apply the philosophical underpinnings of practice to the theoretical 
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frame of transnationalism to analyze how locals experienced the international 
sanctions on an everyday basis. The informal market itself serves as an interpre-
tive tool that carries the narratives of locals and their experience with transna-
tional diaspora-come-trade practices.
In what follows, I address in three parts the overarching question of how mate-
rial encounters influence social relations in detached spaces. Part I introduces the 
reader to a historical context as well as philosophical and theoretical considera-
tions that underpin this book. Parts II and III are based on empirical data, and each 
part is further divided into two chapters.
In Part II, I examine the catalysts that induced anticipatory properties in the 
Bosniak community in Novi Pazar to analyze how locals narrate the past. The 
question of how informants identify with the past must be examined to gauge if 
and how material encounters carry anticipatory properties concerning the mani-
festation of transnational figurations. This part of the book is based on mnemon-
ics, as I identify the medium through which locals remember the past to explore 
how autobiographical narratives differ from historic ones. What are the vehicles 
by which interlocutors transmit memory in Novi Pazar? Does the town of Novi 
Pazar serve as a mnemonic nucleus, and to what extent is family the primary 
carrier of memory? Important in this segment are characteristics by which locals 
collapse the time-space continuum when narrating the past.
In Part III, I move away from the mnemonic functions to explore the practice 
of šverc. In Chapter 4, I reconstruct the socioeconomic and political ambience 
that prevailed in Serbia as presented by Večerne Novosti to ‘recontextualize’ the 
narratives told by locals in Novi Pazar. In Chapter 5, I demonstrate the inherent 
ambiguity of šverc as both a legitimate and inappropriate practice. Locals sanc-
tioned šverc as legitimate by way of narrating the past as a symbolic anchor while 
simultaneously deeming šverc inappropriate due to the connecting of informal 
practices with the Milošević regime. By probing into the actual practice of smug-
gling goods, I filter out how the practice of šverc cut(s) across ethnic, religious, 
and political boundaries. I end this segment with a discussion on anomie.
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1  Narrating history through 
the prism of šverc
According to the 2011 census data, there are 100,410 residents in the municipality 
of Novi Pazar, illustrated in Figure 1.1, of which 77,443 (77.2 percent) identify 
as Bosniak (or 81,545 if those who identify as Muslim are included; 81.2 per-
cent), 566 identify as Roma (0.5 percent), and 16,234 as Serbian (16.2 percent).1 
This corresponds roughly with the questionnaire data as illustrated in Figures 0.3 
and 0.4. Official unemployment numbers in Serbia hover around 11 percent, and 
youth unemployment accounts for 29.1 percent.2 However, during my time in the 
field, I learned that these numbers are inaccurate. According to casual conversa-
tions and unofficial documents retrieved from the local employment agency, the 
unemployment numbers are lower. A number of locals work in unrecorded occu-
pations, including personal care services, the housing and rental sector, and at the 
local market. Due to the international sanctions regime, informal employment 
and the market grew exponentially during the first half of the 1990s, when Novi 
Pazar was a hub of smuggling activities. Novi Pazar, as an urban center, served 
as a thoroughfare for goods and attracted shoppers, traders, and workers from 
nearby villages as well as the greater area around Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, 
and Montenegro.
Due to the busy market activities, residents of Novi Pazar had at once a com-
monplace and yet distinct experience of the 1990s war years compared to other 
citizens of Serbia and those Bosniak and/or Muslim citizens who lived through the 
siege in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Like other citizens of Serbia, residents of 
Novi Pazar endured the internationally imposed sanctions. Living within Serbian 
state borders, however, spared this population from the hardship that Bosniaks of 
BiH experienced. And yet, locals in Novi Pazar became benefactors of Turkish 
charity and development projects during the conflict and after the Yugoslav Suc-
cession Wars ended, as was the case with citizens of Bosnia. This unique in- and 
out-of-state experience of the local community in Novi Pazar is at the core of this 
book. Smuggling – or šverc, as the practice is known locally – illustrates this in- 
and out-of-state experience. Because the informal market connects Novi Pazar to 
Bosnia, Turkey, and also to Serbia proper, I examine how informal transnational 
practices between 1991 and 1995 shaped these communities’ collective sense of 
belonging and social relations locally following the Yugoslav Succession Wars.
30 Part I
Cultivating belonging across time and space
Though Montenegro split from Serbia in 2006, locals refer to their region as the 
Sandžak – an Ottoman-Turkish language loanword that translates into ‘banner’. 
For the duration of the Ottoman Empire, the term ‘Sandžak’ denoted an admin-
istrative district that symbolizes a common foundation among local Bosniaks 
today. The region is, in other words, not a legal entity but rather a mental map 


















Figure 1.1 Sandžak region including municipalities
Source: Map created by Lyubomyr Olinyk, siteGist.com.
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population.3 “While it was referred to as Raška within the medieval empire, as it 
is by Serbs even today,” according to Kenneth Morrison and Elizabeth Roberts, 
“the region became known as Sandžak (or Sanjak of Novi Pazar) only during the 
latter part of the nineteenth century as the Ottoman Empire’s authority over the 
Balkans began to erode.”4 At present, many locals identify as Sandžaklije (i.e., as 
inhabitants of the Sandžak region).
Novi Pazar, once a far-reaching merchant town, connected locals (especially 
merchants) with the Porte – also known as the Ottoman High Porte or the cen-
tral government of the Ottoman Empire – as well as Florence. With the inclu-
sion of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina into the former Ottoman Empire in 
1463, Ottoman trade routes expanded to Italy. Thenceforth, the seaport in Ragusa 
gained increasing prominence as a connecting hub between the Ottoman realm 
and beyond. Because merchants transported valuable goods such as silks, Chi-
nese porcelain, spices, European wool, drugs, and textiles as well as gold and 
silver coins, Ottoman officials maintained a strict security regime along these 
trade routes.5 To be sure, robberies did occur. Halil Inalcik, reflecting on Gertrude 
Richards,6 relates an episode of stolen silk wear near Foça in present-day Bosnia. 
Ottoman officials apparently arrested the thief, recaptured the remnant silks, and 
forced locals to atone for the difference.7 Inalcik’s reflection on Richards illus-
trates that merchants traveled under the protection of Ottoman officials.
Towns along these routes, too, acquiesced relevance as places where travelers 
could rest in caravanserais, feed their horses, and/or pray at local mosques. These 
towns, unsurprisingly perhaps, turned into “typical Ottoman cites,” as stated by 
Inalcik. Novibazar – or Novi Pazar as the city is called today – was along this 
route. Morrison and Roberts affirm: “the Sandžak became part of the paşalık of 
Bosnia, and one of the key Balkan trading centres; a land bridge linking Otto-
man lands”8 with the present-day Western Balkans. In Inalcik’s words, “as trade 
with Florence expanded, the route between Ragusa and Bursa or Istanbul, through 
Foça, Novibazar, Edirne, and thence to Istanbul, or Bursa by way of Gallipoli, 
gradually gained importance.”9 Locals know this and repeatedly emphasized Novi 
Pazar’s character as a historic merchant town during casual conversations and 
interviews.
Ottoman officials did not eradicate pre-existing cultural traditions on the pen-
insula. Instead, the Sublime Porte adopted cultural and religious aspects and 
incorporated them into the overarching social fabric. Mark Mazower sets forth, 
however, “the truth is that while for many centuries coexistence was undoubt-
edly more accepted under the Ottomans than almost anywhere in Christendom, 
there was certainly no sense of equality.”10 One must therefore acknowledge the 
existence of socioeconomic inequalities between Muslim and non-Muslim sub-
jects. Non-Muslims held a second-class status throughout the empire. Accord-
ing to Mazower, non-Muslims were taxed for the assumed opting out of military 
services, disallowed to ride horses, or wear the color green, while authorities at 
court valued testimony of a non-Muslim less compared to that of a Muslim.11 Con-
flicts were thus not of ethnic or theistic nature but had perhaps more to do with 
socioeconomic grievances. These rules, moreover, were not intractable. Inalcik 
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suggested that rigid conditions prevailed when the sultan “sought to fulfill the 
provisions of the Şeriat” (Islamic law).12 The full enforcement of such decrees 
was, in other words, likely not effective at all times and did not correspond with 
the everyday socioeconomic situation on the ground.13 As such, Muslims and non-
Muslims often belonged to the same class, says Inalcik, while “Jewish, Greek 
and Armenian merchant(s) dressed and acted like Muslims.”14 The distinction 
between Muslims and non-Muslims then, while undoubtedly existent, was prone 
to be more fluid as opposed to acutely present.
Seen from this perspective, various reasons contributed to the local popula-
tions’ embrace of the Mohammedan faith, including upward social mobility. 
Conversion, however, took place gradually and in a nonviolent fashion.15 Inalcik 
explains this process by stating that local Vlach knezovi (local Slavic noblemen) 
were able to retain their baštine – land they could levy taxes on (not private land) – 
and enjoyed the same privileges as Muslims did.16 Some noblemen, according to 
Inalcik, retained their religious conviction while their sons adopted Islam. Nenad 
Maočanin found that some of these noblemen embraced the faith later to thereby 
increase the plot of land they could levy taxes on, thus officially becoming sipahis 
(landholders, cavalry men).17 Mazower further asserts that “Greek and Serbian 
notable families converted to Islam to enjoy upward social mobility; a few, for 
a time, held on to their estates without converting.”18 Either way, conversions to 
Islam were not carried out forcefully, though connections with and adaptation to 
the dominant Ottoman power structure led to greater economic security.
In explaining general conversation mechanisms, Salim Ćerić, too, found that 
locals were influenced by the ruling regime, “as is the case in all class-systems.”19 
Some were impressed by the power of the feudal forces and convinced of Otto-
man longevity in the region. Banac echoes this notion and stated, “the progress 
of Islam in Bosnia and the notion – encouraged by the Bosnians themselves – of 
being the vaumure of the Ottoman fortress assured this region a special status in 
the Ottoman state.”20 Others, especially traders who held a privileged position, 
adopted Islam to elicit the liberty of traveling safely and to obtain and sell goods 
freely across the Ottoman Empire. Merchants, like craftsmen and servants, for 
instance, were tied to the feudal class as the primary consumers of material goods 
at the time. It was in part the acquired privilege, argued Ćerić, that tied these 
people to the Porte.21
Overall, Ćerić presents his reader with a historiographic interpretation of BiH 
within the Ottoman Empire from a socialist perspective. This is most obvious 
in his choice of words, and his repeated description of the Ottoman Empire as a 
feudalni klasni sistem (a feudal class system). And yet, it is interesting to point 
toward the resembling debate between Ćerić and Nina Glick-Schiller here. Like 
Glick-Schiller,22 who analyzed social agents within a ‘dialectics of place concept’, 
so too does Ćerić – implicitly – who considered how respective classes related to 
the ruling Ottoman regime within the capacity of their profession:
It is certain that the governing system was of military nature, though the 
Turkish army certainly came in tandem with a team of civilian officials and 
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servants. All their suits as well as the pottery, carpets and the like, might 
have initially been ordered from the homeland, but soon the material needs 
of officers and other state officials demanded these goods be produced on 
the spot. Transport routes were long and the communication along these 
routes was poor. Underdeveloped domestic craftsmanship and weak links 
with the West meant that goods were purchased in the East. Conquerors, 
who came with their specific cultural traditions, were considered supe-
rior, and had no reason to assume Christian customs, manner of dress, 
food, and housing. It should be added that the local people, who embraced 
Islam, automatically assimilated to the customs enacted by the conqueror, 
to prove their sincere acceptance of the new faith, and all attributes of the 
new ideology.23
Ćerić, in continuance of his argument, maintains that these customs were not 
exclusive to the Muslim population. Instead, Christians, too, adopted Ottoman 
manners of speech, diet, style of clothing, and means of housing.24 As such, one 
might argue that Ćerić articulates a version of the networked nature between the 
Porte, their officials, and traders who sustained representatives with goods that 
ultimately influenced the everyday lives of local communities.
During this time, cultural influences traveled from Central Asia and Turkey to 
the Balkans, though ideas and folk customs certainly also traveled the other way, 
not least because of the Janissary Corps – the Ottoman Empire’s elite guard – that 
comprised a sizable Slavic population with an equally sizable number of women 
that resided in the sultan’s harem. While local non-Muslims often portray the 
devşirme, or so-called blood-tax, for instance, as cruel and damaging to the Slavic 
population, Inalcik found that “although some families especially in poor, moun-
tain districts, gave their children of their own accord, sources indicate that people 
usually sought to avoid the devşirme.”25 Considering that one received an educa-
tion in the capital, which included the possibility to rise through the Ottoman 
Empire’s ranks, Inalcik’s argument illustrates that Slavs were not simply ‘under 
the yoke’ of the Porte. Instead, Inalcik demonstrates that Slavs possessed agency 
and were able to become participants in the empire’s bureaucratic apparatus. This 
is significant, because one comes to understand that ‘ethnic’ identification did not 
factor in during the Ottoman Empire’s existence. Perhaps Mazower said it best 
when he stated, “if there was no ethnic conflict, it was not because of tolerance 
but because there was no concept of nationality among the Sultan’s subjects, and 
because Christianity stressed the ‘community of believers’ rather than ethnic soli-
darity.”26 Inalcik’s reflection on the devşirme further indicates that the Ottoman 
Empire’s culture was considered a Leitkultur of which one aspired to become a 
member, as previously indicated by Ćerić. Slavs thus emulated the ways of dress-
ing, speech, and various Ottoman traits because doing so reflected an individual’s 
socialization processes.
With the onset of the declining Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, traders 
who were tied to the Porte lost their privileged position gradually and were super-
seded by the Orthodox merchants.
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The Orthodox merchant class rose to prominence in the 19th century, as doc-
umented by Traian Stojanović.27 Espoused to the advancing Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, Orthodox merchants passed through five successive stages of profes-
sional affiliation before reaching the stage of politician, magnate, or intellectual, 
according to Stojanović. Aspiring statesmen often started as muleteers, peddlers, 
or sailors that practiced brigandage or piracy on the side during that first stage. 
When they moved up the social ladder, they evolved into commission agents or 
forwarders with moneylending on the side in a second stage. Next, they became 
merchants in a third step before moving into the business of banking. Merchants, 
according to Stojanović, often held political office on the side, in a fifth step, 
before assuming the position of statesmen, at which point most of them continued 
the practice of holding businesses.28
Toward the close of the 17th century, Orthodox merchants fell largely into 
the first two categories, while many remained in the third, fourth, and even fifth 
bracket in the 18th century.29 Merchants were, significantly, among the few peo-
ple who could read and write, beside teachers and several priests. They collected 
political experiences and ideas in Austro-Hungary and then related these ideas to 
the local population, as argued by Stojanović. Merchant activities were  initially 
limited to subsidizing Orthodox Churches and schools. Soon, however,  merchants 
emerged as carriers of a distinct Serbian national movement.30 The  Serbian 
 Orthodox church thus rose to power in tandem with the Orthodox merchant- 
cum- political/intellectual entrepreneur class sometime in the 19th century.
This new merchant class was, however, not ethnically and/or theistically uni-
form. In describing the town of Novi Pazar at an unspecified time between 1911 
and 1941, Miodrag Radović depicts the dućan (store) of one Samuel Konforti, 
whom locals called Sumbuliko.31 Konforti, according to one online source,32 
belonged to an influential Jewish family with relatives in present-day Bulgaria, 
BiH, Italy, and Turkey, and owned a store in downtown Novi Pazar that served as 
what one might contemporarily call a mjenjačnica (exchange office). Exchanging 
gold, first Turkish lira (1923–2005), silver, and other valuables, Konforti main-
tained connections with traders in Thessaloniki in present-day Greece and issued 
checks to merchants who traveled there in pursuit of trading goods and/or live-
stock. Upon returning from their business trips to Novi Pazar, traders collected 
their valuables from Konforti who soon turned into a local magnate after combin-
ing his exchange business with that of selling foodstuffs. Radović, reflecting on 
Omar Efendi’s memoires, believed Konforti paid some 50 assistants to buy live-
stock from surrounding villagers in support of his business. Konforti was alleg-
edly an extraordinarily successful entrepreneur who grew his commercial power 
after the agrarian land reform of 1918.
With the proclamation of the land reform, land grants passed to those individu-
als who tilled the fields. In the process, çiftliks (landowners) lost their livelihood, 
and were forced to pawn their possessions, which frequently consisted of gold 
jewelry. “An absolute majority,” according to Radović, pawned these valuables at 
Sumbuliko’s store; Sumbiliko grew wealthier in the process.33 Most of the indi-
viduals that were forced to forfeit their land, meanwhile, were unable to retrieve 
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their valuables from him thereafter. Though Radović’s reflections on Sumbuliko 
end here, one learns from the aforementioned online source that Sumbuliko died 
prior to WWII. His family members, save his daughter Sarina and her daughters, 
perished in the Holocaust.34
Besides illustrating the transnational character of Novi Pazar as a far-reaching 
merchant town, the preceding episode further exemplifies that merchants were 
connected to specific regimes in some way. Čerić highlighted, for instance, 
that merchants sought to increase and maintain the purchasing power of their 
respective ‘commercial bourgeoisie’ – their customers – even by political means. 
Merchants were thus variously tied to the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman 
Empire.
A number of related incidents led to the rise of the Orthodox merchants, includ-
ing domestic political decay in the Ottoman Empire, imperial overstretch, con-
flicts with Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, respectively, and a series of 
economically crippling concessions that led to the decline and final collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire in 1918.35 Within this context, the Porte capitulated to the 
Serbian twin demands of economic and national(ist) emancipation by decreeing 
the two Hatišerifs of 1830 and 1833 during the Tanzimat period. Ljubinka Ćirić-
Bogetić and Miroslav Djordjević explained that Serbs were now free to define 
their borders and internal affairs:36 “Serbs, Turks, and foreign subjects” were now 
able to trade without restrictions.37 Ćirić-Bogetić and Djordjević’s words are par-
ticularly noteworthy in this context as they state: “posebne odredbe odnose se 
na slobodu trgovine Srba, Turaka i stranih podanika.”38 Both Serbs and Turkish 
people were, according to Ćirić-Bogetić and Djordjević, considered local because 
the authors differentiate between Serbs and Turks on the one hand and foreign-
ers on the other. And yet, between the decree and subsequent autonomy in 1878, 
Orthodox subjects secured the right to own land, while Muslims and/or Turks 
were forced to move either into the city or away.
Nationalization and migration processes: a shrinking world 
for the Muslim population of Novi Pazar
With the preceding historical sketch in mind, the Tanzimat period not only 
brought about the socioeconomic emancipation of the Serbian nation and/or those 
individuals who identified as Orthodox but also heralded the expulsion and/or 
forced emigration of the Muslim and/or Turkish population from the Balkans, 
specifically from present-day Serbia. It is instructive, however, to point toward the 
initially fledgling and/or potentially absent sense of national identification among 
the Orthodox population here. Ćirić-Bogetić and Djordjević cite Jevrem Gruić, 
who described the Serbian population of the 19th century as
a bare agent who can belong to one entity, and to yet another at any given 
time. . . . Our nation has no will of its own, but not because he is una-
ble. . . . For internal liberation to take place, our people must understand 
who they are as a nation, the kind of rights this nation should have, why, 
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and given by whom, [our people] must know their borders; It means telling 
people what it means for a nation to live in a state, and to invite people to 
live as such.39
Gruić describes an essentially inexistent Serbian national consciousness that 
yet had to be instilled from above – from the top down. As such, economic 
disputes might have contributed to the social unrest in the region as opposed 
to sheer ‘ethnic hatred’. In this context, retaliations against Muslims in the 
wake of the First and Second Balkan Wars and thereafter may be interpreted as 
a rivalry among classes. Though the ensuing violence accompanying the two 
Balkan and two World Wars is too extensive to cover in this book,40 it is imper-
ative to understand that the Muslim population was driven to leave Southeast-
ern Europe for Turkey by violence and fear – fear that was compounded by 
their loss of land.
Following the first Serbian uprising, according to Ćirić-Bogetić and Djordjević, 
Turkish and Muslim-Slavic families were stipulated to leave Serbia within five 
years following the ratification of the Hatišerifs in 1830 and 1833, and made to 
yield their rights to property.41 Šaban Hodžić states that Muslims moved and/or 
fled to those territories that were yet considered Ottoman protectorates, includ-
ing the Sandžak of Novi Pazar.42 Homogenization processes were thus underway 
before the Austro-Hungarian occupation of BiH in 1878, though they sped up 
markedly after the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin.
Safet Bandžović provides his readers with vivid picture of the nationaliza-
tion processes during the late 19th century. Reflecting on Slobodan Jovanović,43 
Bandžović relates a discussion about the strategic location of the Novopazar-
ski Sandžak that separated Serbia from Montenegro prior to the signing of the 
San Stefano treaty: “the Russians initially pressured Serbia to grant Niš to Bul-
garia; the Serbs, in turn, would get Novi Pazar from where they would expel 
the Turks, if they refused to leave on their own.”44 The Sandžak was not only 
strategically important as regarded the unification of Montenegro and Serbia as 
well as Serbian access to warm-water ports, but it also served as a migratory 
corridor to and through which Muslim Slavs and/or Turks traveled during the 
protracted collapse of the Ottoman Empire. According to Vladan Jovanović, 
following the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1878 and subsequent annexa-
tion of BiH in 1909, the number of Muslim inhabitants in the Novo Pazarian 
Sandžak rose from 45 to 60 percent.45 Bandžović illustrates this inherent fluidity 
of borders and population movement between 1876 and 1919, all the way up to 
WWI and beyond.46
The Sandžak region became a center for immigration as well as a place of 
transit from which Muslims immigrated to Turkey. Migrants – or muhadžiri, as 
they are called locally – migrated through Novi Pazar and on to present-day Mac-
edonia, Albania, and Turkey. Novi Pazar thus developed into an ephemeral space 
for the out-migrating group yet localized the membership for those who stayed 
behind. These families became the ‘vehicle by which locals remember’47 and/or 
engage with the past.
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Diaspora as a “category of practice”:48 a precondition for the 
creation of transnational trade practices
Though in-depth research about migration and diaspora mechanisms far exceeds 
the limit of the present book, the very concept of transnational diaspora practices 
necessitates a clarification in terms. Building on Rogers Brubaker’s three catego-
ries of dispersion, homeland orientation, and boundary maintenance, I conceptu-
alize diaspora and migrant experiences as a category of practice.
Brubaker’s first criterion regards dispersion. Bosniaks who relocated to Turkey 
were not strictly forced, though they were dispersed traumatically across space 
and time. The first migratory wave of Bosniaks leaving Southeastern Europe 
for Turkey followed Austro-Hungarian occupation and the subsequent collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire after 1876/78. A combination of factors drove the first 
wave of outmigration, including the introduction of compulsory military duty on 
the side of the Habsburgs. Austria-Hungary subordinated formerly autonomous 
properties, including vakifs (religious endowments), to the imperial bureaucracy 
and abolished the timariot (‘feudal’ Ottoman land laws). Austria-Hungary finally 
transmogrified the Bosnian system from a subsistence into a monetary economy, 
which impoverished previously landowning beys.
Based on the preceding first criterion, the Bosniak community of Novi Pazar, 
too, falls within the category of diaspora since this community was severed from 
Bosnia proper by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and subsequently KSHS/SFRY. 
As such, Novi Pazar indeed consists of a “settled population . . . that lives as a 
minority outside its ethnonational homeland,”49 which is Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. This situation became tangible again during the Yugoslav Succession Wars.
The largest wave of Muslims left Southeastern Europe following WWII.50 
Though Turkey and Yugoslavia had by now signed the Turkish-Yugoslav con-
vention in 1938 and arranged further population exchanges in the form of the 
so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement in 1953, Edvin Pezo states that it was Turkey’s 
open-door policy that facilitated emigration from Yugoslavia and immigration 
to Turkey, respectively. Turkey’s Settlement Law 2510, according to Pezo, was 
especially instrumental regarding this open-door policy, seeing that this law facili-
tated the emigration of Muslim Slavs to Turkey, provided they spoke the Turkish 
language or else ascribed to republican values. Bosniaks, Torbeši, and Pomaks 
were particularly welcome in Turkey as these groups were thought to assimi-
late to Turkish values and norms with ease.51 Jovanović adds another reason for 
the large-scale emigration to Turkey, namely that of an information campaign 
by which authorities promised ‘rich prospects’ upon moving to Turkey.52 Though 
documentary proof of the Gentleman’s Agreement is missing,53 academics gener-
ally agree that Muslim Slavs were ‘free’ to leave Yugoslavia upon giving up their 
citizenship.54 The agreement further allowed for, or rather stipulated, that Muslim 
Slavs could leave for reasons of family reunification in the Turkish republic.
Brubaker reflects on William Safran in considering his second point on ‘home-
land orientation’.55 According to Safran, diasporas ought to (1) “maintain(ing) a 
collective memory or myth about the homeland”; (2) “regard(ing) the ancestral 
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homeland as the true, ideal home, and as the place to which one . . . will eventually 
return home to”; (3) be “collectively ‘committed to the maintenance or restora-
tion of the homeland and to its safety and prosperity’ ”; and (4) “ ‘continu[ing] 
to relate, personally or vicariously’, to the homeland, in a way that significantly 
shapes one’s identity and solidarity.”56 Brubaker and Safran’s insightful analyses 
force us to differentiate between successive migratory waves and one’s resulting 
identification with the new and/or old homeland, respectively.
The first and second migratory waves differ from the third in that emigrants 
of the former migrated to a state in the making. One might argue they became 
citizens of Turkey in the process because they helped to build the Turkish 
Republic. Though individuals were surely aware of their confessional, gender, 
and class belonging and so forth, the national experience was not as mature 
compared to the national label attached to emigrants of the third wave. Émi-
grés, to be sure, presumably harbored sentimental attachments to their ances-
tral homeland. And yet, these people generally relocated to Turkey for good. 
Reasons for the finality of this move were of a structural and personal nature, 
as interviewees in Novi Pazar and Sarajevo explained. Structural conditions 
included a non-return stipulation on the part of Turkey that left people stranded 
on both sides of the border from where they decided to leave, for instance.57 
Individuals were also left without property rights upon leaving their place of 
origin. Both interlocutors as well as archival research at the Arhiv Jugoslavije in 
Belgrade confirmed this information. One interviewee, for instance, explained 
she had not seen or spoken to her sister in 30 years after she left Novi Pazar for 
Turkey in the late 1930s. “She was unable to return,” the elderly lady explained, 
“because they constantly closed the borders. She did not want to be stuck some-
where in between.”58
Structural conditions hampered family reunification efforts following the 
1934 ‘law of last names’. Reflecting on a paper written by Meltem Türköz,59 
Esra Özyürek stated, “Republican officials were actively involved in the naming 
process when emigrants arrived in Turkey. They vetoed many names on the basis 
that they were not Turkish or appropriate last names, and they simply recorded 
other names in their books.”60 As a result, Bosniaks of Southeastern Europe might 
have been unable to locate family members who emigrated from the constituting 
monarchy to Turkey during the first and second waves and vice versa.
Maintaining personal relations with family members who left for Turkey was 
thus complicated, and this continues to shape transnational relations into the 
present. Amer, a young interlocutor from Turkey, investigated the origins of his 
family in Novi Pazar and Macedonia, for instance, without knowing their last 
names or exact location of their erstwhile residence. He nevertheless kept up 
the search, hoping to reunite with his lost family in Southeastern Europe. He 
explained:
My grandparents’ names were changed when they migrated to Turkey in the 
1930. When I came here the first time, I could not reconnect, but I brought 
home some soil because my mother wanted to put it on her mom’s grave.61
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Significant is, however, that Amer does not speak Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian/Mon-
tenegrin. The same is true for Leijla’s descendants who visited her in Novi Pazar 
after the Yugoslav Succession Wars had ended. Leijla and her nuclear family 
members, meanwhile, do not speak Turkish even though her son-in-law smuggled 
goods from Turkey to Southeastern Europe during the Yugoslav Succession Wars.
Though the Turkish nation-building process lasted well into the 1960s, individ-
uals who joined the third wave may not have perceived themselves as immigrants. 
And yet, the third migratory wave might come closest to our current understand-
ing of the term ‘immigrant’, as these people moved to a foreign, established state. 
This group, perhaps consequently, maintained a stronger link to those Bosniaks 
of the ‘homeland’. Lejla Voloder, for instance, explains the Turkish population 
perceived Muslim Slavs as Bosniaks, not as co-Turks when they arrived in the 
Republic.62 Muslims who left Yugoslavia behind as Turks in the third and last 
wave thus arrived in Turkey as Bosniaks.
Thomas Schad offers valuable insight on this point. He cites the Bayrampaşa gov-
ernors’ website to illustrate the integral character of the Bosniak-Turkish commu-
nity in this district63 that houses “immigrants from the Balkans, and their valued(ing) 
(of) family networks, (have) that contributed to the development of Bayrampaşa 
as one of Istanbul’s most beautiful cities.”64 Significantly, the Bayrampaşa district 
is home to the Bosna Sancak Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (Bosnia Sandžak 
Culture and Solidarity Association) that opened in 1989. Further down, Schad ana-
lyzes an autobiographical novel written by Bekir Bayraktar.65 The author grew up 
in Rožaje on the Montenegrin side of the Sandžak territory and migrated to Turkey 
in 1968. Bayraktar may thus be considered an ideal type that characterizes the third 
migratory wave, a notion that is compounded by the fact that he wrote his text in 
Bosnian. His audience was in Southeastern Europe, and perhaps also Bosniaks in 
Turkey who share Bayraktar’s experience. In other words, he retained an emotive 
connection to the territory of Sandžak and his language, unlike those migrants who 
had come to Turkey with the first and second migratory waves. Bayraktar had not 
emigrated to a state in the making but had arrived in Turkey as a Bosniak.
Hometown associations in Turkey add further critical insight on the question 
of diaspora groups and migrants that act as agents of transnational practices. It is 
interesting to note that the Bosna Sancak Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği opened 
as late as 1989 because it coincides directly with the initial collapse of SFRY. 
The Yugoslav Succession Wars were indeed a catalyst by which émigrés related 
personally with the homeland to the extent that this identification shaped their 
solidarity with Muslims of Southeastern Europe – a place their ancestors had 
migrated from. Reflecting on Jeanne Hersant and Alexandre Toumarkine, Bulut 
also identifies the conflicts as “a factor of communal mobilization . . . with long 
established migrants at the forefront of the mobilization.”66 Yet, early émigrés 
identify decidedly as citizens of Turkey and not as Bosniaks, as illustrated by the 
following announcement of the Bosnia-Sandžak Foundations and Associations:
FROM THE BOSNIA-SANDZAK FOUNDATIONS AND ASSOCIA-
TIONS TO THE GREAT TURKISH NATION. We see that when TRT was 
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making a decision to broadcast in different languages, Bosnian was included 
among these languages. This decision and practice was a surprise for us. We 
are a community that have mixed like ‘SKIN AND NAIL’ for centuries with 
all the people of the Turkish Republic, the greatest legacy left to us by the 
Great Leader ATATURK. We support with all our heart the spirit and under-
standing of ATATURK’S expression “HOW HAPPY IS HE WHO CALLS 
HIMSELF A TURK” and carry our TURKISH identity with pride [original 
emphasis].67
Safran’s fourth point seems thus confirmed, though only partially. The local dias-
pora community evidently relates personally with the homeland to the extent that 
the Yugoslav Succession Wars shaped their solidarity significantly. Émigrés, how-
ever, no longer identify as Bosniaks, as illustrated earlier, but as integral citizens 
of the Turkish Republic.
With the preceding examples in mind, one may confirm the existence of a 
collective memory maintenance, as suggested by Safran. The Yugoslav Succes-
sion Wars clearly serve as a crucial point of rupture here, because the family unit 
served as the primary vehicle that harbored these memories in this initial phase. 
With the outbreak of the war, the practice of collective memory maintenance 
moved into the public sphere of Bosnia-Sandžak hometown associations. Safran’s 
second point is more difficult to confirm, though one might point to the structural 
difficulties that prevented people from returning to Southeastern Europe even if 
they wanted to. Time is a crucial factor here, as individuals, including Amer’s 
family and Leijla’s relatives, became settled in their new ‘homeland’. The desire 
to return may have shifted further into the distance and made way for Safran’s 
third and fourth point, namely, a collective commitment for the maintenance and 
restoration of a distant homeland.
Brubaker’s third and final criterion involves the question of boundary main-
tenance that involves “the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis a host 
society.”68 To be sure, Bosniak émigrés often settled in the Istanbulite mahalles 
(city districts) of Pendik and Bayrampaşa. Bosniaks also initiated the construction 
of hometown associations and collected aid for Bosnia. Yet, these people did not 
wish to be instrumentalized, as illustrated in the preceding quote. Instead, they 
demonstrated their identification with the Turkish state. And yet, Bosniak émi-
grés are dispersed across time and space since the border of the Ottoman Empire 
moved beyond the territories they currently inhabit.
Locals in Novi Pazar are twice removed: once from BiH and once from the 
former Ottoman Empire and present-day Turkey. There was, however, no collec-
tive desire to return to the homeland or any vigorous homeland orientation that 
altered and/or influenced the collective identification mechanisms of this émigré 
group. While attitudes shifted to active commemoration of the ‘homeland’ since 
the 1990s, this group does not collectively aspire repatriation to one of the former 
Yugoslav republics or to Bosnia specifically. I thus agree with and build on Bru-
baker, who argues for a “category of practice” instead of defining émigré groups 
as bounded entities.69
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Categories of practice allow for a diachronic analysis of transnationalism with-
out assuming that post-Ottoman communities share one unified culture. Joseph 
Rouse states:
Instead of positing such a unified conception of culture, practice theories 
recognize the co-existence of alternative practices within the same cultural 
milieu, differing conceptions of or perspectives on the same practices, and 
ongoing contestation and struggle over the maintenance and reproduction of 
cultural norms. . . . Instead of treating cultural interaction as a matter of trans-
lation between whole cultural systems, practice theorists can recognize more 
localized practices and meanings that function within each of the interacting 
fields of cultural practice.70
Rouse’s argument about disparate cultural milieus is imperative here for the very 
understanding of the diachronic narrative structure presented in this book. The 
practice of šverc reveals ongoing contestations over the maintenance of cultural 
values among Bosniak citizens. It is thus commonplace to learn about šverc as 
a pragmatic practice that subsided with the end of the sanctions. Sanja Kljajić, 
for instance, declared the “talk of brotherly relations” between the Turkish émi-
gré population and local Bosniaks a myth.71 Others argue that švercerci of all 
backgrounds embraced Milošević because traders got rich in the process. Again, 
others emphasize the personal links that connect Bosniaks of Novi Pazar with the 
diaspora community in Turkey. It is this very emphasis on the “dynamics of social 
structures and their governance or constraint of individual actions [that] gives a 
strongly historical dimension to” the present examination of šverc in Novi Pazar.72
Diaspora connections and neo-Ottomanism: a Turkish 
perspective
Every successful narrative necessitates a responsive sender and receiver. Trans-
national relations between émigrés and local Bosniaks, in other words, did not 
transpire in a vacuum but fell on fertile ground in Turkey. At the inception of this 
project in 2012, the Zero Problems with Neighbors policy served as a focal point 
for the analysis of Balkan-Turkish connections, transnational and otherwise. Prof. 
Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s former minister of foreign affairs, developed this 
strategy in response to cope with and influence regional political developments 
following the seismic shifts of the post–Cold War era. Turkey was, according to 
Davutoğlu, not simply a bridge between East and West but central, based on its 
historical heritage.73 Interlocutors gravitated toward this heritage and never tired 
of emphasizing their historic connection with Turkey.
Turkish citizens, too, mined “through the remnants of their past in order to 
find clues to help them understand or control the present,” according to Esra 
Özyürek.74 Turgut Özal, Turkey’s prime minister from 1983 to 1989 and act-
ing president of Turkey between 1989 and 1993, was instrumental regarding 
this shift from Turkish isolationism to one of expansion. In his tenure as prime 
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minister and acting president, Özal importantly sanctioned the reinterpretation 
of Kemalism. Former president Özal thus not only invited the government to 
reconsider the past but also allowed for a public discourse about and recon-
ciliation with the history of the former Ottoman Empire. Turkish repositioning 
within the geopolitical context based on its past coincided directly with the 
Yugoslav Succession Wars.
Most astute in this context is perhaps Joshua Walker’s dissertation on “How 
Post-Imperial Successor States Shape Memories.”75 In identifying Özal as the 
original architect behind the neo-Ottoman turn, Walker points toward Özal’s 
ruminations on the post–Cold War constellation of states. Özal was not, according 
to Walker, interested in a network of Islamic states, but guided by pragmatism. In 
Walker’s words:
It was instead a pragmatic political agenda – based on real, historically-
guided identity networks and political culture legacies – aimed at capitalizing 
on the new regional dynamics of the 1990s in a manner impossible within 
the nation-state structure that had held sway since World War I in Turkey.76
Walker’s analysis rings familiar, especially when considering the above quote by 
which the Turkish cultural office in Novi Pazar seeks to “promote Turkey’s cul-
tural heritage in all its different expressions, and to offer the possibility of meeting 
and dialogue between the cultural reality locally, and the Turkish cultural herit-
age.”77 Southeastern Europe presents an ideal territory that unites both historic 
and cultural aspects of Ankara’s pragmatic foreign policy.
Some Serbian scholars, meanwhile, perceived the Zero Problems with Neigh-
bors policy with a hefty dose of suspicion. In his book Neoosmanizam, Darko 
Tanasković summed the policy up as follows:
Neo-Ottomanism streamlines the nostalgia of a great historical nation that is 
dissatisfied with her current position in the world. As such, this policy serves 
as a beacon that guides Turkey’s foreign policy despite all the real and trans-
parent ideas, including Atatürk’s radical secular revolution. Neo-Ottomanism 
runs as an undercurrent [to official policies].78
Tanasković, an Orientalist by training and former ambassador to Turkey, dis-
trusted the Neo-Ottoman discourse of the early 2000s. He understood the actions 
of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a ploy by which the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Jus-
tice and Development Party, AKP) sought to dismantle the secular state in favor 
of a cross-border ideology based on Islamic values. I disagree with Tanasković 
in much of his analysis, most notably that Islam serves as a legitimating factor in 
Turkish politics. With the benefit of hindsight, one must, however unfortunately, 
agree with Tanasković that the AKP dismantled the secular state of Turkey, as 
analyzed by Bahar Baser and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk.79 At the time, however, partici-
pating in and having perhaps even a sense of admiration for those who organized 
the trade was normal.
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In part, Turkish rumination on the past fueled and perhaps legitimized the cross-
border connections that materialized in the form of aid and trade. Significantly, 
the Bosniak émigré community welcomed Bosniak refugees during the Yugo-
slav Succession Wars. Kemal Kirişci, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, 
stated: “many of their relatives and friends (came to Turkey) as refugees, bringing 
them into direct contact with first-hand disturbing news about the conflict. . . . 
the conflict affected directly a large number of people because of their personal 
ties to Bosnia.”80 Extending material aid in any form and shape thus seemed not 
only legitimate but crucial, albeit informal and to some extent illegal from the 
perspective of international lawmakers. Turkey supported the implementation of 
sanctions against Belgrade and even proponed a ‘Gulf-like’ military operation 
against Serbia.81
Sandžak, the predominantly Muslim enclave between Montenegro and Ser-
bia, thus reveals two important aspects, one relating to the supposedly “unified 
conception of culture” and the second about pragmatism in international politics. 
I will return to the former further later. The latter aspect, however, is instruc-
tive in our understanding of Turkish positioning in the post–Cold War world 
and Ankara’s own understanding of the inviolability of sovereignty. Meddling 
in the Sandžak region, in other words, might have lent credibility to the Kurdish 
question in Turkey and was therefore unacceptable. Material aid to the Sandžak 
region, consequently, transpired covertly by way of informal relations between 
émigré Bosniaks and locals in Novi Pazar. This feeling of perceived normalcy 
legitimized transnational trade practices, a notion that radiated all the way into the 
2000s, also because of the local perception of Turkey as a stable state, especially 
in comparison to the crumbling Yugoslav state.
Transnationalism as a constituent component of trading 
practices, and the formation of social relations
This book reflects transnational theories as discussed by Thomas Faist, Rainer 
Bauböck, and Nina Glick-Schiller’s particularly astute discussion about the 
‘good versus bad’ migration narrative.82 Heeding Glick-Schiller’s criticism on the 
conflation of state and society, the present study of transnational diaspora rela-
tions addresses historical processes that go beyond the narrow confines of the 
nation-state to include how international developments affect and influence local 
experiences with migration. Serbia is not, to put it in Glick-Schiller’s words, a 
“historically discrete sovereign state” but is connected to the greater post-Ottoman 
realm by way of shared “experiences, norms and values. . . [that are] embedded 
in social, economic and political processes, networks, movements and institu-
tions that exist both within and across state borders.”83 Examining transnational 
 kin-com-trade-networks illustrates that international organizations (IOs) do not 
possess the power to isolate a state economically. Neither does the state have 
the sole authority to shape the behavior of people within its boundaries socially. 
Instead, it is a dynamic interplay between IOs, the state in question, and the 
legitimacy locals confer upon the former. Sandžak, particularly Novi Pazar, is a 
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favorably situated space in which to analyze this process empirically. Novi Pazar 
is, to put it in Pierre Bourdieu’s words, a “vast social laboratory”84 in which one is 
able to examine the longue durée of transnational diaspora connections.
Cross-border practices are embodied, as opposed to virtual cross-border assig-
nations. Procuring goods, contacts, and trading with commodities involves phys-
ical motion across borders and engagement with material goods coming from 
abroad. As such, the theoretical underpinnings of this study in part diverge from 
transnationalism as defined by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen.85 Crossing the border 
physically, she states, is not a precondition when examining political practices 
among migrants and refugees. Political links, according to Østergaard-Nielsen, 
contrast with “economic and social practices” in that political engagement does 
not require “actual travel.”86
Schad introduced a similarly disembodied approach in his working paper “The 
Rediscovery of the Balkans? A Bosniak-Turkish Figuration in the Third Space 
Between Istanbul and Sarajevo.”87 Schad dismisses transnationalism because the 
paradigm
assumes the existence of the nation as a category in the first place. . . . Violent 
expulsions of Muslims form the Balkans and Christians from Anatolia, popu-
lation exchanges, resettlement agreements, pogroms killings, and genocide in 
the name of the nation can absolutely not be ignored.88
Transnational relations, to be sure, insinuate a national coefficient, as suggested 
by Schad. Yet, ‘trans’ as a prefix delimits a transformation of “having changed 
from one thing to another.”89 Transnationalization thus defines exactly the pro-
cess of looking beyond the nation to describe cross-border practices. Utilizing the 
analytic tool of transnationalism does not obviate that one dismisses nationalism, 
or worse, condones atrocities committed in the name of a nation as suggested by 
Schad. Transnationalism is not “simply about migration and development, but 
also transnationalization”; it is about the process of looking how internal and 
external events influence individuals within artificially created borders.90 Perhaps 
Faist said it best when he explained:
Transnational syncretism [is] not located on a magic carpet of a deterritorial-
ized space of flows. It only makes sense when firmly tied to specific spaces in 
different nation states. It is not a notion above nation-states but a combination 
of both the inside and the between.91
The practice of transnationalism must be, in other words, situated within nation-
states because this is the reality of the international system. The task then, is to 
tangibly filter out these social connections across state borders.
Speaking of embodied cross-border mobility bears analytical consequences. 
First, physical border crossings indicate the presence of a manned border, how-
ever dysfunctional the state in question may be. The Yugoslav rump state was not 
only an internationally recognized state and thus policed from within, but it was 
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also regulated from without due to the international sanctions regime. Second 
(and related) is the fact that Novo Pazarci did not travel to Turkey en masse. How, 
in other words, does one extrapolate from and apply the embodied experience of 
mobile traders to the sedentary experience of those who did not travel to Turkey? 
Esra Bulut, too, examines this conundrum in her research on transnational links 
between Turkey and the Balkans.92
For Bulut, the state is central in her analysis of transnational relations. She thus 
proposed a paradigm shift from transnational to trans-state relations. Considering 
the case of the SFRY, Bulut suggested that
physical and virtual trans-state interaction between individuals, groups 
and organizations in Turkey and the rest of the Balkans has been altered 
by changes in the means and conditions of communication and movement, 
framed by the opening up of the region with the demise of the Eastern bloc.93
Her insight is valuable, though raises some analytic questions. Yugoslavia 
belonged to the Eastern Bloc only until 1948 and was in fact a founding member 
of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Yugoslav citizens were thus relatively 
free to travel and enjoyed much greater freedoms until the end of the Cold War. 
Following the Yugoslav Succession Wars, Bosniaks, Serbs, Montenegrins, and 
Kosovo-Albanians were barred from traveling visa free until 2009. Statements 
about the virtual sphere, too, must be qualified. International sanctions, coupled 
with the Milošević regime’s information propaganda, impeded access to the 
Internet until 1996.94 The analysis put forward by Bulut, to be sure, is vital to 
our understanding about how the Turkish state utilized ‘migrants’, and diaspora 
relations.
Transnational practices highlight how agents shape narratives from below – 
histories that rarely fit neatly within the narrow confines of nation-states. I thus 
agree with Bulut in her assessment that states remain to be the main unit of 
analysis, though I diverge from her conclusion that transnationalism results from 
contrived ideas “academics [found in their] search(ing) for an alternative to the 
destructive statism and nationalism in the region.”95 This analysis is deceptive for 
three reasons. First, finding solutions to the persistent problems with nationalism 
ought not be an intellectual riddle. I therefore agree with Bulut that individuals in 
the Western Balkans need applicable solutions for the economic and social vows 
the Yugoslav Succession Wars created back in the 1990s, and not an academic 
‘search for alternatives’ to describe real problems people face on a daily basis. 
Second, such assumptions further play into the hands of nationalist leaders and 
narratives about the dangers of cross-border connections that are not sanctified 
by the state. Third, and perhaps more important, is the fact that states are not the 
primary problem, but political actors are; a faceless state does not nationalism 
make, but political actors do.
To understand the discord of the term ‘nation’ within the conceptual frame of 
transnationalism, we must return shortly to the preceding point about the nation 
within the transnational paradigm. In Homeland Calling, Paul Hockenos asserts, 
46 Part I
“the primordial pull of Balkan ancestry forges a timeless bond, indubitably 
stronger than the acquired legal credentials of foreign citizenship.”96 Expatriate kin, 
Hockenos argues, thus remain to be part of the nation “eternally.” Though I disa-
gree with the former analysis, his argument about the heterogeneity of migrant and 
diaspora experiences is instructive. Hockenos differentiates Albanian, Croatian, 
and Serbian exile patriots and nationalists from the Gastarbeiteri (guest work-
ers), the latter of which mainly migrated to work in Germany and Switzerland. 
Notably, he states the former “vigilantly nursed dreams of a return triumphant” 
while the latter migrated to earn money.97 As reflected by the difference between 
the Albanian, Croatian, and Serbian expatriate and Gastarbeiter diaspora, one 
must differentiate between the various experiences of exile and reasons as to why 
people left their home following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
The road to hell is paved with good intentions: illicit trade 
practices and sanctions-busting in Serbia during the 1990s
Nekome rat, nekome brat.98
During the 1990s, the ‘international community’ imposed the most comprehensive 
set of sanctions to date against the Yugoslav rump state.99 Considering the grue-
some war in the former Yugoslav state with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that 
the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro backfired. Local ‘patriots’ despised 
the international community for their meddling in Yugoslav (i.e., Serbian and 
Montenegrin) affairs, and those victimized by the war lost their faith in the United 
Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as convincingly 
argued by Thomas G. Weiss in The United Nations and Changing World Politics.100
Measures taken by the international community allowed for, and replicated, 
the very nationalism these IOs sought to extinguish. Boutros Boutros Ghali, who 
served as UN secretary-general between 1992 and 1995, conceded that sanctions, 
instead of achieving the sought-after modification in behavior of the state in ques-
tion, often provoked nationalist backlash domestically,101 as was the case in Serbia.
Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise the 
ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the 
target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders 
whose behavior is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects. Sanc-
tions also always have unintended or unwanted effects.102
By 1995, it was painfully clear that the sanctions against Serbia were not only 
futile but strengthened Slobodan Milošević’s position in social and military terms. 
In fact, Belgrade benefited from the international arms embargo because most of 
the military equipment was stationed within Serbian territory.103 Also, the Yugo-
slav National Army (JNA) was designed on the premise of self-sufficiency. The 
international arms embargo, in other words, created a strategic advantage for the 
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Belgrade-sponsored paramilitary unit Jedinica za specijalne operacije (Unit for 
Special Operations, JSO).
R. T. Naylor examined the repercussions of the embargo in Economic War-
fare – Sanctions, Embargo Busting and Their Human Cost.104 Serbia was well 
equipped in military terms, and continued to produce and then ship equipment to, 
for instance, Rwanda – yet another state under international sanctions.105 Serbian 
arms dealers even provided Bosniak combatants with artillery shells during the 
Croat-Bosniak hostilities106 and sold arms to Libya107 and Croatia108 in exchange 
for oil. These examples illustrate the shallow depth of the supposedly deep-seated 
nationalism that separated ordinary Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. One indeed 
wonders if, as Peters Andreas argued, the international communities’ inadequate 
involvement in the Yugoslav Succession Wars prolonged the war in the former 
Yugoslavia, especially the Bosnian war.109
Serbian officials were further involved in massive financial pyramid schemes. 
Dafina Milanović and Jezdimir Vasiljević, managers of the infamous Dafiment 
and the Jugoskandik Savings Bank, respectively, collaborated with the authori-
ties in their money-laundering arrangements and to ship oil and food to Serbian 
rebel armies in Bosnia and Croatia.110 The Dafiment and Jugoskandik Bank also 
served as tools by which Belgrade deprived the Serbian population of their sav-
ings. Vasiljević’s Jugoskandik Bank, according to Naylor, amassed “more than 
$2 billion dollars in savings from more than 2 million people.”111 Others, includ-
ing Robert M. Hayden and Mladen Dinkić, likened this massive fraud to the failed 
transition from socialism, a transition in which those who engineered the destruc-
tion of the state profited from the war.112
Given the dimension of this large-scale fraud, one must consider Donald Cres-
sey’s groundbreaking study on organized crime networks in the United States.113 
Cressey examined the organizational structure that swept the Cosa Nostra to 
the top of the criminal underworld during the 1960s. Paying special attention to 
the nexus between the cultural background, family ties, the code of conduct, the 
division of labor among Sicilian migrants, and the organizational strength of the 
mafia structure forged in the United States, Cressey confirmed the initial connec-
tion between family ties and criminal activities among individuals of the Sicilian 
migrant community. The relevance of cultural attachment, however, atrophied 
when the organization grew. Instead, trust among allies and, decisively, profes-
sionalization befitted the Cosa Nostra’s growth and ultimate endurance, much as 
previously illustrated by Klaus von Lampe on transnational crime networks.114
One might be tempted to relate Cressey’s work to the present study on the 
social connections between the local Bosniak and diaspora community in Turkey 
in view of illicit trade practices. Yet, Theft of the Nation correlates with activities 
performed by the Serbian state, considering the consolidation between Belgrade 
and the criminal netherworld. Misha Glenny explored the connection between 
criminals and Belgrade between 1991 and 1995, and stated:
As a consequence of war, sanctions and corruption in the Balkans during 
the first half of the 1990s, the states of the former Yugoslavia turned to and 
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nurtured mafias to run the logistics of their military effort, and it was not long 
before the criminals were in control of the economy, the government and 
the war. Anyone with any serious political ambition had no choice but to get 
mobbed up.115
By 1995, Serbia turned into an archetype for Cressey’s Theft of the Nation, see-
ing that one was no longer able to discern the mafia from the state.116 Belgrade 
broke the social contract that not only shattered Yugoslavia but also the integrity, 
the social fabric, and the moral compass among the citizens of Serbia. Entrepre-
neurship, according to Naylor, became synonymous with “smuggling and war 
profiteering,” while ordinary people turned to the informal market to procure and 
sell goods.
‘Making do’
The designation of ‘relations’ is too descriptive in terms and thus inadequate when 
seeking to analyze how social interactions between Novo Pazarian and émigré 
Bosniaks and/or Turkish people inform local narratives about transnational ties 
between the Western Balkans and Turkey. Instead, practice, as defined by Joseph 
Rouse, offers a cogent roadmap to examine how the creation of this second market 
informed habits that transformed local values from within empirically.117 Accord-
ing to Rouse:
Practices are sometimes regarded as tacit propositional attitudes, and some-
times as inarticulable competences or performances. In either case, however, 
the concept of practices is typically invoked to explain continuities or com-
monalities among the activities of social groups.118
Locals absorbed the practice of trading because they tolerated the market as 
a necessary means of survival and security. Narrative accounts indicate that 
Novo Pazarci not simply condoned the market but welcomed its existence with 
enthusiasm.
The Yugoslav Succession Wars and subsequent international sanctions on Ser-
bia created a niche market for elastic goods, including textiles, cigarettes and 
coffee – goods locals sought and knew how to procure elsewhere. Trading was 
thus an acquired practice that individuals professionalized over time. At one point 
during my fieldwork, for instance, I had this exchange with an interlocutor:
ME: So, how did this work? How did you guys get the goods, and how did this 
whole thing start?
SENAD:  What do you mean by how did it start!? We just picked up the phone 
and called someone we knew there. Easy. We asked, “Hey, we don’t have 
window-frames, clothes, concrete, coffee, whatever. Do you know someone 
who can get us this stuff?” You know, that’s how it worked. We knew some-
one, who knew someone, who knew someone.
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ME: Aha, OK. And what about the sanctions, how did you get it here?
SENAD:  What sanctions? . . . There were no sanctions against us from Turkey.119
This short example illustrates that private connections facilitated the trade between 
Novi Pazar and Istanbul, though it sheds light on the fact that kin relations served 
as crucial intermediary connections. As such, family connections expedited the 
procurement of necessary contacts for other traders, Bosniaks and otherwise. The 
concept of practice thus offers empirical insight to examine transnational prac-
tices without the fallacy of studying Turkish-Bosniak relations from a homog-
enous perspective. Addressing this point is significant in that it liberates analyses 
of transnational relations from what Nina Glick-Schiller calls “methodological 
nationalism.”120 Conceptualizing šverc as a transnational practice then highlights 
that all parties involved benefited from this trade – Bosniaks, Serbs, Roma, Alba-
nians, and even the Milošević regime, not to mention the people who worked in 
the Kapalıçarşı (the Grand Bazar in Istanbul, Turkey).
It is crucial to emphasize the complexity of the preceding point. A large num-
ber of Bosniaks and Serbs believe that Novi Pazar’s second economy supplied 
Novi Pazar, Serbia, and Montenegro with otherwise inaccessible goods during 
the first half of the 1990s. Additional research in the news stacks at the National 
Library of Serbia, documentaries, newspaper articles, and a substantial body 
of local and international academic and non-academic literature illustrates that 
šverc was common in all of Serbia at the time. Šverc thus situates local modes of 
existence at the intersection of a quintessentially Serbian in-state experience and 
cross-border/transnational practice that fostered connections between Turkey and 
Southeastern Europe.
Still, the question of extrapolating from individual actors to society en masse 
remains unanswered. The practice of ‘small-scale entrepreneurship’ – or šverc 
across porous borders – offers a salient clarification on how to reconcile embodied 
with sedentary experiences. Individual traders crossed borders to procure elastic 
goods. Yet these material goods were not simply a means to quench the local 
population’s thirst for coffee or desire for a new pair of jeans. Instead, one must 
understand these goods as a “shared event of practice”; marketable goods became 
“enacted objects.”121 Traders did not simply distribute goods from Turkey in Novi 
Pazar; they also “re-transfer[red] cultural customs” across the border.122 Traders 
were thus salient social agents that not only fulfilled material but also emotive 
needs people cherished. Traders assumed, in other words, affective functions that 
individuals replicated locally. Rouse positions the learning and emulation of hab-
its at the intersection of individual agency and maintenance of cultural values:
Such learning is not merely a matter of imitating the movements of others 
or being trained or disciplined into correct performance by straightforwardly 
casual means, but instead requires appropriate uptake, which involves some 
understanding of the performance to which one responds. The capacity for 
such ‘proto-interpretative’ uptake is presumably acquired gradually, as one’s 
responses to earlier performances are assessed in light of a more extensive 
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background of experience, including one’s interpretation of others’ responses 
to one’s previous performances.123
Rouse thus offers a roadmap on how to examine the evolution of the second econ-
omy, directing our guise to recognize the culturally relevant context that allowed 
this market to flourish.
In the present case, the context contained an increasingly self-serving, mafia-
like state structure that was policed by armed thugs from within and international 
sanctions that policed the borders from without. It is in this context that one must 
understand the growing distrust toward the political establishment in Belgrade, 
the widening gap between Western/Central European states and the former Yugo-
slavia, isolation from the international community, and the resulting solidarity 
networks that crystallized during the war years. Individuals in two or more states 
thus established cross-border practices that allowed for the import of consumer 
goods to ensure self-sufficiency and to make do.
Frontier economy
The practice of šverc was deemed (and remains) necessary in this system that per-
petually fails to satisfy a citizens’ basic needs. Because Belgrade has continuously 
failed to fulfill its social contract, it comes as no surprise that šverc was assumed 
as morally acceptable in Serbia. It is in this context that we must understand the 
strong cultivation of transnational ties between émigrés in Turkey and Southeast-
ern Europe.
Understanding the discourse about šverc as a set of emulated practices allows 
for a nuanced understanding about transnational trade as a habituated custom 
that normalized the existence of the informal market. Alejandro Portes and 
William Haller’s research on informal markets is instructive regarding soli-
darity among networked communities in economically weak states.124 Building 
on Yochanan Altman and his research on the second economy in Georgia,125 
Portes and Haller stated “little enforcement capacity may . . . leave civil soci-
ety to its own devices. This leads to a ‘frontier’ economy where observance of 
commodities and regulation of economic exchanges depend on private force or 
traditional normative structures.”126 Portes and Haller’s analysis is especially 
pertinent because Serbia was militarily strong and able to rely on an extensive 
web of thugs that also patrolled the Sandžak region. Serbia and Montenegro 
were at the same time economically weak due to the international sanctions that 
lasted between 1992 and 1996.127 The Yugoslav rump state was thus a strong-
weak hybrid state128 that was unable to curb either the massive unemployment 
or exponential inflation rate.
In view of the economic situation in the Yugoslav rump state, it may come as no 
surprise that “networked communities accustomed to relying on their own devices 
for survival . . . view(ed) the organization of informal enterprise as a normal 
part of life and involvement in the underground economy as a justifiable form of 
resistance.”129 This statement, however, must be qualified. Different communities 
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within Serbia resisted diverse organizations. Bosniaks, one may generally argue, 
resisted the Serbian regime, while those who perceived themselves as ‘patriots’ of 
the rump state opposed the international community’s imposed sanctions regime. 
Informal trading was thus a badge of honor for those who spited the United 
Nations and a medium that imbued local experiences in Novi Pazar with anticipa-
tory properties.
As different as the reasons and perceptions of the informal economy were, most 
people were involved in the second economy one way or another. Smugglers 
traded illicit and licit goods across the borders, consumers bought the goods on 
the various buvljaci, government officials allowed for and/or partook in the sec-
ond economy, and neighboring states were implicitly or explicitly letting smug-
gled goods pass their borders. The necessary cross-border mobility that served as 
a precondition for the subsequent transnational informal practice was thus multi-
farious and allowed for what von Lampe termed “criminal foraging.”130
Von Lampe connects criminal foraging with the creation of criminal network 
links and dispels claims about ethnicity and family ties as strong sources for 
such links. Indirect contacts, trustworthiness, and reliability often trump ethnic 
homogeneity while evidence suggests that criminal networks often form “in the 
absence of pre-existing ties,” according to von Lampe.131 Seen from this perspec-
tive, transnational agents are firmly rooted in but affected by the policies pursued 
by their states and the international community, as illustrated by the very case of 
Novi Pazar. What emerges in the case of Serbia is an intersection between trans-
national practice and opportunistic crime, as defined by von Lampe:
Transnational crime, as understood here, involves the cross-border move-
ment of one or more of the following: people, goods and information. It has 
been argued that much of ‘TOC’, and in fact much of ‘organized crime’, boils 
down to international smuggling activities.132 For the most part this means the 
cross-border transportation of prohibited, controlled or highly taxed goods 
such as child pornography, stolen motor vehicles, pirated textiles, drugs, pro-
tected animals, illegally logged timber, protected cultural goods, arms, embar-
goed technology, human organs, hazardous waste, gasoline or cigarettes.133
Mobile traders indeed smuggled stolen motor vehicles and entire cars to and from 
Serbia in addition to controlled goods, pirated textiles, drugs, arms embargoed 
technology, human organs, gasoline, and cigarettes as variously documented by 
the Council of Europe, Eulex, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and 
local and international scholars and journalists.
Taken together, von Lampe’s and Portes and William-Haller’s concepts on 
informal economies and the practice of transnational crime, respectively, illus-
trate the situation on the ground. Belgrade’s aggression toward its own Yugoslav 
citizens elicited an international trade embargo that allowed for the informal econ-
omy to flourish. Sanctions-busting was thus not only necessary to make do but 
was increasingly perceived as normal. The case of Novi Pazar, further, illustrates 
von Lampe’s findings that informal and criminal networks rarely find their origin 
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in ethnic and/or national homogeneity. As such, examining transnational practices 
from the perspective of šverc, the narrative of diaspora, and local Bosniak rela-
tions reveals a much more nuanced depiction that goes beyond the discourse of 
ethnic hatred and/or ties.
For the aforementioned reasons, one must not conceptualize transnationalism 
as a tool that subverts state boundaries. Doing so creates a binary discourse about 
the supposed dangers of migration and resulting diaspora connections, as previ-
ously highlighted by Glick-Schiller:
In these discourses, migrants, are attacked for their supposed lack of loyalty 
to their new homeland. Politicians, demagogic leaders, and media personali-
ties blame migrants for national economic problems, including the growing 
disparity between rich and poor, the shrinking of the middle class, the reduc-
tion in the quality and availability of public services and education, and the 
rising costs of health care and housing.134
The dangers inherent in a binary view are palpable in the present study of 
šverc, and transnational family relations between the diaspora and local Bos-
niak community. Considering the Bosniak community that was not a migrant 
population, but connected to one in Turkey by way of the bygone Ottoman 
Empire, transnational practices ought to be viewed as a set of mechanisms 
actors may resort to lest the state fails to assume responsibility for the society 
it governs.
The nation per se, as suggested by Schad, is equally secondary within the con-
cept of the transnational. Understanding the nation as the driving factor in trans-
national movements implies that all Bosniaks are the same regardless where they 
live and/or grew up. Such a frame not only insinuates the nation as innate but gives 
credence to political actors who insist on the protection of ‘co-nationals’ across 
borders. Instead, what emerges as the sine qua non is the performance that allowed 
for the enactment of transnational relations, or in this case, the objects that brought 
it into existence.
Small-scale trading and šverc among common citizens
Rory Archer and Krisztina Rácz explored local experiences about illicit trade 
practices and small-scale smuggling, or šverc, on the Vojvodinian-Hungarian 
and Vojvodinian-Romanian borders. The authors ask if and how narratives about 
the socially and economically challenging 1990s differ in relation to the previ-
ous period during which Yugoslavs experienced a comparatively high degree 
of civil liberties. The authors examine their question in light of the expanding 
European Union in order to glean a better understanding about local interac-
tions and the fluid borders created by states, the nation, social groups, and legal 
systems. Archer and Rácz seek to demonstrate that small-scale smuggling chan-
nels shaped further opportunities for illegal business transactions while existing 
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networks served the purpose of facilitating šverc. Archer and Rácz’s findings 
are especially insightful regarding their conclusion that locals in Serbia per-
ceived and still perceive the practice of šverc as valuable and morally accept-
able, and they define the morally acceptable practice of šverc as “subsistence 
smuggling.”135
Archer and Rácz’s terminology of “imagined hierarchies,” however, must be 
examined. The authors state that imagined hierarchies between the states involved 
in smuggling were inverted at different points in recent decades – since the 1980s, 
ever-changing visa requirements and divergent economic conditions prompted 
various flows of informal and cultural activity across state borders.136 Yet, were 
those hierarchies indeed imagined, or were those conditions real and experienced 
as such by locals? I maintain the latter, especially in light of Archer and Rácz’s 
own explanation that hierarchic changes included “visa requirements” and “diver-
gent economic conditions.” The shifting conditions described here seem very real 
seeing that former Yugoslavs had to cope with issues such as the ‘ever-changing’ 
visa requirements. The Yugoslav passport was a prized possession before the Suc-
cession Wars,137 and citizens traveled freely across state borders. With the onset 
of the war, however, citizens from newly emerging states – including Serbia, 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia – faced harsh visa restric-
tions until 2010. In addition, citizens of the states in question indeed encountered 
diverging financial situations. Inflation in the Yugoslav rump state (Serbia and 
Montenegro) reached record highs, growing from 3.3 percent in 1993 to 313 mil-
lion percent per month in 1994.138 These hierarchies are thus all but imagined; they 
were/are very real.
Be that as it may, šverc is deemed necessary in this system that perpetually 
fails to satisfy a citizens’ basic needs. Because Belgrade has continuously failed 
to fulfill its social contract, it comes as no surprise that šverc is deemed morally 
acceptable in Vojvodina as well as Novi Pazar and beyond.
Novi Pazar was, as was also the case with a Vojvodinian town, firmly entrenched 
in the mafia-like state structure that engulfed all areas of the Serbian state during 
the Yugoslav Succession Wars. The distinctly in-state practice of šverc, however, 
produced an alternative, transnational connotation for the local population of 
Novi Pazar – one in which Bosniaks invigorated communal bonds with Turkey by 
way of trade relations.
Small-scale trading and šverc among common citizens: 
looking beyond the Western Balkans
Madeleine Reeves analyzed the continuity of trade relations in the aftermath of 
the Soviet Union’s dissolution in the Ferghana Valley in Travels in the Margins 
of the State: Everyday Geography in the Ferghana Valley Borderlands, and Bor-
der Work – Spatial Lives of the State in Rural Central Asia.139 She illustrates that 
performative acts and material encounters produce state-like spaces notwith-
standing governmental efforts to depress trade relations that continue to connect 
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communities across adjoining state boundaries.140 She encourages us to think 
of transnational spaces as diagnostic frames in which individual tradesmen and 
customers produce state-like structures as opposed to mere border areas. Social 
relations and material encounters are central in forging a sense of community, 
even when governments criminalize trading practices to legitimize their exist-
ence. Reeves states:
What initially appear as violations of a preexisting boundary between ‘state’ 
and ‘society’, ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’, can be understood as constitutive acts. It is 
precisely through the struggle to define certain activities as falling within the 
domain of ‘state law’ or particular encounters of being subject to the norms of 
‘official’ interaction (rather than those of friendship and kinship) that the state 
is made at its limits coming to figure in daily life and political imaginaries as 
an autonomous structure.141
Reeves’s understanding of formal versus informal trade relations is astute – 
 notwithstanding whether they are sanctified and/or barred by the state – and 
 particularly relevant for the present study because she illustrates trade relations as 
a tangible instrument that both generates and sustains social relations.
Geography, the production of state-structures, and the creation of economic 
interdependencies across (non-)governed borders are also the focus in Janet Roit-
man’s Fiscal Disobedience.142 Roitman examines how licit and illicit transna-
tional trade relations reconstitute citizenship through economic practices in the 
Chad Basin. Contrary to Reeves who identified how post-Soviet governments in 
Central Asia criminalize transborder trade relations to solidify the newly created 
state, Roitman discerns how government officials partake in ill/licit trade practices 
across the Chad Basin. Her argument is essential because she demonstrates that 
individuals consider ill/licit trade practices legitimate when officials partake in 
and thus sanctify the trade.
Fiscal Disobedience highlights the question, which has been overlooked 
to date, of how state actors foster and thus legitimize illicit trading practices. 
Seen from this perspective, paramilitary and commercial smuggling networks 
do not corrode but stabilize the state by offering “the only conceivable frontier 
of wealth creation in a region that has no viable industrial base and is not even 
an industrial periphery.”143 Both Roitman and Reeves provide critical insight 
on the correlation between criminalized practices and government comport-
ment by going beyond the assumption that poverty and unemployment cause 
misconduct.144
Looking beyond the immediate cause-effect argument about poverty and ‘crim-
inal’ behavior invites questions about the legitimacy of the state and/or governing 
actors, as previously noted by Daniel M. Goldstein. In Owners of the Sidewalk: 
Security and Survival in the Informal City,145 Goldstein examines the inability and/
or unwillingness of Bolivian authorities to integrate illicit merchants of Cocha-
bamba – the so-called ambulantes – into official economic state structures for two 
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reasons. First, ambulantes generate economic resources for the state and wages 
for themselves and their families. Thus, second, dismantling the sidewalk market 
would deprive the state, as is the case with the vendors, of economic stability. 
Ambulantes are, consequently, suspended in a perpetuate state of informality, as 
Goldstein argues:
Rather than a fixed position inhabited by permanently ‘informal’ actors, then, 
informality is a condition, a pervasive and fluctuating status that may char-
acterize the operations of any given actor or institution at any given moment. 
State authorities selectively adopt informal behavior when it suits their needs, 
and at other times they rail against the informal activities of the criminal 
underclass.146
While Goldstein does not explicitly engage Victor Turner’s argument of the “limi-
nal personae [‘threshold people’],”147 one is nonetheless able to grasp the liminal 
space these ambulantes inhibit. Ambulantes are indeed “neither here nor there,”148 
or as Goldstein argued, “neither fully included nor entirely excluded . . . always 
on the fringes but never fully recognized as belonging.”149 Turner’s concept of 
the liminal is highly fruitful when contemplating state security and informal trad-
ers, because traders are not simply criminal but often criminalized by governing 
authorities who seek to emphasize the legitimacy and/or stability of the state, as 
previously illustrated by Reeves.
Building on Reeves and Roitman, the present study conceptualizes socialization 
processes through performative acts and material encounters. Roitman’s analysis 
of state-sanctioned ill/licit trade practices and the nexus between citizenship and 
trade is especially valuable. Because the Sandžak region is not adjacent to Turkey, 
however, the present study diverges conceptually from both Reeves and Roitman, 
who examined cohesive spaces that are nonetheless separated by borders. To be 
sure, the Sandžak region itself, too, is a cohesive transborder region. Yet, the pre-
sent study aims to answer how individuals in non-cohesive spaces relate by way 
of informal trade practices locally. More specifically, how do material encounters 
influence social relations in detached spaces, and how do locals in Novi Pazar, 
specifically, make sense of these connections in view of the informal economy 
during the war years?
Because Belgrade used illicit channels to procure products, including oil, weap-
ons, and food, for instance, traders such as those in Novi Pazar, too, were initially 
not persecuted by the state between 1991 and 1995. Instead, Belgrade fostered 
transnational trade relations so long as the state benefited from these small-scale, 
sanctions-busting enterprises. Goldstein and Roitman’s work on merchants in 
Cochabamba and the Chad Basin are instructive here because they corroborate 
the link between a state’s inability and/or unwillingness to dismantle illicit trade 
practices for the sake of state stability. Belgrade not only approved of but fostered 
small-scale šverc to penetrate the internationally imposed trade sanctions on Ser-
bia during the first half of the 1990s.
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Thus, all having the same wishes, it turns out that private interest becomes the 
general interest: when we express our hopes for ourselves we are expressing them 
for the republic.
Voltaire1
How do material encounters influence social relations in detached spaces, and 
how do locals in Novi Pazar, specifically, make sense of these connections in view 
of the constituting informal economy between 1991 and 1995? In other words, 
how do locals narrate these transnational ‘societal configurations’ in light of the 
informal economy? Within the context of this first narrative, I posit that locals 
understand trading with the émigré Bosniak community in Turkey as a system of 
connections within which performative acts supersede the loss of belonging to a 
Yugoslav community. This approach relates to what Faist called “the inner logic 
of social action”2 and demonstrates transnationalization processes.
According to popular belief in Novi Pazar, Serbia, there are 3–4 million 
Bosniaks who live in Turkey. Conventional wisdom there holds that it is this 
very community of émigrés in Turkey that provided Sandžak Bosniaks with the 
necessary tools to run and upkeep the textile production that, in part, sustained 
the informal market during the international communities’ economic sanctions 
on Serbia between 1992 and 1995. “Without the diaspora,” I heard time and 
again, “we would not have made it.” This narrative, I contend, provided locals 
with anticipatory properties. Because Serbia is not a “historically discrete sov-
ereign state,”3 by reconnecting with the Bosniak émigré community in Turkey 
locals reconceptualized their associative space as post-Ottoman and Turkish, 
respectively.4 As such, material encounters shaped social relations that forged 
a sense of community between local and émigré Bosniaks in Turkey. Under-
standing these connections as meaningful transnational solidarity chains illus-
trates that “experiences, norms and values . . . [that are] embedded in social, 
economic and political processes, networks, movements and institutions exist 
both within and across state borders,” as previously stated by Glick-Schiller.5
In order to answer the overarching question of how material encounters 
influence social relations in detached spaces, I examine the catalysts that 
2  The ‘inner logic’ of 
transnational relations
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induced anticipatory properties among the Bosniak community in Novi Pazar 
and how locals narrate these expectations locally in this chapter. I was espe-
cially interested in exploring if material encounters serve as salient carri-
ers of anticipatory properties concerning the manifestation of transnational 
configurations.
This chapter is based on ethnographic research and open-ended, semi- structured 
interviews with locals in Novi Pazar, as well as questionnaires with N = 500. 
Following Smith’s interpretation of heteroglossia/multivocality, I illustrate that 
narratives are contingent on the audience, which in turn reveals how interview-
ees imbue recollections with meaning. In-text interview quotes are in quotation 
marks, and direct interview excerpts are indicated as such by way of stand-alone 
passages henceforth.
Belonging through the prism of šverc: making sense  
of the Yugoslav Succession Wars
The TKS is to some extent emblematic for the town of Novi Pazar, where the 
factory is located. Once a regional giant for the production of textiles, the fac-
tory collapsed in the 1980s. Since its establishment in 1956, the Kombinat was 
a major source of employment up until the economic recession of the 1980s 
when the company gradually let go of its employees. However, it is instructive 
to remember here that the Yugoslav system did not allow for laid-off employ-
ees. This was particularly the case during the international sanctions and subse-
quent NATO bombings of Serbia. Factories, for instance, were responsible for the 
social welfare of their employees as opposed to the state.6 As a result, companies 
seldom let their workforce go officially, because doing so incurred higher costs 
on manufacturing plants. This was also the case for the TKS in 1992, when the 
factory failed to formally discontinue the contract of its workforce. Instead of 
laying their workers off, the TKS forced its employees to take an open-ended, 
unpaid leave of absence.7
“All these people were suddenly unemployed,” Asem recalls. “But doing so 
burdened employees especially after the war, because the people of Novi Pazar 
momentarily utilized their craftsmanship instated of waiting for handouts from 
the state.”8 Asem is a dashing, tall, middle-aged, very well-educated (Bosniak) 
man who grew up in Novi Pazar, and one of the interviewees I shadowed between 
2012 and 2016. After picking me up in a sleek vehicle that suggested affluence, 
Asem steered his automobile to a location of his choosing for our first interview 
in May 2012. We drove up and into the hills that surround Novi Pazar and came 
to a stop in front of a charming vikendica (weekend house). His family inher-
ited this cottage as well as the plot of land on which the small house stands. 
Once in the yard that surrounded the chalet, Asem made sure to exhibit the roses 
that nearly covered the entire yard (Figure 2.1). He pointed toward a bunch of 
plastic jars, filled with what appeared to be water, mixed with those same roses 
(Figure 2.2). Before returning to his recollection of the 1990s, Asem offered me 
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a glass of the syrupy drink. “The Ottomans introduced this beverage to the Bal-
kans,” he explained:
Now . . . why did the government do such things that led me to believe that 
they do not want me here. Why was there such a mess here, and why did they 
make us feel as though we are second-class citizens in this country. And so, 
Figure 2.1 Starinska ruža (antique rose)
Source: Picture taken by author.
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slowly, after being out of work for three, five years . . . there is no work, there 
is no work, I start to have problems. I can’t cover my elementary needs for 
survival. I don’t have a job, so, I have to steal, or do any sort of work that can 
sustain me. I no longer feel the government provides me with opportunities. 
Then, what happens, our people, during the 1990s, because our factories here 
collapsed, lost their jobs. Those were big systems that employed up to 5000 
people back then. They all lost their jobs because the system failed. First, the 
system decays in such places as this one, smaller places, before collapsing 
in Belgrade. Up there, the government gives, gives, gives, gives, until it is 
no longer able to give a thing. They seized to support us immediately, and 
the collapse was instant. Then what happened, our people had to find work. 
These people were only skilled in the textile and furniture manufacturing 
business, to work in those state-owned factories.9
Asem describes the deteriorating economic situation as it was felt across the entire 
former SFRY.
By 1989, the hyperinflation rate was 1,256 percent annually.10 To curb the infla-
tionary rate, Ante Marković – then Prime Minister of Yugoslavia – initiated a  fiscal 
stabilization plan led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that prompted a 
six-month pay freeze, which culminated in the introduction of a new currency. 
Figure 2.2 Starinske ruže (antique roses) in jars
Source: Picture taken by author.
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In Serbia, the inflation kept soaring. By 1992, the annual inflation rate stood at 
9,237 percent and rose to “a quite literally astronomical 116.5 to the power of 10 
to the power of 12 percent in 1993.”11 Vesna Pešić, a sociologist, politician, and 
human rights activist, stated this hyperinflation resulted from the Milošević era 
initiated narodnjačke revolucije (populist revolution).12 According to Pešić, the 
gross domestic product fell by 20 percent during the four consecutive years since 
1990 and up to 1993. The same was true, she states, for the hyperinflation in the 
Yugoslav rump state that is considered the longest in history.13
As a result of the socioeconomic and political crisis, Yugoslavs turned to what 
Susan Woodward called the established modus vivendi in communist regimes: 
“cultural identities, alternative social networks, and organizations that are already 
present in society.”14 Bosniaks in Novi Pazar, such as it was, turned to their rela-
tives in Turkey, as explained by Asem:
Now . . . our people (naši ljudi) had to do business privately. There was 
no capital investment with which we could have started this business. We 
(mi) could not expect anything from the state, and the state was disappear-
ing. There was this . . . war, sanctions, all that . . . all that was happening, 
and our people went to their relatives in Turkey, those who had migrated 
there. They were fortunate, because they had gained some economic strength. 
Turkey strengthened economically sometime between 1985 and the 1990s, 
which is why our people were able to help us. It was based on personal fam-
ily ties. They did not give us money to feed ourselves, they gave us sewing 
machines. They said: here is a machine and some jeans fabric, I will give 
you some machines, go and sell the product somewhere. And so, after about 
five months, we paid off the material that we got, and bought some more. . . . 
Our people were forced to do this. . . . And this is how we established hun-
dreds of these small family owned businesses here. These businesses were 
usually located in family homes and were made up of two workers per one 
machine – usually the father and the mother, both of whom had learned how 
to do this job in the Kombinat – they had these skills and the know-how for 
this work. They just had no money to buy the machines, and this is how 
we created these small factories in Novi Pazar. Then, the children grew up 
slowly, and they also worked on these machines, and the production went 
on in this way. When Serbia was under sanctions, Novi Pazar experienced a 
boom. It saved us, this rescue from our relatives in Turkey, this initial help, 
which then turned into a business. This was not a gift. Thanks to that, we, as 
Muslims (mi, kao muslimani), withstood the economic situation here. Other 
cities did not have this opportunity, and the state could not help any other 
regions except Belgrade, so they all collapsed. They called Kragujevac the 
valley of death . . . in Prstenik, Niš . . . all the industries were no longer able 
to export anything from Serbia. The sanctions prohibited it, because of the 
war. . . . So, everyone went to participate in the wars, but we did not want to 
go. They first put pressure on us to go, but we did not want to. We did not . . . 
we did not want to go. And then, they let us be. They could not make us go.15
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Other interviewees confirmed Asem’s narrative of the crushing economic situ-
ation in Serbia during the 1990s. For instance, Leijla’s daughter, a crestfallen 
middle-aged (Bosniak) lady, explained that locals were forced to help themselves:
And then, you know, the textile and shoe factory closed. That’s when people 
became self-employed, and started to work in their houses, bought machines, 
and sewed jeans. We all tried our best, as best as we could, to do something, 
some . . . anything . . . workshops, shoes . . . and you just work, get some 
more textile from Turkey, bring it here, buy some more machines, open a 
business. . . . do you understand? Sell (Prodaješ) your wares here, in Novi 
Pazar. There are so many who did just that . . . so many.16
Like Asem, she identifies the intersection between existing knowledge, namely, 
the work at the Kombinat and the possibility of procuring goods in Turkey. Locals 
turned to Turkey due to the deteriorating socioeconomic condition in Serbia and 
made use of their existing skills they had acquired locally. Trading, however, 
would have been unavailing if not impossible without material aid coming from 
Turkey.
Asem evidently portrayed the Bosniak community in Novi Pazar from a first-
person perspective in his repeated emphasis of our people (naši ljudi), we (mi), us 
(nas), and so forth. Reflecting on Smith’s deliberation on Bakhtin’s heteroglos-
sia,17 one might thus suggest that Asem narrated his experience of the 1990s based 
on his audience that consisted of me, an outsider who was not versed in the social 
codes of his community. Asem, in other words, tailored his narrative to fit the 
initial contact and interview scene. Following this logic, Asem – deliberately or 
not – created a highly symbolic context for our first in-depth, semi-structured 
interview. Not only did he make sure to explain the origin and use of the roses in 
his yard, but he also arranged to demonstrate how they are dried before offering 
me the syrup for consumption. Humans, as previously argued by Max Weber, 
produce social actions that reflect their values.18 Following the inner logic of this 
narrative and symbolic sense-making process accordingly, one may suggest that 
Asem not only displayed a degree of fealty toward the distant past by which he 
anticipated the future, but he had already absorbed it.
According to Asem’s choice of words, the future of the Bosniak community 
did not belong to Serbia. In his words, “Our people could not expect anything 
from the state, and the state was disappearing.” Yugoslavia, which, to be sure, did 
not accept the Bosniak national identity as titular,19 seized to exist, and so did the 
Bosniak place in the emerging Yugoslav rump state. He said:
I was very talented, and I had the possibility to play basketball. Back then, 
basketball used to be very popular in Yugoslavia. And we, as a sort of pro-
file of those young people back during the 1980s, you know, as a sort of 
immodest example, I had, I can say, an ideal profile in the sense that I was 
a very good student, I did not participate in any conflicts, – beatings, theft – 
 something our youth today is often implicated in. I had no problems and 
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didn’t drink or smoke. This was somehow foreign to us, completely. We 
respected our parents, our professors, and were never in a situation. . . . we 
were afraid of meeting our professors on the street out of some sort of respect, 
because we did not want him to think we loiter around town, as opposed 
to studying. That was the sort of mentality back then. Back then, I played 
sports, and grew up according to some sort of model by which young people 
should be raised. It was truly a carefree time. When I was 16, I traveled to the 
Adriatic on my own, for the first time, without my parents. This means it was 
a carefree time. We were able to go wherever we wished. Yugoslavia was a 
truly wonderful country. One could not feel any of what is considered normal 
now. Now, the first thing people think about is who you are, where you come 
from, do you have money, or not, how . . . the criteria have changed totally. 
But I was raised in that other environment. We were not burdened with these 
things. Today, people are scared to become poor, of deprivation. Back then 
you simply had enough money. But money was not the priority. As a young 
man, I just wanted to travel, and if you were a good student, the parents give 
you just a little bit of money, and, I was an athlete, and this is how I got the 
chance to travel, as an athlete, all the time. We played competitions all over 
Yugoslavia, and we traveled a lot. I really liked that. I never experienced any 
problems just because I am a Muslim. I never felt excluded . . . never felt it 
was a problem. None of the girls minded, or anybody else. It was a non-issue. 
It was o.k.20
Asem emphasizes that he had never experienced any problems despite being a 
Muslim, and he even perceived himself as having had an ideal profile before the 
Yugoslav Succession Wars. His elaboration on the past suggests he identified with 
the Yugoslav state. Asem, one might argue then, perceived the system as inclusive, 
a system he was able to participate and thrive in. His experience stands in sharp 
contrast to the 1990s, given the regime-driven discourse and Belgrade supported 
proxy wars that induced animosity between Serbian and Bosniak Yugoslavs.
The loss of the republic is perceived as such by both Bosniaks and Serbs (and 
allegedly others). Bojana, a strong-willed, well-educated, and somber (Serbian) 
lady in her middle years, for instance, agreed with Asem about the reliable stand-
ard of living in Yugoslavia when compared to life in the Yugoslav rump state and 
Serbia at present:
Back then, the state was organized. Back then, people used to respect the law. 
One valued work and order (znao se red i rad). Now, nothing. . . . there is 
nothing. Everyone interprets the law in their own way. All of that was social 
once, the manufacturing plants, all those companies and all that.21
Questionnaire results (Figure 2.3) put these two statements further into perspec-
tive. For a total of 34.6 percent of survey participants, the former Yugoslav state 
remains very important, while 25.5 percent deem Yugoslavia as somewhat impor-
tant. This means that a combined 60.2 percent of survey participants – roughly 
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every other person and more – regard the former Yugoslav state as at least impor-
tant. The perceived loss of Yugoslavia is thus a collective one and parallels a 
rupture that cuts across national affiliation. And yet, the Succession Wars brought 
about a retrograde affection with the nation-state, which amounted to a luxury for 
Bosniaks. Bosniaks, in other words, were faced with the violent territorial dis-
pute Croatia and Serbia had fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 
1995. Bosniaks not only lost their social status as equal citizens in the rump state 
but also their existential well-being.
The Yugoslav rump state – consisting of Serbia and Montenegro – was, as 
emphasized by Asem, unable to lift its citizens out of the economic downward 
spiral. But locals in Novi Pazar helped themselves by invigorating transnational 
ties with the émigré community in Turkey:
When Serbia was under sanctions, Novi Pazar experienced a boom. It (the 
market) saved us, this rescue from our relatives in Turkey, this initial help, 
which then turned into a business. This was not a gift. Thanks to that, we, as 
Muslims, withstood the economic situation here.
Novo Pazarci, Asem seems to suggest here, did not rely on or expect to receive aid 
from Belgrade. Instead, Asem indicates that locals organized economic structures 
that were based on personal networks. Other people in Serbia, according to Asem, 
did not have this possibility: “Other cities did not have this opportunity, and the 
state could not help any other region, save Belgrade, so they all collapsed.” At the 
time, inferred from Asem’s narrative, it appears that Novi Pazar, and the Sandžak 
region generally, existed from without the economic purview of Belgrade. Seen 
from this perspective, it comes as no surprise that Sulejman Ugljanin, then and 
still political leader of the Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA),22 advocated auton-
omy for the region in October 1991.23
It is important to emphasize here that Asem, though speaking from a position 
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Figure 2.3 Perception toward past empires and supranational collectives
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from the socioeconomic structures that governed Serbia at the time, the com-
mencing economic boom made autonomy thinkable. Though latent, one may nev-
ertheless point toward a possible correlation between the desire for autonomy in 
late 1991, and, according to Asem, the “booming market” that too started in 1991. 
Autonomy, in other words, became economically viable.
As seen in Figure 2.4, 50.9 percent of those who participated in the question-
naire agreed strongly with the statement that most of the goods sold on the Novi 
Pazar buvljak (flea market) came from Turkey, while 33.5 percent agreed with 
the statement. Meanwhile, 57 percent of all participants strongly agreed with the 
statement that this trade supplied Novi Pazar with goods during the 1990s, while 
28.6 percent agreed with this same statement. This means that 84.4 percent – a 
great majority of participants – at least agreed with the statement that most goods 
that sustained the market in Novi Pazar came from Turkey, while 85.6 percent of 
all participants believe the market supplied Novi Pazar – and to a lesser degree 
Serbia (81 percent) and Montenegro (73.4 percent) – with goods during the 1990s.
Sustaining transnational relations with the émigré community thus seemed of 
vital importance. With the benefit of hindsight, one may posit that Belgrade’s ina-
bility to safeguard Serbian citizens from the economic chaos induced anticipatory 





































































The trade on the flea market / the market in Novi
Pazar supplied Novi Pazar with goods during
the 1990s
The trade on the flea market / the market in Novi
Pazar supplied Serbia with goods during the 1990s
The trade on the flea market / the market in
Novi Pazar supplied Montenegro with goods
during the 1990s
I know someone who worked on the flea
market / the market during the 1990s
I worked on the flea market / the market
during the 1990s
I still work on the flea market / the
market in Novi Pazar
Most of the goods sold in Novi Pazar came /
come from Bulgaria
Most of the goods sold in Novi Pazar came /
come from Hungary
Most of the goods sold in Novi Pazar came /
come from Turkey
Figure 2.4 Origin of goods available on the market in Novi Pazar during the 1990s
Note: N = 500. Color range: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.
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early months of 1992 was perhaps, in other words, a greater degree of autonomy – 
a prospect that was based on closer cooperation with Turkish businesses, and per-
haps Ankara. What appears to emerge from the data then is an inverse power 
structure between the capital and Novi Pazar that set off a process of sociopolitical 
disengagement between locals in the Sandžak region, particularly in Novi Pazar, 
and Belgrade. Sociopolitical disengagement from Belgrade, meanwhile, seemed 
viable due to economic independence from Belgrade.
Asem provides us with an explicit sociopolitical example about local disen-
gagement with the Serbian state. In the preceding quote, Asem explicitly empha-
sized the point that Bosniaks did not wish to join the Jugoslav Army. Another 
interviewee, Dubravko, agreed with Asem:
So . . . the war was a period in which Serbs enlisted as army reserves. 
They were engaged in the army, while the Bosniaks did business. . . . they 
worked in business. But at that time, there was no turmoil here. Still, one 
knew the matter, and how (znalo se i kako), and we kept up neighborly 
relations, even friendships. The majority of people knew that something 
should have happened here. It was supposed to happen here, but someone 
prevented it.25
Dubravko, a middle-aged, educated, and heavy-set (Serbian) man whom I inter-
viewed once in 2012, affirmed Asem’s notion that Bosniaks – in part due to 
their business acumen – did not participate in the Yugoslav Succession Wars 
as recruits. Apart from agreeing with Asem about the apparently burgeoning 
disassociation of Bosniaks from Serbia proper, the tone of the respective nar-
ratives is instructive. On comparing the linguistic expression of the preceding 
passages, one is able to discern Asem’s active if not assertive tone, compared to 
Dubravko’s rather passive voice. Applying Smith’s dichotomy of official versus 
contrasting voices to these passages,26 one might conclude that Asem narrates a 
contrasting story line of the 1990s. Asem emphasizes a symbolic construction of 
past events, one in which Bosniaks were active agents and not passive recipients 
of repression and/or violence. Transnational trade relations were thus not only 
a tool by which to endure the economic downturn in Serbia, they also served 
as a centripetal force for the ongoing memory construction and reconstruction 
among Bosniaks. Dubravko, meanwhile, reproduces an official account of the 
past, one in which Serbian involvement in the war prevails trade with the Bos-
niak émigré community. Transnational trade relations in the form of material 
encounters thus produced contrasting memory patterns among Serbs and Bos-
niaks locally.
The following passage Dubravko recounts is especially telling:
The war was a period in which Serbs enlisted as army reserves. . . . But at that 
time, there was no turmoil here. Still, one knew the matter, and how (znalo 
se i kako). . . . The majority of people knew that something should have hap-
pened here . . . but someone prevented it.
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Dubravko is noticeably absent from his own narrative and communicates his 
experience from the perspective of an onlooker. He plays no part in the Serbian 
military-conscript or the Bosniak-business narrative and thus seems to assume the 
position of a passive outsider; he had no choice in the matter and to some extent 
accepted the socioeconomic situation that reigned at the time.
Asem, conversely, appears as an active agent within his own narrative:
The sanctions prohibited it, war . . . so everyone went to participate in the 
wars, but we did not want to go. They first put pressure on us to go, but we 
did not want to. We did not . . . we did not want to go. And then, they let us 
be. They could not make us go.
Asem presents the collective refusal to fight in the Yugoslav wars as an active 
choice. It is interesting to note here that Asem refrains from naming either the 
state or Serbs who chose to partake in the wars – willingly or by coercion. Instead, 
Asem, in referring to Belgrade and Serbs as they in contrast to we and us Muslims 
and/or Bosniaks, creates a binary narrative that deflects continuity in belonging 
to Serbia. This becomes especially clear when compared to his description about 
the former Yugoslavia: “We were able to go wherever we wished. Yugoslavia 
was a truly wonderful country.” Asem, in narrating his experience of the 1990s, 
displays restraint regarding Belgrade, and contiguity with transnational solidarity 
networks: we, as Muslims – he states – withstood the economic downturn because 
our relatives in Turkey rescued us.
The two narrative styles suggest a ‘division of labor’ within which Bosniaks 
partook in business dealings, while Serbs were expected to join the army.27 By 
continuing with Ken Morrison’s reflection on Emile Durkheim regarding the 
coordination of economic and domestic activities “for the purpose of survival,” 
one recognizes how social processes conditioned anticipatory properties among 
the Bosniak community in Novi Pazar. Material encounters shaped this commu-
nity to such an extent that locals could disengage from the state – even autonomy 
seemed viable at the time.
Asem, apart from establishing an understanding for how individuals narrate 
their experience of the 1990s in Novi Pazar provides us with fruitful insight into 
both failed and realized expectations of communal life in Serbia. Matti Hyvärinen, 
building his expectation analysis of narratives based on Bakhtin, stated: “life sto-
ries essentially recount the story of changing, failing or realized expectations.”28 
Adopting Deborah Tannen and her list of evidence to frame expectations,29 
Hyvärinen catalogs the following terms by which to frame failed, changing, and/
or realized expectations:
Repetition; false starts; backtracks, breakdown of temporal order of tell-
ing; hedges that flavor the relation between what was expected and what 
finally happened; indeed, just, anyway, and however; negatives; contras-
tives; modals; evaluative language; evaluative verbs; intensifiers, including 
laughter.30
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Bosniaks in Novi Pazar repeatedly framed their bereaved national inclusion, 
and confusion thereof, within narratives of changing and failing expectations. 
Burhan, a very tall, sullen-looking, middle-aged (Bosniak) man, for instance, 
articulated his failed and changed expectations about communal life in Serbia 
as follows:
Anyway, I think, I was . . . I was in the army when I was younger. I was, 
ahm . . . how do you say that, I remember the history of this country. . . . I 
don’t know why. . . . why does this country belong to someone else, why is 
it not mine also? I fulfilled all my obligations to this country. I pay taxes, 
I obey the law, I served the army (as a young conscript). I don’t know what 
more I could have given, or how someone else gave more to this country 
than me.31
Similar to Asem’s recounted experience, Burhan displays an array of the afore-
mentioned analytic categories that frame failing expectations of the Yugoslav 
community, including repetition (“I think, I was . . . I was”); false starts (“I don’t 
know why . . . why does this country belong to someone else?”); and negatives 
(“I don’t know what more I could have given”). Most illustrative is the break-
down of temporal orders as Burhan seeks to make sense of his current position in 
society. Burhan explicitly recounts the Yugoslav history with himself as an active 
participant as a young man in it and contrasts this experience with his perceived 
exclusion from the Serbian state. His narrative mirrors Asem’s experience and 
was not lost on younger generations, either. Erol, a young, educated, and contem-
plative (Bosniak) man, for instance, observed:
People usually did not keep tabs on others during socialism. . . . But my 
grandma told me that before that, people kept tabs on who is who because of 
the two Balkan wars here . . . those wars before the Yugoslav wars. They . . . 
they kept tabs on who is who . . . I mean, I don’t know if they felt divided, but 
they kept tabs on each other, she said, about who practiced which religion, 
about . . . national customs, before the existence of Yugoslavia. Then, Tito 
came. That is when my mom grew up. . . . She remembers a totally different 
time . . . during which people sort of lost this national affiliation . . . and now, 
I don’t know.32
Erol juxtaposes past societal configurations with the present situation by way of 
contrasting the narrated experiences of his grandmother and his mother to that 
of his own. It is remarkable that we have three generations in this narrative, all 
three of whom experience divergent expectations regarding their place in society. 
Erol’s grandmother was an Ottoman subject that turned into a Yugoslav, while his 
mom was a Yugoslav that turned into a Bosniak – willingly or not. Erol, mean-
while, often displayed bewilderment as to his own future as a young Bosniak man 
in Serbia during this in-depth interview and our numerous casual conversations 
between 2012 and 2019.
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Asem who, like Erol’s mother, grew up as a Yugoslav, expressly located the 
loss of community within the time frame of the 1990s:
I told you, we knew immediately in the 90s when Slobodan Milošević went 
to war with Croatia, and then with Bosnia, that they would not help us. 
We had to turn toward ourselves, and we had no one else expect our fam-
ily in Turkey. I told you, my father had lived in Novi Pazar, while two of 
his sisters left Novi Pazar to live in Turkey. This means our family was 
broken-up. This means we were able to relieve the pressure. We knew Ser-
bia thought nothing good of us, and so we saved ourselves, we secured 
our economic foundation to have a life, to have jobs, to live, to survive. In 
other parts of Serbia, Kragujevac, Kruševac, Niš, people felt as though the 
government owed them something, that Belgrade must help them. They 
waited for the state to help them. They had no friends in Turkey. . . . we 
did not go to Turkey because the business was good. . . . we went because 
we had someone there. . . . we had no food. . . . they gave us a fishing rod, 
and not the fish. They gave us as much as they were able to give . . . one 
sewing machine, two, and you pay the debt whenever you can, to survive. 
When people noticed that survival could turn into a business, they started to 
expand. Then, they bought five machines, ten. Then, they had to leave their 
houses, because they worked in living and bedrooms where their daughters 
and sons slept. Pretty soon, these rooms turned into workshops, and the 
family members all had to sleep together in one room. And then, when they 
started to earn money, they established their own enterprises. . . . They had 
to construct new buildings, because they were not allowed to buy those 
abandoned companies.33
Asem articulates his shattered anticipatory horizon, regarding his place within the 
Serbian community, with clarity. Bosniaks, according to Asem, expected nothing 
from Belgrade. He stated unambiguously, “We had to turn toward ourselves to 
survive.”
It is further instructive to analyze the breakdown of temporal sequences as pre-
sented by Asem:
I told you, my father had lived in Novi Pazar, while two of his sisters left 
Novi Pazar to live in Turkey. This means our family was broken-up. This 
means we were able to relieve the pressure. We knew Serbia thought nothing 
good of us, and so we saved ourselves, we secured our economic foundation 
to have a life, to have jobs, to live, to survive.
Asem tied the 1950s, during which members of his extended family moved to 
Turkey, directly to the Bosniak community’s economic survival during the Yugo-
slav Succession Wars. One might thus confirm a cognitive disruption with the 
Serbian state on the one hand and temporal continuity with the émigré community 
in Turkey on the other.
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While Asem connected the trade to the historic migration of Bosniaks to Tur-
key and his extended family in Turkey specifically, others also identified the geo-
graphic location as fundamental to the successful trade during the 1990s. Saleh, a 
shrewd and well-educated young (Bosniak) man, explained: “It is this position of 
the city, our city in this border triangle between three countries, including Monte-
negro, Serbia, and Kosovo, that . . . that makes (šverc) smuggling possible, even 
to this day.”34 Leijla’s daughter, too, ascribed geographic features to the flourish-
ing trade of the 1990s. In her words:
Here, we are between Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia, right by our 
neighbors from the old State, and you could do some smuggling (mogao si 
da prošvercuješ) here, generally. You could make pretty good money doing 
that back then.35
These two statements are illuminating in that these two interlocutors do not sim-
ply assert a geographic location or proximity with neighboring states, they dem-
onstrate intimacy with former co-nationals – their neighbors from the old State. 
Seen from this perspective, šverc was just another means for trading goods across 
newly created borders that had not existed before. These ties, in other words, did 
not subside because politicians decided to redraw the map.
Daud, a young (Bosniak) merchant without family members in Turkey, took 
this notion one step further:
If you want to learn about trade here, you have to understand the history of 
this place, the history. I will tell you about it. Ras is about eight kilometers 
from here.36 Ras, as the old town is called. This is the first Serbian city. This 
means, there was neither Belgrade, nor anything else here. There was Sveti 
Sava.37 It was a Serbian city, and it was the first commercial place in all of 
Europe. When London had barely 8,000 inhabitants, Novi Pazar had 12,000. 
Novi Pazar was full of caravans from Byzantium and Rome, and they all 
came here to trade. Novi Pazar has an ancient commercial tradition, older 
than that of London, or that of Switzerland. Novi Pazar has a very old tradi-
tion of trading. Had it not been for the wars, Novi Pazar could have been 
Europe’s Istanbul for trade. But the wars ruined everything.38
Daud, like Saleh and Asem, looks to the past to rationalize the economic boom 
of the 1990s. Daud, however, has no family members or friends in Turkey, 
which may be the reason for his emphasis on the geographic location over fil-
ial ties. And yet, his frame is decidedly historic. This pertains to all the above 
interlocutors who assign present-day properties to historic events of both filial 
and/or territorial nature. What sets Daud’s narrative apart from Asem’s, how-
ever, is the length of the historic view. Daud includes all of Novi Pazar’s his-
tory, including the medieval past, though emphasizes that “Novi Pazar could 
have been Europe’s Istanbul for trade” had it not been for the wars that ruined 
everything. By referring to the Byzantine Empire, Istanbul, the two Balkan 
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wars, and the Yugoslav wars, Daud collapses the time-space continuum entirely 
to make sense of the present.
Apart from assigning the present to the past,39 Daud taps into a common narra-
tive about Novi Pazar as a disempowered region and the necessity for local resil-
ience in the face thereof. Serbia, as illustrated earlier, quashed local desires for 
autonomy in the 1990s, while both Montenegro and Serbia divided the Sandžak 
region during the Balkan Wars. And yet, it is this exact narrative that instills locals 
with a sense of pride:
If all this had happened somewhere in Europe, in Germany, England, or 
France, people there would probably given up. But here, people can always 
make something from nothing! In Europe, they run to their government 
immediately, and the government helps them when they have problems, and 
then, the government helps them. Here, we cannot expect anything from our 
government.40
Self-sufficiency is thus a source of local pride and a narrative I encountered 
repeatedly. This account of aptitude simultaneously overlaps with narratives of 
perceived disregard, namely, indifference and neglect toward Novi Pazar by Bel-
grade, based on the predominantly Muslim background of locals. Interviewees, 
in other words, often invoked a narrative of necessity in the face of sociopolitical 
and economic negligence by Belgrade and took pride in their ability to accom-
plish self-sufficiency in the face of systemic collapse. In addition to providing 
locals with an impression of social continuity, trade relations replaced state sup-
port by Belgrade accordingly.
Given the fact that a potential 6 to 7 out of every 10 persons have family mem-
bers who moved to Turkey at any point in time serves as an abstract, though no less 
important, backbone for the inner logic of transnational relations. It is important 
to recognize that locals understood themselves to be in a comparatively favorable 
position because Bosniaks had cross-border connections. Bosniaks, by following 
this train of thought, were not only able to opt out of what they perceived to be a 
vicious regime – and rightly so. Historical grievances also seemed corrected, as 
those Muslims who fled Southeastern Europe since the Austro-Hungarian annexa-
tion of Bosnia, and subsequent separation of the Sandžak region between Serbia 
and Montenegro, aided locals from a position of socioeconomic strength. As such, 
the practice of trading across porous borders – or šverc as locals called it – turned 
into a “shared event of practice” that fostered transborder connections. Traders did 
not simply distribute goods from Turkey in Novi Pazar; they also “re-transfer[red] 
cultural customs” across the border.41 Trade, in other words, not only fulfilled 
material but also emotive needs, as becomes clear in the preceding narratives.
Synthesis
The Yugoslav Succession Wars provided ample reason to disassociate sociopoliti-
cally from Serbia proper within and of itself. Bosniaks in Sandžak, and Novi Pazar 
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in particular, also had the possibility to connect with the greater Bosniak émigré 
community in Western Europe, for instance.42 And yet, I did not come across nar-
ratives of symbolic and real transnational networks between émigré Bosniaks in 
Switzerland, Germany, or Sweden and locals. Instead, locals emphasized their 
failed expectations regarding Yugoslavia on the one hand, and the economic res-
cue in the form of material aid from Turkey on the other. The Yugoslav Succession 
Wars thus served as a rupture, a discontinuity of belonging to the subsequent rump 
state, as emphasized by a range of interlocutors.
The economic situation in the Yugoslav rump state – consisting of Serbia and 
Montenegro – spiraled out of control, and locals in Novi Pazar communicated the 
state would disregard them based on their religious affiliation. As a consequence, 
locals invigorated transnational ties with the émigré community in Turkey. 
Interlocutors repeatedly affirmed the positive effects of this market, including 
an economic boom during which other regions experienced severe existential 
insecurity. Trade relations, however, were more than simple business exchanges. 
These connections served as catalysts that induced anticipatory properties 
among the Bosniak community in Novi Pazar. As such, one might be inclined 
to argue that transnational trade relations induced local divisions between Serbs 
and Bosniaks. While interlocutors confirmed that Bosniaks mostly dealt in busi-
ness while Serbs joined the army, however, all parties involved benefited from 
the trade. 
For now, those migrants – or muhadžiri, as they are called locally – who emi-
grated through Novi Pazar, and on to Turkey, are especially important regarding 
the first narrative. Interlocutors frequently emphasized that family members in 
Turkey significantly contributed to the socioeconomic safety locally, so much so 
that political autonomy became thinkable. Seen from this perspective, Bosniaks 
were active agents who created fortunes out of thin air, as one of the inform-
ants stressed. Transnational trade relations were thus not only a tool by which 
to endure the economic downturn in Serbia, but they also served as a centripetal 
force for the ongoing memory construction and reconstruction among Bosniaks.
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3  Novi Pazar as a mnemonic 
nucleus for the transmission 
of memory
The modern democratic constitution also requires citizens to agree on matters one 
cannot cast a vote on – trust, responsibility, and the common good.
H. Welzer1
In the previous chapter, I illustrated how residents of Novi Pazar narrate their 
experience of the economic downturn in Serbia. Locals repeatedly emphasized 
their surmounting the financial collapse by way of transnational trade relations 
between local and émigré Bosniaks in Turkey. In due process, informants, to 
frame it in Suzan Ilcan’s words, “created ways in which alternative relations of 
belonging change(d) their home without moving anywhere.”2 Interlocutors not 
only highlighted the socioeconomic prominence of transnational connections, but 
by accentuating émigré kin-relations and belonging to the post-Ottoman realm 
they invoked mnemonic continuity. Trade relations, in other words, served as a 
centripetal force for the ongoing memory construction and reconstruction among 
Bosniaks in Novi Pazar. Informal market activities between Novi Pazar and Tur-
key were thus not simply a means to overcome economically induced predica-
ments but connected historical narratives to autobiographical experiences.
Maurice Halbwachs stated: “memory may be lost altogether unless it is brought 
to awareness again through contact with otherwise almost forgotten associa-
tions.”3 I argue that trading – alternative, material contacts – not only resurrected 
and to some extent re-created links between the local and Bosniak émigré com-
munity but also “brought to awareness those almost forgotten associations” in due 
process.
To answer the overarching question of how transnational practices between 
1991 and 1995 shaped this communities’ social relations locally, the question of 
how informants identify with the past must be examined. This question is at the 
core of the following section. I will identify the medium through which locals 
remember the past and analyze how autobiographical narratives differ from his-
toric ones. Crucially, how do historicized narratives inform the present? I will 
examine these questions by answering the following two sub-questions. First, 
what are the vehicles by which interlocutors transmit memory in Novi Pazar? 
The town of Novi Pazar itself serves as a mnemonic nucleus, while families act as 
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carriers of memory. Second, what are the characteristics by which locals collapse 
the time-space continuum when narrating the past, and do these characteristics 
inform the present?
Following Halbwachs and his distinction between historic and autobiographi-
cal narratives,4 I will analyze how lived experiences and invigorated commemora-
tions – official and not – merge in local narratives, and how locals identify with 
this narrated past. I must, however, preface this section by emphasizing that it 
is not my aim to examine the Bosniak identity. Instead, I seek to filter out how 
agents identify their social condition through narratives.5 Identification, as pro-
posed by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, is a fruitful tool to investigate 
why social agents emphasize certain narratives over others without falling into 
the trap of analyzing identity as a static entity. In Brubaker and Cooper’s words:
[It] (Identification) invites us to specify the agents that do the identifying. 
And it does not presuppose that such identifying (even by powerful agents, 
such as the state) will necessarily result in the internal sameness, the dis-
tinctiveness, the bounded groupness that political entrepreneurs may seek to 
achieve.6
Like Rouse and Glick-Schiller then, Brubaker and Cooper encourage us to think 
beyond ethnicity as a bounded entity within which all group members share one 
and the same experience. Seen from this perspective, examining how locals iden-
tify and narrate the past is significant on account of hypothesizing the salience of 
transnational ties across time and space.
Social sites of belonging
Novi Pazar was an important trading town before turning into a space of tran-
sit with the onset of the collapsing Ottoman Empire. Migrants – or muhadžiri, 
as locals call those Muslim Slavs who emigrated from Southeastern Europe – 
migrated through the present-day Sandžak region to reach contemporary Macedo-
nia, Albania, and finally Turkey. As such, the town itself serves as a mnemonic 
nucleus, while families serve as “vehicular units by which locals remember”7 and 
engage with the past. I will unpack the two latter aspects in succession, starting 
with the statement that Novi Pazar itself serves as a mnemonic nucleus.
Looking in from afar, Novi Pazar appears like any other town in the Western 
Balkans where Muslims – practicing or not – constitute the majority of residents. 
The streets are lined with proper homes, unfinished Gastarbeiter houses and old, 
renovated, and/or new mosques dot the skyline (Figure 3.1). In Novi Pazar, impe-
rial, communist, and national proclivities and/or ideologies continue to character-
ize the town in the form of architectural objects.
Standing at the center of town, one can see the wall of the old Ottoman fort on 
top of which stands a library and a relatively modern outdoor café (Figure 3.2).8 
The Amir-Aga Han looks as though no one ever bothered to renovate the structure 
since Ottoman officials retreated to present-day Turkey. Locals enjoy sipping hot 
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Figure 3.1 The town of Novi Pazar
Source: Picture taken by Joshua E. King.
Figure 3.2 Ottoman fort in Novi Pazar
Source: Picture taken by Joshua E. King.
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brews within the shady though crumbling enclosure of what is left of the Isa-Beg 
hammam (Figure 3.3), and on the other side stands the massive socialist bloc that 
locals call lučna zgrada (Figure 3.4). After a ten-minute stroll from downtown 
Novi Pazar toward the direction of Raška, one reaches the St. Peter and Paul 
Church (Figure 3.5), and further out of town, perched on top of the hill overlook-
ing Novi Pazar, stands the Djurdjevi Stupovi monastery (Figure 3.6). The rem-
nants of old Ras, as well as the Sopočani monastery, are within a 30- to 40-minute 
drive from town.
The Nemanja dynasty, the Ottomans, and the Socialist Federal Republic not 
only left their imprints in the form of cultural and religious practices that are 
still common to many post-Ottoman spaces, but also a material trail of struc-
tures that yet dominate the architectural landscape around a 20-kilometer radius 
of Novi Pazar.
Residents are proud of their legacy that is visible in cultural traditions and the 
surrounding heritage sites. After some time in town, locals began to flag me down, 
randomly, to initiate conversations about the city they inhabit, as was the case 
with an elegant, mustachioed, elderly gentleman who was sipping Turkish coffee 
in one of the cafés along the ever-packed pedestrian boulevard in downtown Novi 
Pazar. “This is our heritage,” the man said proudly as he pointed up at the old 
Ottoman fort. “It’s part of us. My family calls Novi Pazar home for seven genera-
tions! You can look it up in the archives if you want.”9 This sentence, ovo je naša 
dedovina (this is our heritage), was a decree whose presence was felt all around 
Figure 3.3 Isa-Beg hamman in Novi Pazar
Source: Picture taken by Joshua E. King.
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Figure 3.4 Lučna zgrada in Novi Pazar
Source: Picture taken by Joshua E. King.
Figure 3.5 St. Peter and Paul Church in Novi Pazar
Source: Picture taken by Joshua E. King.
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Figure 3.6 Djurdjevi Stupovi
Source: Picture taken by Joshua E. King.
town in words and deeds, and was exhibited on signs, as is the case with this ban-
ner that hung from the Amir-Aga Han (Figures 3.7 and 3.8).
A middle-aged, tall, and lanky man with sunken eyes invited me to climb the 
otherwise locked (so I was told) minaret of the Altun-Alem Mosque that was 
built in the 16th century. The Altun-Alem Mosque is among the oldest and per-
haps most famous mosques in Novi Pazar, in part due to its unique architecture 
(Figure 3.9). The mosque has a single dome and a porch that is covered with 
two smaller cupolas – similar structures can be found in Turkey. Altun-Alem is 
placed in the midst of a courtyard that includes the original water well, a maktab,10 
and gravestones engraved with Ottoman-Arabic calligraphy. As we climbed the 
long, narrow, and dimly lit staircase of the minaret, the caretaker explained he 
had renovated the mosque and its surroundings out of his own initiative, seeing 
that Belgrade was not willing to refurbish historic buildings in town. “I was able 
to renovate this mosque,” he explained, “because we got donations from private 
investors who sought to see this mosque restored.”11
Looking down at the town of Novi Pazar (Figure 3.10), I was reminded of Peter 
Sugar’s description of Southeast European cities under Ottoman rule:
A bird’s eye view of any city disclosed to the observer the plan of the city. 
Its center was clearly distinguishable by the major mosques, large buildings 
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Figure 3.7 Pansion Amir-Aga Han in the center of Novi Pazar
Source: Picture taken by Joshua E. King.
Figure 3.8 Ovo je naša dedovina, banner hanging from the Amir-Aga Han in Novi Pazar
Source: Picture taken by Joshua E. King.
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housing the chief markets, a fortress if any, and even a large open square. 
The size and height of structures in a given mahalles indicated clearly to 
which millet its inhabitants belonged. Not only were public buildings more 
substantially constructed then were the private homes, but their shapes were 
also indicative of their functions.12
It appears the public buildings were indeed constructed more substantially, as 
put forth by Sugar, seeing that bakeries, the hammam, han, water fountains, and 
mosques still stood intact after all these years – though dilapidated.
Figure 3.9 Altun-Alem Mosque in Novi Pazar
Source: Picture taken by Joshua E. King.
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Since the 1990s, such heritage sites, their maintenance and/or negligence 
thereof,13 turned into contested sites of memory that are attached to cultural prac-
tices. Because, as Bourdieu maintained, material conditions endow social actors 
with “schemes of perception,” one may extrapolate that locals imbue these build-
ings with meaning that mirror their social position within Serbia.14 Indeed, the 
difference between the care for Orthodox heritage sites compared to that of the 
often ramshackle state of Islamic and cultural facilities from the Ottoman period 
is striking. As illustrated in the preceding images, Ottoman sites are often in tat-
ters if not renovated with private capital, while Belgrade donated funds to reno-
vate Orthodox heritage sites. A case in point is the renovation of the Djurdjevi 
Stupovi Church (1170) that was initiated by Zoran Djindjic.15 The Djurdjevi Stu-
povi Church is, of course, integral to Serbian historiography, seeing that Stefan 
Nemanja himself ordered the construction of the church as a dedication to a saint 
who, according to Nemanja, rendered his victory over the Byzantines possible.16 
The church illustrates, in other words, a re-creation of Serbian nation-building 
processes that are based on Orthodoxy. This is significant because it symbolizes 
that Orthodox Slavs merit to be included in the social fabric of present-day Ser-
bia while, drawing on interviews and casual conversations with locals, Muslim 
Slavs are not.
Figure 3.10 View of Novi Pazar from the Altun-Alem Mosque
Source: Picture taken by Joshua E. King.
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It comes as no surprise that Bosniaks turn toward historiographical sources that 
acknowledge their social presence in the very space they inhabit to overcome their 
marginal status. Heritage sites, because they symbolize belonging, are optimal 
sources that illustrate – quite literally – historic continuity. Perhaps Ilcan said 
it best when she stated: “belonging to a place is not an individual matter but an 
experience of being connected in and between social sites of social relations.” As 
a consequence, heritage sites symbolize simultaneous and disputed claims to the 
space of Novi Pazar, which political entrepreneurs variously claim so as to high-
light or dispute collective impressions of belonging among Serbs or Bosniaks, 
respectively.
Social sites and family narratives: chronicles of belonging 
in Novi Pazar
Both Serbs and Bosniaks in Novi Pazar tie narratives of belonging to social sites 
that highlight their respective historiography. In the following, I convey a dia-
logue between Erol and me that started with a chat about the 2012 election during 
which Tomislav Nikolić (SNS) won the Serbian presidency by a narrow margin 
of 49.54 percent. Upon my question about his consideration revolving around the 
recent election in Serbia, Erol replied:
EROL: A predetermined group of people won the elections, which means, Serbs 
won the election. I cannot understand this patriotism. If Nikolić won the elec-
tion. . . . I don’t know. . . . it also means that some Serbs voted for him. I hope 
they forged the elections. If this person won . . . this person who was a perpe-
trator of violence (zločin) in the 1990s. . . . It’s not enough for them that their 
boss (Šešelj) is being judged in the Hague. He was their boss, the president 
of their party. Now he answers for his crimes in the Hague. I mean, what can 
I say about those Serbs that actually voted for him.17
ME: You say “a predetermined group won the elections,” what do you mean by 
that? And, what do you think about the low voter turnout?
EROL: Well, now you’re asking me about something that. . . . You came here to 
observe how people live in this town. Some people stereotype us, and the 
papers make this place look bad all the time. . . . Now . . . this guy won the 
elections. It is completely unimportant how many people turned out to vote 
for him, if they even voted, or not . . . he won. And this is an image that . . . 
you know, is difficult to change in a man. When I see that Nikolić won the 
elections, it is irrelevant how many people voted for him, because I already 
feel bitter. I already feel troubled about his victory. What can I say? Perhaps 
he will be decent. But, you know, these people did something. . . . Look, Vuk 
Drašković. . . . there is this footage that was recorded up by the St. Peters’ 
church. . . . Drašković said: the person who embraces the Turkish or any flag 
except the Serbian one, will lose their hand and their flag. And this person 
is supposed to be a liberal politician . . . if they are Turks. . . . At the begin-
ning, they were not as evil, but by the end, they were really evil, but not at the 
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beginning. But that’s war . . . every war is violent. There is no non-violence 
in wars. You kill someone to establish peace . . . but in a violent way. You 
know, the Turks were here for 500 years, and the Serbian churches were not 
ruined. You know, that kind of speaks for itself, that’s again some evidence 
that makes you think about this situation. Even some Serbs cried when the 
Turks (Turci) left Novi Pazar.18
What Erol refers to in the preceding dialogue is the development of the Progres-
sive Party that re-entered mainstream politics with Tomislav Nikolić at its helm in 
2012. Vuk Drašković, together with Vojislav Šešelj and Mirko Jović, formed the 
Serbian National Renewal party (SNO), though Šešešelj later formed the Serbian 
Radical Party (SRS), half of which was renamed the Serbian Progressive Party 
(SNS) in 2008. For Erol, these men represent a group of people with nationalist 
ambitions and ideologies according to which non-Orthodox Slavs constitute a 
fifth column. Indeed, in the footage that was recorded at the St. Peter and Paul 
Church, Vuk Drašković is seen shouting:
Every person that embraces, on this Rascian land, a Turkish flag, a Croatian 
flag, an Albanian flag, or any other flag except the Serbian flag, will be left 
without a hand, and without a flag!19
According to Drašković, Albanians and Croats also constitute a potentially 
subversive element that undermines the Serbian nation-building process and 
thus the social fabric of Serbia. However, due to the question concerning 
transnational practices between local and Bosniak émigrés, I must focus on 
the Bosniak and/or Muslim community in the Sandžak region. It is interest-
ing to note here that Drašković emphasizes Raška in his speech because the 
Petrova Crkva stands within a ten-minute walking distance from Novi Pazar, 
while Raška lies within 19 kilometers of the church. Novi Pazar, one might 
thus argue, is not an ideal site to propagate national unity from the perspective 
of nationalistically inclined politicians because it poses a misfit for the projec-
tion of an alleged Serbian homogeneity. Drašković’s statement is, moreover, 
an explicit summons to assimilate lest one seeks to lose the claim to the land 
one lives on.
Both parties – Drašković on tape, and Erol during our in-depth interview and 
casual conversations – emphasize historic narratives that warrant belonging. 
Political entrepreneurs as well as locals, in other words, use – and rely on – the 
Ottoman Empire to either find meaning in, substantialize, or dismiss subsequent 
claims to this region in Serbia following the Yugoslav Succession Wars.
It is especially fruitful to recall Erol’s earlier quote about his grandmother, who 
was an Ottoman subject, and his mom, who was a Yugoslav citizen. Both strands, 
the imperial and socialist narratives, conditioned his upbringing. Yet, when asked 
about the sociopolitical situation in Serbia, Erol identifies with the Ottoman past. 
“Even some Serbs cried when the Turks left,” he explained. His understanding of 
present-day circumstances, and thus frame of mind, mirrors the narrative of his 
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grandmother during which “people kept tabs on who is who because of the two 
Balkan wars here.”20 Though he did not experience the two Balkan Wars person-
ally, Erol equates his social condition with that of his grandmother, who narrated 
the exodus of Muslim Slavs following the two Balkan and World Wars to her 
grandson. His social condition reflects that of his grandmother who experienced 
the World Wars and not the peace encountered by his mother. Erol, by parallel-
ing the incident at the Petrova church with the exodus of the Ottomans, may thus 
exemplify the construction of social memory as hypothesized by Halbwachs who 
theorized that memory is “a social construction mainly, if not wholly, shaped by 
the concerns of the present.”21
A second and related aspect in Erol’s quote is strikingly clear; Erol distrusts 
political institutions in Serbia. He learned from his grandmother that Belgrade 
could not be trusted in the past and makes the same experience at present. 
Erol states: “a predetermined group won the elections and hopes they (Bel-
grade) forged the elections.” His statement illustrates two critical points. First, 
Erol differentiates between governmental institutions and ordinary Serbs as he 
voices his hope that average citizens abstained from voting for Nikolić. Sec-
ond, in floating the possibility of rigged presidential elections in Serbia, Erol 
alludes to a broken and potentially unreliable political system. The general 
welfare of the political establishment in Serbia, one may thus extrapolate, is 
not protected.
To put this statement further into perspective, Figure 3.11 illustrates the extent 
to which questionnaire participants distrust governmental institutions. Regarding 
the statement that Belgrade does enough for the equal development of all regions 
in Serbia, 51.6 percent of respondents strongly disagree and 26.9 percent disagree. 
This means a total of 78.5 percent of all questionnaire participants feel that Bel-
grade neglects to develop their region.
Equally telling is the high number of participants who feel their only chance to 
advance in their career depends on whom they know; 81.8 percent of all partici-
pants at least partially agree with the statement that a potentially successful career 
depends on personal relations. Based on these numbers, one may pose that mis-
givings toward Belgrade run deep in the region, a topic that recurred frequently 
during casual conversations and in-depth interviews. These numbers further sug-
gest a strong patronage system in Serbia overall, a finding that correlates with 
research carried out by transparency international.22 According to Andy McDevitt, 
the author of the study, 80 percent of Serbian citizens believe political parties are 
corrupt or extremely corrupt, and that self-censorship increased, while govern-
mental institutions increasingly influence the media.23
Distrust, however, is not only directed at the political establishment in Bel-
grade but also toward local politicians and religious representatives in Novi Pazar. 
Asked if people feel they are valued for their intelligence and abilities in their 
own region, a total of 68.9 percent at least partially disagreed, while 76.6 percent 
agreed at least partially with the statement regarding career advancement if they 
come from a wealthy family.
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Figure 3.11 Opinions toward career options and government services
When asked about misgivings or satisfaction with local politicians, interview-
ees frequently stated disillusion with electoral processes due to manipulation, as 
illustrated by Daud:
It’s easy to be a politician like that. Politicians here just take advantage of 
what hurts people the most. They always remind you about the past, about 
how they burned the mosques one hundred years ago. They never talk about 
what we should do to get ahead, what they should do to make things happen. 
Why do they remind people of what happened a hundred years ago. . . ? Why 
are they politicizing this way?24
Daud refers to the Bosniak side of political and religious leaders who variously 
seek to utilize the symbolism of heritage sites to “persuade people to understand 
themselves, their interests, and their predicaments,” to frame it in the words of 
Brubaker and Cooper.25
In Novi Pazar, there are two Islamic communities: the Islamic Community of 
Serbia (IZS) and the Islamic Community in Serbia (IZuS).26 Both communities 
purport to represent all Muslims of Serbia and thus claim Islamic heritage sites.27 
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The political leadership in Belgrade supports the IZS due to Serbian territorial 
integrity; in contrast, the IZuS is oriented towards Sarajevo.28 Yet, the existence 
of two Islamic communities in Serbia must be understood from the perspective of 
fluctuating border regimes and the way in which distrust in governmental institu-
tions shape local communities. At the local level, disputes that surround the repre-
sentation of the Islamic community in Serbia serve as a prism through which we 
understand that locals do not simply endorse decrees because they are couched in 
religious terms. To the contrary, locals seek to escape the straitjacket of national 
boundaries and partisan policy makers, as illustrated by questionnaire results and 
the preceding statement by Daud.29 Individuals possess agency to choose whether 
they seek to concede to persuasion efforts of political entrepreneurs and, signifi-
cantly, they are also shaped by their families.
Both Daud and Erol grew up in Novi Pazar, are nominal Muslims of similar 
age, though they do not share one and the same view. Erol, as exemplified earlier, 
regularly referred to historiography and narratives as told by his grandmother 
when seeking to make sense of his own social position in Serbia. Daud, inversely, 
ordinarily referred to his nuclear family – his children, wife, and brother – and 
beheld the present to question the political stagnation in Belgrade but also locally. 
Daud, moreover, consistently emphasized his Serbian citizenship and general 
indifference toward Turkey despite taking regular trips to Istanbul to procure 
wares for sale in Novi Pazar. One of the explanations for the disparity between 
Erol and Daud might be their upbringing and perception of the past: Erol was 
co-raised by his grandmother and mother, Daud primarily by his parents. This is 
an important difference one must consider when assessing the strength of transna-
tional relations in Novi Pazar; this will be examined in the next section. For now, 
we must reflect the consistent tenor that runs through all the narratives: distrust 
toward political institutions en masse.
Daud raises an important question about “why they (politicians) politicize the 
way they do.” I would like to reformulate his question to inquire when place- 
making turns into forced homogenization practices. The answer comes from Asem 
who, when asked about his assessment of the current sociopolitical  situation and 
his place in it, replied:
Now, there are several elements that explain the current political climate, 
including nationalism, radicalism, and all that. This was not simply the result 
of our wish, or because we wished for this situation to develop in this way, 
or because we wanted to air our grievances, no. This current situation is a 
result of our defense against the Serbian nationalism we experienced during 
the 1990s. Meaning, some guy called Šešelj appeared on the political scene, 
some guy called Vuk killed people just because they were Muslims. We lived 
here in Serbia, and waited for our turn. . . . And, as a sort of resistance, we, 
our . . . our people created some sort of platform, to protect ourselves from 
that, because people were physically annihilated. Bosnia was right here, our 
neighbor, and we saw what was happening there, and so many family mem-
bers from there came here . . . every day . . . they stayed with us for a while . . . 
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but we were scared from the government, because people would have been 
beaten. . . . This was all done in secret. This is why I say, conditionally, Bos-
niak nationalism, Muslim nationalism. It was not just created because we 
planned this, because we complained about some invented reason, no. It was 
created as an antipode, a protection against the strong nationalism that was 
propagated by Slobodan Milošević, because of the nationalism propagated by 
Šešelj, and Vuk Drašković.30
The platform locals created to protect themselves against Serbian nationalism, as 
suggested by Asem, thus not only caused local ruminations and a reorientation 
toward the past to understand the present, but also led to a nationalist counter-
movement. As a result, interlocutors frequently demonstrated resignation and apa-
thy toward, but also emancipation from, political institutions – local and national. 
Locals, it seems, entered a depoliticized stage in which political information and 
historiography disseminated by way of official channels lost significance.
For instance, Siniša, a stylish, very well-educated and outspoken young (Ser-
bian) man, argued:
For the first time we have local Bosniaks, Muslims, not atheists, who say: 
Look, I appreciate and respect your opinion, and I also wish for my rights to 
be respected, but I don’t want to be told how to live. I want to live freely and 
in tune with 21st century values. This actually leads to democratization the 
way it has in BiH were Bosniaks say they don’t need anybody telling them 
that they are Muslims. They know that by themselves, too. They don’t need a 
mufti to tell them they are not good Muslims.31
Because religious and political leaders seek to influence locals, informants often 
emphasized aversion toward officially sanctified historiography, as was the case 
with Mirijam, who emphasized oral history as opposed to official sources pro-
vided by the government:
I always consider both sides, the side of those people that are manipulated, and 
those that are armed to carry out inhuman acts, things from which they will 
never recover. . . . That’s what interests me. I am telling you, history is like 
that. Anyway, I believe in the history that is told by the simple people here. You 
know . . . ahm . . . all that government wants to do is exploit history.32
Interlocutors regularly refer to external forces that seek to manipulate and/or 
persuade individuals to adopt particular perspectives. This was the case with 
Drašković, who instructed Muslim Slavs to embrace the Serbian flag, and a nation-
alizing group of Bosniak political and religious leaders as described by Asem.
History – mythologized versions thereof that are tied to specific cultural arti-
facts – is a powerful agent that carries local narratives, especially when infused 
into still existing heritage sites. Yet, humans are not monoliths who absorb mes-
sages of political entrepreneurs without reflection. Individuals are influenced by 
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their social circumstances but also conditioned by their family history, as illus-
trated by Daud and Erol.
Erol, who had a very close relationship with his grandmother, emphasized the 
500-year history of the Ottomans when asked about national elections, highlight-
ing that Ottomans never destroyed Orthodox Churches. Daud, who does not have 
relatives in Turkey but goes to Istanbul regularly, rarely stressed family narratives, 
even when directly asked about them. Instead, he ordinarily chose to focus on the 
duties the government fails to fulfill. It is important to understand this differen-
tiation because it sheds light on how interviewees view the past and the salience 
locals confer upon informal historic narratives and non-state, ‘alternative social 
networks’ in turn.33
Collapsing the time-space continuum
Overall, 69.5 percent of 500 questionnaire participants confirmed to have fam-
ily members who migrated from Novi Pazar to Turkey. It is through these filial 
relations and the connected narratives of migration – forced and voluntary – that 
locals “take up contact with the past.”34 Overall, 69.5 percent of all questionnaire 
participants have family members who migrated to Turkey, while 46.4 percent of 
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means a little less than every other person has connections to members of their 
family who moved to Turkey since the first wave migrated in 1876/78. Transna-
tional contacts, however strong they may be, are couched within the physical and 
tangible heritage sites left over from the Ottoman era and revitalized by way of the 
Yugoslav Succession Wars. As such, tacit knowledge about the migration to inte-
rior Ottoman lands resurfaced where it acquired a public value. Tacit knowledge 
about earlier migratory waves allowed for operationalizing transnational practices 
for symbolic but also practical means. As such, the first narrative as hypothesized 
in the previous chapter is substantialized because these relations present a seem-
ingly chronological extension between the past and the present.
Interlocutors, as illustrated earlier, associate the presence of the Ottoman 
Empire in Southeastern Europe with the still existing, though often decaying 
social heritage sites in Novi Pazar. In turn, social heritage sites connect present-
day concerns tangibly with memories narrated by elder generations who not only 
seem to re-experience the past but also confirm the social condition younger indi-
viduals experience at present. Halbwachs theorized that older men and women
are in a most favorable position to evoke events of the past as they really 
appeared. But if these events recur is this not because they were always 
there?35
Senior citizens, by preserving the past, link younger generations to a history they 
did not experience by themselves. Under the un-‘favorable’ conditions that were 
the Yugoslav Succession Wars, links to the émigré community turned into salient 
connections because they confirm existing assumptions among locals that Bos-
niak citizens had no place in society. Younger generations, in other words, experi-
ence a present that mirrors the past as narrated by elders; a feedback loop between 
social sites and unofficial, or rather orally transmitted history, is created. Such 
links are powerful because, as stated by Halbwachs:
Memory gives us the illusion of living in the midst of groups which do not 
imprison us, which impose themselves on us only so far and so long as we 
accept them.36 . . . In short, the most painful aspects of yesterday’s society 
are forgotten because constraints are felt only so long as they operate and 
because, by definition, a past constraint has ceased to be operative.37
In the case of Novi Pazar, past constraints turned operative once more when 
nationalistically inclined political entrepreneurs seized heritage sites to denounce 
all affiliation with the Turks (i.e., the Ottoman Empire). Though not sequential, 
events following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, including the exodus of 
loved ones and abolition of favorable social conditions that subjects of the Porte 
enjoyed, are strung together into a seamless chronological narrative in which 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and the subsequent Jugoslav State 
imprisoned the Sandžak region by imposing themselves upon Bosniak Muslims. 
Ergo, life – or a reconstructed recollection thereof – was better under the Porte, 
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and might be favorable under Turkish rule. Painful memories of loss and eradica-
tion of commonly held values were thus a focal point around which interlocutors 
spun their narratives to understand present circumstances. This is especially the 
case for elder generations. Mustafa Imamović, too, argued along these lines and 
stated that elder generations “suffered the most, because they still remembered the 
Turkish administrative system” and feared persecution.38 Senior citizens raised by 
parents who remembered the collapse of Ottoman governing structures thus pre-
sent an especially significant link to this past. These individuals connect the past 
to the present in the form of narrative transmission.
Leijla is one of those individuals who was raised by parents who experienced 
the Ottoman Empire. Though she does not know the exact date of her birth, she 
states she is “somewhere in her upper nineties.” She wears her long white hair in 
a bun and speaks so softly that all activity seems to grind to a halt when she does. 
Her two daughters sat beside her and listened intently as she spoke of migration, 
expulsion, and the two Balkan and World Wars. Both of her daughters nodded 
empathetically as Leijla rummaged in her memories upon my asking if there were 
people she knew who had migrated to Turkey:
Indeed, child (bogumi jeste, sine). Yes, there have been a lot of families who 
left. My two sisters left also. I was the third daughter. I stayed here. Mom and 
dad both died . . . and I got married when my sisters left for Turkey. Now, 
everyone has grown old. I grew old, my sisters grew old, our kids are old. . . . 
I don’t even know when they left here anymore . . . can’t remember the year 
anymore . . . which year.39
During our conversation, I learned that Leijla’s sisters left for Turkey sometime 
during the early 1930s. Speaking from a first-person, past-tense perspective, Lei-
jla conveys a personal autobiographic experience in the preceding quote. Later on, 
during our taped conversation, Leijla mixed her lived experience with historicized 
events the way I encountered in younger generations when they spoke of the Otto-
man Empire:
Back in 1912, there were beatings, fighting . . . that was somewhere around 
1912. . . maybe. I don’t know. It doesn’t even matter which year it was. . . . 
When the Austrians came, that’s when everybody left immediately. . . . some 
fled to Turkey, after that, people started to leave.40
Though Leijla was not sure when she was born, it is not likely that she remembers 
the outbreak of the first Balkan War. To her, however, these events seem to present 
a logic continuity of past incidents that were conveyed to her when she herself 
was a child. Her repeated oblivion for time is, to be sure, a sign of old age. Yet, it 
is also indicative of how the past blends together to form the present when people 
are asked to narrate their experience from memory.
During the Balkan Wars in 1912/13, Serbia and Montenegro unified, upon 
which the Sandžak of Novi Pazar ceased to exist officially. Since then, the region 
Novi Pazar as a mnemonic nucleus 101
is no longer a legal entity but a mental map that symbolizes a common history 
among Bosniaks.41 Reflecting on the Balkan Wars, Sabrina Ramet stated that con-
flicts between Bosniaks and Serbs were of class nature but also ensued as a form 
of revenge against subjects who were formerly loyal to the Porte:
Some violence had a class nature with Serbian peasants seizing land from 
Muslim estate-owners. But Muslim peasants were also targeted, because 
they were Muslims. Most of Serbia’s troops had had no experience of living 
among Muslims, and had been brought up to think of Muslims as such almost 
as mythical symbols of the enemies of Serbia. In addition, such sentiments 
were reportedly fanned by the Serbian boulevard press.42
As a general note, one might note the striking similarity of this quote when con-
sidering the 1990s. In reflecting on the quote in isolation, in other words, one 
might mistake this assessment for a description of the Yugoslav Succession Wars. 
Be that as it may, interlocutors deliberated both of these aspects, including the 
general fear and class disparities upon my question how and why people left 
Southern Serbia, and Novi Pazar in particular:
They went to Turkey because they were scared. Do you know what was hap-
pening here back then? It was the agrarian reform. They took from the offic-
ers (Aghe) and the chieftains/governors (begs) who had a lot – and the others 
where workers (čifčije). They worked for them for money, for a little bit of 
money. But they had a lot of money. Eh, then the state (država) took every-
thing, and divided it up equally. But they were used to living . . . but they also 
left because they were scared.43
Though Leijla does not remember these events of her own accord, she was intent 
on conveying how she felt about the Balkan Wars, the subsequent dispossession 
and cycle of retribution that followed: “the things I experienced here . . . I remem-
ber this fear,” she repeated over and over.44 Notions of pain and fear, such as the 
one described by Leijla, are not communicable through history books or debated 
in public. Instead, these are transferred within the family unit or swapped among 
close acquaintances.
Interviewees emphasized affectual reactions they either experienced, as was the 
case with Leijla, or heard by way of narratives transmitted by parents and grand-
parents, as was the case with Erol. Past grievances, in other words, were not aired 
in public, as emphasized by Asem:
And that’s this fear, do you understand. . . . Some četnik slaughtered my 
grandfather here. . . . he was only 13 when the četniks killed his father. This 
is all public knowledge, but nobody talks about it in public.45
After the unification of the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene Kingdom (KSHS) 
in 1918, the agrarian reform continued to herald retributions against Muslims. 
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Local Serbian peasants avenged former landholders “very often with the nod-
ding encouragement of Serb authorities.”46 Rich and poor Muslims were equally 
targeted by Serbian paramilitary and voluntary militia groups who were set to 
profit from the emigration of local Muslims, and peasants used the general law-
lessness at the time to seize land, as described by Husnija Kamberović.47 Signifi-
cantly, local Muslims organized a revolt against dispossession which, however, 
was swiftly quashed by the newly minted monarchy.48 As a consequence, Muslim 
Slavs continued the migratory process to interior Ottoman lands that had started 
in 1876/78.
Interviewees emphasized how they felt about these events, because they were 
not present to witness them in person. Both Leijla and Asem highlighted fear as 
a salient component that led to the large migration of local Muslims to Albania, 
Macedonia, and interior Ottoman lands in general. Yet, these events are so far in 
the past that hardly anyone alive between 2012 and 2018 could remember these 
events personally. Narrative transmission practices within families were thus 
likely strong. Leijla’s interview is illustrative of this possibility, given her blend-
ing of autobiographical and historicized narratives.
Because the 1990s seemed like a recurrence to elder generations, narratives 
of the past not only came to mirror present circumstances but parallel each other 
across generations. Here, a statement given by Leijla’s daughter is especially 
edifying:
They . . . were under the Turks for a long time. A long time. 500 years. Now, 
they are convinced that those of us who stayed here, are some sort of sub-
Turks (pod-Turci), or whatever else they think we are. That is how they 
think . . . that we should pay for something they had experienced.49
Leijla’s daughter grew up in the former SFRY and never experienced the govern-
ing structures of the Porte. And yet, her statement reads as though she grew up 
during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and encountered subsequent retribu-
tions against Muslim Slavs herself. It is instructive to recall Hyvärinen’s expecta-
tion analysis of changing, failing or realized expectations here.50 Leijla’s daughter 
states, “now they are convinced” that Bosniaks are sub-Turks. She speaks, in 
other words, in the present tense, and states that Orthodox Serbs avenge Muslims 
for their collaboration with the Porte at present. Between the narrative memory 
reconstruction of her senescent mother and her own experiences of the 1990s, one 
might argue the social conditions within which Leijla grew up after the turn of the 
century mirrors her own.
Narratives oscillate between the past and the present, a process that is invigor-
ated by local skepticism toward governing structures. Oral history thus acquires 
additional weight, as iterated by Mirijam:
I don’t consider the official history, only what Bosniaks tell each other unoffi-
cially, the memory of Bosniaks. And there is so much that happened here dur-
ing the 20th century. . . . I mean, this is not a long historical period. When you 
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look at it from the perspective of historical times, then, I guess, it is somehow 
short. But so much happened here, and nearly every family has relatives who 
moved from the Sandžak (region) to Turkey. I am talking about the Sandžak 
region now, but this happened to all Bosniaks in Southeastern Europe. All this 
also happened in Bosnia, in Macedonia . . . since 1912 when the Balkan Wars 
started, since the Ottoman Empire left this region. When the Turks stopped to 
govern this region, many of the Islamized peoples here (islamizirani narod) 
found themselves within new borders. A lot of them . . . they had a really hard 
time to adjust. They were like fish on land. . . . One people (jedan narod) were 
suddenly supposed to divide into four, five new states.51
Besides confirming wariness with officially sanctioned historiographies, Mirijam 
taps into a significant narrative in this quote, namely the common supposition 
that all Bosniaks lived as one under the Ottoman Empire. Following the logic of 
this recurring conjecture among informants, Bosniaks constitute a diaspora – one 
community that was forced to espouse monarchic and subsequent supranational 
and national values to fit into newly created states. It is difficult to overstate this 
last argument. Local Bosniaks learned about the seemingly recurring past from 
individuals who narrated the breakup of an empire by way of violent expulsion, 
state-led misappropriation of property, and fear on the basis of their belonging to 
an ostracized religious group. This recurring experience of the past, however, con-
nects locals not only with their history but also with the entire Bosniak diaspora 
that was subject to the same developments. Locals in Novi Pazar are, according 
to this logic, not subject to Serbia but belong to this very diaspora that was left 
scattered around Southeastern Europe and Turkey following the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire.
Because the newly minted monarchy of Southeastern Europe was to avoid 
existing cohesion with the antiquated Porte, borders replaced millets while Mus-
lims were stripped of their privileges. Economic privation, and new state struc-
tures were consequently a recurring topic that informants addressed. According 
to Mirijam:
The borders constantly changed! Up, down, up down . . . and the people 
were constantly on the move, now to the left, then to the right. You know, 
the Ottoman Empire existed here for about 500 years. During that time, 
they strengthened their power here. But those institutions were not held 
by Turks. Those institutions were mostly in the hands of those who had 
converted to Islam. I am not going to talk about who is a Bosniak, are 
they this or that . . . no. Anyway, they were landowners before all else (pre 
svega). In the Balkans, those included Albanians, Klefts, Illyrians, and all 
those who embraced it (Islam). . . . eh, and those people, as Islamized (kao 
islamizirani narod) peoples had, how to say, privileges. Of course, the main 
rights. And they were in those Ottoman institutions, which is why, when the 
Ottoman army moved out, they were left without their state, and stripped 
of those privileges.52
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Mirijam repeated time and again that she did not consult history books to learn 
about the past. Instead, she was intent on listening to oral testimonies given by 
locals. Her interview corroborates the above assumption by which locals swap 
stories to learn about a past with which interviewees identify at present. Mirijam 
also raises the important aspect of privileges and the loss of property.
The loss of property following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was a regu-
lar topic I encountered in casual conversations and interviews. Omar, an older, 
very tall and hefty gentleman, for instance, explained:
They came here, and they started to kill people. They took the properties from 
families. Then they gave the land to the other people, the Austrian Slavs . . . 
all the Imams became jobless because of this development.53
The loss of property is evidently tied to reprisals by which Orthodox peasants 
seized land from the former beys – a development that is further tied to the abol-
ishment of religious institutions. Seen from this perspective, the abolishment of 
religious institutions was not simply an act of seizing land and mosques. Instated, 
the act of seizing heritage sites implies a loss of common values. To put it in Miri-
jam’s words, Bosniaks “were like fish on land” after the creation of nation-states 
in place of the old Ottoman Empire. Omar and Mirijam thus both substantiate 
Bourdieu’s theory that material conditions endow social actors with “schemes 
of perception.”54 Omar elucidates that heritage sites were not simply structures 
made of concrete, but tied to a specific way of life Ottoman subjects were accus-
tomed to:
Usually, people who were considered to have enough means of their own 
and for their families paid into a foundation in the form of zakāt,55 to support 
the community, schools, and other things. Families used to have their own 
school, madrasas, here. But . . . those institutions were taken away from Bos-
niak families, and those properties fell apart.56
Like Leijla’s daughter, Omar portrays the sociopolitical transformation as though 
he was himself present at the time. Whether relations exchanged anecdotes within 
the family unit or not, narrative events about the consequences following the col-
lapse of the Ottoman Empire impressed themselves on the public conscience to 
such an extent that interviewees perceive them as their own.
In addition to emphasizing the loss of property and depletion of income for 
religious institutions, Omar’s statement implies a forced acquiescence on the side 
of the Bosniak community, an aspect that also recurred in Leijla’s interview:
Everything was settled . . . those who had possessions, those who had to leave, 
where to, and how they had to divide [into the different parts of] Yugoslavia.57
Leijla, Omar, and Mirijam seem to suggest here that Bosniaks were no longer 
able to exercise their own autonomy. Bosniaks – as was the case with individual 
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Muslims who identify with other nationalities at present – were told to leave their 
home, their friends, and a way of life they knew. This is an important aspect, 
because it bears an aspect of ambiguity. Muslims who moved to interior Otto-
man lands were forced to leave their home. And yet, early émigrés managed to 
preserve a way of life by doing so. An interview excerpt from Amer, a young 
descendent from a Bosniak and Albanian family that had settled in Turkey during 
the 1920s, is insightful here:
My grandmother had lived in this one village ever since she came here (to 
Turkey). So we went to visit there for Bayram. They were Republicans, they 
were part of the Turkish Republic. They felt and called themselves Turks.58
At that time, Novi Pazar was no longer a viable trading town and lost its economic 
significance.59 When Amer’s grandparents left Southeastern Europe, Novi Pazar 
turned from a place of trade into one of transmigration for Muslims who sought 
to leave Southeastern Europe.60 This was especially the case during the second 
migratory wave. The Turkish state was instrumental as regards the migration of 
Muslim Slavs, seeing that Ankara passed the Law on Settlement that allowed 
members of Muslim communities to migrate and settle in Turkey. The Law on 
Settlement stipulated:
Those who are accepted as ‘muhacir’ are given Turkish citizenship by the 
Council of Ministers. Muhacir are people of Turkish descent or those who 
either come as an individual to settle in Turkey or who make their application 
as a group.61
Kemal Kirişci, however, draws attention to the fact about the inexistence of clear 
criteria that defined Turkish ‘ethnicity and culture’. Instead, according to Kirişci, 
it was “the Council of Ministers that (is) [was] empowered to decide which groups 
abroad qualified as belonging to Turkish ethnicity and culture.”62 Muslims fell 
into two groups upon migrating to Turkey: iskânli göçmen and serbest göçmen.
Iskânli göçmen depended on state support for their resettlement.63 Migrants of 
this group were, according to Kirişci, settled into predetermined areas because 
the state allocated land to these émigrés. This type of state support, however, sub-
sided in the 1930s as land became stretched thin.64 Serbest göçmen, by contrast, 
included migrants who left their residence of origin on their own behest. They 
were stipulated to apply for resettlement before leaving and were free to settle 
anywhere in Turkey upon receiving a visa.65 Amer’s grandparents belonged to 
this early group of migrants who moved to Turkey for good. People of these early 
waves migrated to the Republic as Ottoman subjects and subsequent Turks, not 
as Bosniaks.
There are several explanations as to why the Sandžak region turned into a space 
of transmigration, including safety and bureaucratic reasons. Asem stated, for 
instance, that Novi Pazar was “still considered safe at the time.”66 Jovanović indi-
cates administrative reasons, seeing that Sandžak was a place where locals give 
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up their citizenship – a stipulation lest one sought to apply for a visa in Turkey. 
By the 1950s, he states, “a river of émigrés traveled through Sandžak, and on to 
Macedonia.”67
The last wave of Muslims left Southeastern Europe in the wake of WWII.68 
Turkey and Yugoslavia had by now signed the Turkish-Yugoslav convention in 
1938 and arranged further population exchanges in the form of the ‘Gentlemen’s 
Agreement’ in 1953. These two documents facilitated the emigration of Muslim 
Slavs to Turkey, provided they spoke the Turkish language or else ascribed to 
republican values. Bosniaks were particularly welcome in Turkey as these groups 
were thought to assimilate to Turkish values and norms with ease. Here, the pre-
viously mentioned reconciliation between Turkey and the Yugoslav Republic 
spurred the second large emigration wave from Southeastern Europe to Turkey, a 
period that lasted well into the 1960s when this wave slowly abated.
With the outbreak of the Yugoslav Succession Wars, Bosniaks again migrated 
and fled Southeastern Europe. Relying on a report from 1994, Kirişci states that 
20,000 Bosniak refugees settled in Turkey, some of whom moved in with rela-
tives in Istanbul.69 The greatest number, however, settled into the prefabricated 
housing for the Bulgarian refugee wave of 1989, which was provided by the 
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). A mix of government and non- 
governmental authorities, including hospitals and schools, the Anatolian Devel-
opment Foundation, and private citizens provided these refugees with aid in the 
form of schooling, care for injured Bosniak soldiers, and vocational training.70
Asem did not elect to leave Novi Pazar during the 1990s, and he gave the fol-
lowing answer when asked about his decision to stay in Southern Serbia:
On my mom’s side, they came to Novi Pazar sometime in the 1890s. . . . My 
mom’s side is Albanian, and they came to live here before 1900. My grandpa on 
my mom’s side was a tailor. He ran his own cooperative. He had three brothers, 
and they all lived together under one roof. After the great war, sometime in 
1922, or 1923 – that is when people from here started to move to  Turkey – 
two brothers of his also left. My grandfather stayed here. Those two that left 
were sent to Izmir where the Turks had driven out the Greek population, 
by the island there. When the generation of the 1950s started to emigrate, 
they went to Pendik by Istanbul. And, ahm, somehow, as is the case in any 
war, I know for example how it was in this war, during the bombing, I also 
stayed here. My older brother and my younger sister both left for Turkey, they 
couldn’t live like this. You can’t persuade people, or explain, why they should 
stay or leave. Nobody knows how they react in such a situation, to this fear, 
somehow. . . . Look, I told you about my son; Before he was born, I didn’t 
think that I would experience his birth as something that would make me this 
happy. When he was here, I was happy. But I didn’t know what it would feel 
like before he came. This is the same principle. Just the opposite. Bombing. 
At that time, I had three children, my oldest son was eight, my daughter was 
four, and then there was the baby. Now, when I consider the whole situation 
with some logic, I would tell myself to leave. But then, you couldn’t get me 
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out of here. No chance. My older sister also stayed, but my older brother, 
and my younger sister, they both went to Turkey. We have a house there in 
Turkey, by the sea. So, they left. They were there during the bombardment. 
They left in April and returned by September. I went after the bombardment 
ended. I went there to recuperate for a month, and after that we all came 
back together. Those are strange times, when you experience such things. So, 
there is no clear answer to your question about why I stayed. It just happens. 
There are no big conclusions here. You just don’t plan for these things, never. 
And, I can imagine these people back then. . . . When someone is forced to 
leave . . . there was misery, poverty, there was not one particular reason. Just 
fear for one’s life. You could basically disappear overnight. The next day, 
there would be rumors about how they shot you, as in, this guy disappeared, 
that guy disappeared. . . . And people weren’t even supposed to ask what had 
happened to whom. And the rumors about what exactly happened just keep 
spreading because people couldn’t talk about it openly out of fear about their 
disappearing, too. . . . Think about it, Sandra, what if I told someone that I am 
selling my house, or anything else, and I leave, and you can be sure that there 
are thieves around, and people purposefully scare you away because your 
house is right downtown, because they want your house. . . . And because of 
this, you have nowhere else to go when some official doesn’t hand you out 
the documents that allow you to leave the country. So, he stays where he is. 
We can’t understand their motives from this distance. Look, it’s still the same, 
we, as a country in general, we don’t have a defined direction. What we want 
to do, who we are, what is it that we actually want!? If we at least knew what 
we do not want, what we no longer are. . . . This would actually open a path 
toward the future. If we were able to say, this is right, and this is wrong, to 
admit it was a crime that some person was liquidated 70 years ago. I didn’t 
read these things in a book; I learned these things by listening to my family 
members. This means there was someone who’s name was četnik (znači, tu 
je bio neko ko se zvao četnik), and don’t ask me if a soldier is responsible for 
his own actions or not. This someone killed my grandfather. And now, I am 
supposed to have a sort of approach to this as if it never happened. But it is 
all connected.71
This quote is, to be sure, exceedingly long. Yet, it was imperative to keep this 
answer together for two specific reasons. First, Asem corroborates all narrative 
strands that recurred in casual conversations and in-depth interviews, as illus-
trated here. These include the significance of heritage sites, and loss of prop-
erty, autonomy, and safety – or rather the lack thereof – among Muslim Slavs 
in Southern Serbia. Second, and connected, is the fact that Asem illustrates the 
extent to which interviewees collapse the time-space continuum to understand 
their current sociopolitical situation. Nearly all interviewees oscillated between 
past and present narratives during casual conversations and in-depth interviews – 
Asem articulated this aspect most clearly. Instead of handing me a simple answer 
as to why he chose to stay in Novi Pazar during the war years, he lunged into a 
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full-fledged historic explanation that he couched into previous decisions his fam-
ily members made in the past. His narrative is a clear and chronological continuity 
to a non-sequential past. This is especially clear when reconsidering his favorable 
description of the former SFRY. Yet, upon my inquiry about his decision to stay, 
he clearly displayed affinity toward the social condition as experienced by family 
members who left the Sandžak region out of fear.
The extent to which interviewees string narrated atrocities together with auto-
biographical experiences of the 1990s is striking. Cognitive connections with the 
émigré community – based on memory transmission within the family unit – form 
a bedrock for the continuity of social relations among Bosniaks for two reasons. 
First, connecting with the émigré community served the purpose of “symbolic or 
normative anchoring” by which interlocutors superseded their loss to the Yugo-
slav community.72 Second, family relations with the émigré Bosniak community 
in Turkey assumed the character of a collective diaspora experience and herit-
age with which locals identify, even in the absence of strong personal relations 
to émigrés. The fact that much of the local Ottoman heritage stands in tatters 
serves as powerful and very public reminder for the marginalization of Muslims 
in Southern Serbia. Though many local Bosniaks had not emigrated themselves, 
they nevertheless identify with and to some extent exhibit a diasporic experience 
as a result. Narratives by which locals learn about the past are, crucially, tied to the 
loss of cultural heritage sites and private property, as illustrated earlier.
And yet, not all interlocutors share the same experiences. It is thus important to 
recall Marsden, who cautioned that individuals construct associations of and with 
the past based on present circumstances, while heeding Brubaker and Cooper’s 
invitation to go beyond ethnicity as a bounded entity that connects individuals. As 
such, it is instructive to illustrate, shortly, that maintaining rapport with the émigré 
community was difficult if indeed impossible at times.
The maintenance of kin relations across space and time
Considering the maintenance of kin relations from our perspective seems an easy 
feat. Bearing in mind the first large-scale migration from Southeastern Europe to 
interior Ottoman lands and Turkey took place around the turn of the century, how-
ever, renders the uptake of relations across newly forming state borders difficult. 
Interlocutors variously confirmed this notion. Upon my asking if Leijla managed 
to stay in contact with her sisters after they left Novi Pazar, she answered:
I went to Turkey twice. I was there for a month . . . perhaps I have even been 
there three times. But I went later, now there is public transportation. Back 
then, you had to travel for months at the time to get there, and you didn’t 
know how. She (my sister) also came here, later. You know, people were 
afraid of coming back here, of being stuck here when you returned . . . it’s 
hard from me. . . . I cannot talk about that . . . that one sister that left . . . both 
of my sisters left.73
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Structural difficulties thus hampered efforts to sustain contact among family mem-
bers. Once family members emigrated, moreover, individuals feared to return, 
which further strained filial connections over time.
Finding relatives in Turkey after they migrated, moreover, bore its own dif-
ficulties because émigrés received new identity cards, at times along with new 
surnames upon arrival. This was the case for Amer’s family:
My grandmother has a different surname than her brother. They came at dif-
ferent times to Turkey. I am not sure who came first, but they came at different 
times, and were situated in different locations in Anatolia at first. So, they had 
to find each other. I don’t know how, but they did.74
While this seems inconsequential for Amer himself, reconnecting with relatives 
in Novi Pazar was exceedingly difficult because he did not know the last name of 
his relatives.
Language serves as an additional and decisive factor that permits relations to 
uphold connections across time and space, or not. Amer, for instance, explained:
My mom’s dad was born in Novi Pazar, so, of course, this is the birthplace of 
a beloved person for the whole family. But, I think this is not enough to feel 
that connected. . . . I mean, she does not know the language. She would have 
to know Albanian and Bosnian. And me, I don’t speak Albanian, or Bosnian 
either. So . . . even if she came here, she won’t understand anything.75
Following this logic, Amer feels fealty toward the birthplace of his ancestors, so 
much so that he traveled to Novi Pazar to discover his roots. Yet, he questions 
whether this serves as a glue that is strong enough for the continuation of a com-
mon bond across space and time. One might therefore argue that socialization 
processes in Turkey and Yugoslavia, respectively, superseded ethnic ties.
Synthesis
Informants clearly identify with the past as demonstrated earlier. The seemingly 
salient tradition of narrative transmission of historiographical experiences within 
the family unit is especially notable. Halbwachs stated that memories might be lost 
lest they are resurrected by way of nearly forgotten associations.76 The Yugoslav 
Succession Wars served as one such association that brought these recollections 
to the fore with full force. Because narrated experiences recounted by elders to 
some extent mirrored the experiences of younger individuals at present, the Yugo-
slav Succession Wars served as an indicator that history indeed recurred. Muslims 
and/or Bosniaks lost the right to own much of the estates they owned prior to the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire following the Balkan and World Wars, as was 
the case across the border in Bosnia during the Yugoslav Succession Wars. As a 
consequence, heritage sites (and private property) are an important piece to the 
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puzzle, seeing that they serve as visible and public reminders about the marginal-
ized status Bosniaks and/or Muslims inhabit(ed).
Both Serbian as well as Bosniak and/or Muslim political entrepreneurs 
capitalize(d) on cultural and religious heritage sites to emphasize historiographic 
presence and thus social belonging. Yet, locals are no longer content with and 
distrust officially sanctified historiographic accounts. As a result, locals turn to 
narrated sources of historiography to understand their social circumstances at pre-
sent. Transnational connections build a focal point within these narratives, seeing 
that Bosniaks ascertain their place within the larger, scattered diaspora experi-
ence. As such, local Bosniaks – while belonging within the jurisdiction of Ser-
bia – find a symbolic anchor within the transnational connections that link them 
with the émigré community in Turkey by tangible means.
And yet, it is vital to acknowledge and stress that this is a symbolic anchor – 
an anchor that is not based in or determined by a purportedly common ethnic 
denominator. Socialization processes and the tradition of narrative transmission 
within the family unit, for instance, influenced the degree to which individuals 
identified with the past, as illustrated with Erol and Daud. Structural barriers fur-
ther illustrate the difficulty by which locals were able to uphold kin relations. 
Time and structural factors variously served as stimuli or detracting factors that 
allowed for kin relations to stay intact, or not. Amer and Leijla illustrate this point 
vividly. Overall, one can ascertain that Asem is the closest to his family. This 
can be explained by the fact that his family members migrated to Turkey in the 
1960s and again in the 1990s. As such, one might confirm the earlier statement 
that Bosniaks of the third wave migrated to Turkey as Bosniaks and no longer 
as co-Turks. Individuals of this last large migratory wave migrated to an estab-
lished state and come closest to our current understanding of migratory patterns 
to established states. One might thus further argue that this last group – Bosniak 
migrants belonging to the third wave – builds the core of individuals with which 
local Bosniaks connected during the Yugoslav Succession Wars.
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4  Recontextualizing narratives 
of šverc within the discourse 
of economic collapse
In Part II, I retraced how Bosniaks identify and narrate events related to the 
practice of šverc to examine the salience of transnational ties between locals and 
the émigré Bosniak community across time and space. Due to the experience 
of the Yugoslav Succession Wars, locals reconstructed a narrative in which life 
had been safe under the Porte and perhaps favorable within a Turkish sphere 
of governance. Senior citizens in Novi Pazar are instrumental in this process. 
They were raised by parents who remembered the collapse of Ottoman governing 
structures and present a living link to a past that yet exists physically in the form 
of social heritage sites in Novi Pazar. Transnational relations, in other words, are 
couched into a “shared event of practice” that connects present narratives to the 
past, thus serving the purpose of sense-making by which locals understand their 
socio-political situation at present.1 To answer the overarching question of how 
transnational practices shaped this communities’ social relations locally, I will 
reconstruct a sociopolitical and economic version of events as reported by the 
Večernje Novosti2 newspaper between 1993 and 1995 in this chapter. Recon-
structing sociopolitical and economic events between 1993 and 1995 serves the 
purpose of embedding experiences as narrated by interlocutors in Novi Pazar 
within a larger, national frame.
Novosti is a fruitful source by which to reconstruct and analyze a version of 
sociopolitical and economic events in Serbia. Serving discursive functions that 
shaped nationalizing processes before the outbreak of the Yugoslav Succession 
Wars started, the paper, for instance, leaked the infamous SANU memorandum.3 
During the war, the paper enjoyed the highest circulation rates across national 
boundaries and within Serbia. By 1990, Novosti sold up to 222,282 copies and 
thus led circulation by numbers ahead of other prominent papers, including the 
Večerni list (ZG), Politika ekspres (BG), and Politika (BG).4
Regarding the time frame, I chose to view newspaper articles published between 
1993 and 1995 despite the United Nations enacting of sanctions on Yugoslavia in 
19915 and rising inflationary rates during the 1980s.6 Belgrade ordained a media 
crackdown between 1991 and 1995, which manipulated the nature of news Ser-
bian citizens consumed.7 In their effort to quash anticipated dissent among jour-
nalists, the Serbian regime purged the media staff following the electoral victory 
of the Socialist Party in 1993.8 By 1994, Borba (resistance) was the only reliably 
118 Part III
independent newspaper, which nevertheless ousted regime disloyal individu-
als in December 1994.9 Concurrently, previous research recorded a reduction in 
the formal economic sector, and a minimum per capita consumption by 1993.10 
Between 1993 and 1994, individuals in the Yugoslav rump state experienced gal-
loping inflation rates of up to 313 million percent per month,11 while the Dayton 
Peace Accords in 1995 heralded an end of sanctions and a steady, albeit sluggish 
stabilization of the market thereafter. As such, examining the time frame between 
1993 and 1995 allows for insight into the socioeconomic state of Serbia when 
inflation, sanctions, and informal-market activities intersect with a governmental 
crackdown on the media.
Coding for šverc, for instance, suggests the prominence of smuggling increased 
between 1993 and 1994, for the term appears 2.5 times more often between those 
years. By 1995, the term šverc appears 5.5 times more often when compared to 
1995. In 1995, the paper discussed šverc 215 times in one year.
One might further assume that even though the socioeconomic situation 
improved in 1995, šverc had already turned into an ordinary practice that did 
not subside with the Dayton Peace Accords. Because Belgrade used informal 
channels to penetrate the sanctions, political actors cultivated transnational trade 
relations so long as the state benefited from the sanctions-busting businesses. Bel-
grade not only approved of but fostered small-scale šverc to penetrate the inter-
nationally imposed trade sanctions on Serbia during the first half of the 1990s. 
Perhaps Momčilo Grubač said it best when he explained the Serbian regime 
accepted criminal activities as a source of state stability.12 Belgrade was thus ini-
tially unwilling to dismantle informal trade practices for the sake of state stability 
and proved unable to quash informal trade practices thereafter.
Utilizing the narrative frame of interlocutors, I further coded for the terms 
‘Ottoman’ and ‘Turkey’ to analyze how the news portrayed Ankara and the Otto-
man past. Further terms, including weapons, drugs, cigarettes, Islam and Muslim, 
borders, gray and black market, and (consumer) prices are utilized here for three 
reasons. First, interlocutors regularly referred to terms such as Turkey, Islam and 
Muslim, borders, and šverc when narrating experiences of the 1990s. I therefore 
apply these terms to recontextualize local narratives about the 1990s. Second, 
smuggling practices include the terminology of buvljak (a type of flea market) 
and šverc because the availability of goods occupied locals in their everyday lives, 
while smugglers brought coffee, cigarettes, and other consumer goods across the 
shifting borders of the Yugoslav rump state. Discursive schemes about informal 
goods, including weapons, are coded for because interviewees narrated experi-
ences of governmental intimidation practices against Albanian and Bosniak citi-
zens of Serbia based on their alleged clandestine harboring of firearms during 
the Succession Wars. Third, utilizing the coded words demonstrates how regime-
loyal representatives portrayed the practice of šverc in the paper.
To narrow the analytic frame, I also coded for Belgrade to compare the dis-
course about šverc to that of smuggling in Novi Pazar by utilizing the Atlas.ti 
coefficiency table (Table 4.1).











































































































































































































































































































































To gauge discursive qualifications about Islam and Muslims, as well as Turkey, 
I coded for additional, evaluative attributes including good, bad, and nice.
Following Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl, I analyzed the newspaper articles 
through the lens of a discourse-historical approach (DHA) to gain distance from 
but also to triangulate the data collected in the field.13 Utilizing a DHA approach 
allows for a ‘socio-diagnostic critique’ of social actors that shaped local practices by 
way of locate the ‘manipulative character’ the government and regime loyal actors 
employed during the 1990s.14 To answer the overarching question of how transna-
tional practices shaped social relations in Novi Pazar, the aim of the following sec-
tion is thus twofold: I first reconstruct the socioeconomic and political ambience that 
prevailed in Serbia as presented by the paper to ‘recontextualize’ the narratives of 
locals in Novi Pazar. I do this by way of examining the coded terms in Figure 4.1.15 
In a second step, I analyze ‘discursive qualifications’ about šverc in Novi Pazar by 
Table 4.1 Atlas.ti coefficiency table
Београд Муслиман Нови Пазар Осман Турска
Belgrade Muslim Novi Pazar Ottoman Turkey
Београд / Belgrade 0 4 11 1 7
границe / borders 8 3 3 1 6
Девизе / 7 0 0 0 0
foreign currency
Добро / good 18 8 2 0 9
Дрогa / drugs 42 2 5 0 20
Екстремиста / 0 0 2 0 1
extremist
Ислам / Islam 0 15 2 2 5
Лепо / nice 19 1 4 0 1
Лоше / bad 12 5 0 0 0
Муслиман / Muslim 4 0 22 0 28
Нови Пазар / 11 22 0 1 19
Novi Pazar
Оружије / weaponry 10 39 11 1 28
Осман / Ottoman 1 0 1 0 4
потрошачка корпа / 0 0 0 0 0
consumer price
сиво тржиште / gray 0 0 0 0 0
market
Терористи / terrorist 0 1 0 0 3
Турска / Turkey 7 28 19 4 0
фри шоп / fri šop 0 0 0 0 0
Цене / prices 25 0 0 0 5
Цигаре / cigarettes 12 1 0 0 4
црно тржиште / black 6 0 1 0 2
market
Шверц / šverc 13 3 2 1 13
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utilizing Table 4.1.16 Doing so allows for greater insight into the sociopolitical and 
economic situation that defined Novi Pazar’s in-state and transnational character.
A discursive analysis of šverc in Serbia
Between 1993 and 1995 (Figure 4.2), Novosti discussed the topic of prices 305 
times.17 Fluctuating and rising prices, especially, were a recurring theme in the 
paper during the years under investigation. In 1993, and thus the initial period of 
the sanctions regime, the paper seemed to portray the emptying stores and rising 
prices with little concern. In fact, one might argue the paper illustrated the bur-
geoning informal market activity with a sense of benevolence, if not adventurism. 
On April 26, 1993, for instance, the paper seemed to guide potential customers to 
the various buvljaci where goods were available and reasonably priced.
On Belgrade’s most famous flea markets (buvljacima), the Zeleni Venac,18 
the Boulevard of the Revolution, and the New Belgrade Block 44, smugglers 
(šverceri) and customers alike appeared in droves. The supply of merchan-
dise was as good as usual – reaching from light bulbs, batteries, hygienic 
products, women’s and men’s vests, over coffee, cigarettes, and flour. For 
only 30,000 dinars (the price for these goods was twice as high in the stores) 
customers can buy a 100-watt light bulb, while the cheapest batteries for 
watches are about 40,000 dinars (there are none at the stores). The best offers 
concern prices for hygienic products – four rolls of toilet paper cost 100,000 
dinars, domestic soap of 150 grams cost between 25,000 and 30,000 dinars. 
Foreign soap costs between 40,000 to 80,000 dinars [original parentheses].19
Figure 4.2 Večerne Novosti, December 7, 1994: 7
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Buvljaci were, judging from this article, well stocked on a regular basis. Using 
a positive evaluative adjective, the paper defined the supply as good as usual, 
suggesting that šverceri commonly offered domestic as well as foreign products. 
Regular stores, meanwhile, ran low on goods. This is interesting considering 
UN resolution 757 that banned trading with companies and individuals from 
the rump state from 1992 onward.20 Šverceri thus turned into valued members 
among the community because these individuals procured the most basic of 
goods, including toilet paper and soap, despite international sanctions. Smug-
glers were not, in other words, viewed and portrayed as deviating from social 
norms. Instead, the practice of šverc, and thus smugglers themselves, developed 
into necessary agents whose practices enabled a semblance of normalcy during 
the sanctions years.
It is especially useful to consider the terminology used in the clipping in 
 Figure 4.3. Smugglers and citizens came in droves to procure goods at the (as 
usual) well-stocked buvljak. One might argue that by 1993, one year after the 
international community enacted the sanctions regime, smuggling was no longer 
simply necessary. Buying smuggled goods, and relying on the availability thereof, 
became an ordinary feat in a citizen’s everyday life. Moreover, because smug-
glers imported foreign products across international borders, including the soap 
as described in the news clipping, governmental agencies were surly aware of 
the sanctions-busting enterprises. The government, then, as suggested by Grubač, 
relied on smugglers to warrant state stability.
In addition to guiding citizens to available goods, the paper also discussed 
price hikes. Tables discussing and comparing prices for commodities, such as 
Figure 4.3, appeared at regular intervals to inform consumers about and illus-
trate rising prices. Expenses for the most basic staple food items, including bread, 
milk, feta cheese, yogurt, and so forth, increased exponentially. Sugar prices, for 
instance, increased by an incredible 205 percent between March and April of 
Figure 4.3 Večerne Novosti, December 7, 1994: 7
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1993. The price for bread increased by 196 percent. All the while, unemployment 
rose to 39 percent in 1993 from an initial 14 percent in 1991.21
The potrošačka korpa (consumer price index), illustrated here by way of 
 Figure 4.4, increased steadily, while income and employment contracted. On Sep-
tember 23, 1993, a kilogram of white bread cost 300 million Serbian dinars,22 and 
on October 20, 1993, Belgrade was out of bread altogether.23 Meanwhile, the dinar 
further devalued in 1993, and the paper regularly published announcements about 
current black-market exchange rates in regions around the rump state:
Black mark exchange rates continue to grow! Yesterday, the price for a 
Deutsch-Mark was the highest in Podgorica, Kruševac, and Sombor where 
Figure 4.4 Večerne Novosti, May 5, 1993: 9
124 Part III
the Deutsch Mark was offered at a rate of 4.200 Dinars, and sold at a rate of 
3.700 and 3.800 Dinars. Exchange rates for the Deutsch Mark were the low-
est in Kragujevac, where dealers sold the Deutsch Mark for 3.700 dinars, and 
bought the Deutsch Mark at a rate of 3.300 and 3.400 Dinars. In Leskovac, 
the Deutsch Mark cost 3.800 dinars, and sold for 3.300 dinars. . . . The official 
purchasing price for the Deutsch Mark is 405,07, and for the dollar 658,19 
Dinars.24
By September 23, 1993, the hyperinflation had reached such high levels that Nov-
osti announced the bank would render the 1 million dinar bill as 1 dinar from here 
on out. The mint, in other words, simply shaved off six zeroes from the banknote – 
a move the paper caricaturized by way of assigning an etc. (i.t.d., i tako dalje) next 
to the number on the bill to indicate indignation with the bellowing insignificance 
of paper money (Figure 4.5).
At the time, very low and/or altogether missing wages and disappearing pen-
sions induced the creation of the second or informal-market economy. The second 
economy got under way in earnest during the early 1990s and soon flourished to 
account for 30 to 40 percent of Serbia’s entire economy.25 It is the intersection 
of this hyperinflation, price hikes, and the regular announcement of the black-
market currency exchange rates in different regions around Serbia that normal-
ized black marketeering and informal practices. Exchanging Serbian dinars in 
privately owned offices and on the street proved simply more profitable compared 
to exchanging the worthless dinar in state-sanctioned institutions, as illustrated 
in a news clipping from October 31, 1993.26 Official exchange rates in the state-
owned banks, according to the article, were twice as low compared to the value 
received in private exchange offices. One hundred German marks, for instance, 
Figure 4.5 Dinar Briše Lire, Novosti, September 23, 1994: 4
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yielded between 14,000 and 14,800 dinars in unofficial exchange booths, and 
half as much at state-sponsored institutions. “It is difficult to buy decent clothes 
for half of this sum,” the journalist of this piece stated. “Prices for an ordinary 
sweater, for example, start at about 8.000 Dinars. Quality products cost twice as 
much. The only product that is cheaper, are jeans.”27
Among the goods that cost exponentially more compared to prewar and sanc-
tions years was coffee. Coffee, according to a newspaper clipping of July 15, 
1994, was either inexistent or hopelessly overpriced.28 The cost for coffee hov-
ered around 7–8 dinars before Dragoslav Avramović developed the program to 
curb inflation on January 24, 1994. On July 15 of that same year, the price for 
coffee stood at about 20 dinars for 1 kilogram. In other words, the price for coffee 
increased by 185.7 percent within six months. It is worth quoting the reporter of 
this particular piece in his own words:
In those countries in which we tend to buy our coffee, the prices have not 
even doubled. In our country, the price for coffee increased by 300 percent 
since the beginning of the inflation. This renders the import of coffee the most 
profitable job – after petrol.29
It appears the reporter at once doubts the legitimacy of the price hikes while sug-
gesting to readers they might turn a profit by joining the coffee trade. Trading 
coffee, to be sure, was not illegal in itself. Yet, under international law, trading 
goods beyond the borders of the Yugoslav rump state was indeed illegal due to the 
international sanctions regime. UN Security Council resolution 757 stated in no 
uncertain terms that states ought to prevent individuals from importing all prod-
ucts and commodities to Yugoslavia, except for medical purposes and comestibles 
as stipulated by the UN.30
By 1994, the paper regularly discussed šverc in connection with the practice 
of smuggling drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. According to a 
news clipping from March 27, 1994, “drugs continued to travel from Turkey 
to Europe, across our country, despite the embargo. There were attempts to 
smuggle narcotics across Romania,” but, as stated in the article, “it was too 
risky.” It is worth quoting the article here due to the (again) mixed message 
in the paper:
There is great pressure on the shipment of narcotics to Italy. Traders and 
smugglers are lamenting the slowdown, of course, because transit through 
Yugoslavia has reduced. Customs officers at the border have time to inspect 
every passing vehicle closely, especially those that seem suspicious.31
As was the case with the coffee, the paper seemed to offer guidance to readers by 
implying that smugglers ought to avoid certain border crossings in view of the 
likelihood of increased inspection. This is an apparent practice as seen during the 
initial period of the sanctions regime whereby papers informed potential shoppers 
about anticipated delays on borders crossings.32
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In all, the paper discussed drugs 42 times in connection with Belgrade and five 
times in relation to Novi Pazar. On February 6, 1994, the paper announced “Bel-
grade had turned into the largest market for drugs in the Balkans.”33 As was the 
case with much of the reporting during the period under investigation, the paper 
sent contradictory messages about drugs. On July 28, 1994, an article in the paper 
explained:
Hashish and marijuana are the cheapest drugs that can be bought on the street. 
At present, the price for weed starts at two dinars (German Marks) on the 
streets of Belgrade. One gram usually yields two joint-cigarettes. The use 
of cannabis is almost impossible to determine. Young people smoke weed at 
parties. But middle-aged, or older people also smoke weed. It is difficult to 
calculate the number of those who tried weed, or smoke weed on a regular 
basis. Marihuana and hashish are mainly domestic products, which is why it 
is inexpensive. This weed is known as domaćica.34
Domaćica alludes, most likely, to the double meaning of domaće, which means 
homegrown and/or domestic, relating to the production of goods. Domaćica, as 
an abbreviation from the stem, means homemaker and/or housewife. In connec-
tion with the title of this article, one might extrapolate the paper meant to sound a 
warning about the increasing dependency of drugs among the citizens of Serbia: 
“there is no such thing as a harmless drug” (nema naivne droge). And yet, the 
word domaćica sounds benevolent in itself, while the paper instructs readers that 
1 gram of marijuana yields two joints. One might argue that this way of reporting 
sends mixed messages to readers.
Over the course of the 1990s, the drugs trade became more volatile as diverse 
groups sought to control the market in Serbia. Wads of money as well as drugs 
were found and sold in various flats and bunkers in and around Belgrade,35 while 
turf wars led to multiple deaths in the capital city.36 Even a cursory analysis of 
the news implies that Belgrade failed to fulfill the social contract. The state was 
unwilling or unable to root out the increasingly harmful and deadly trade in drugs. 
Instead of employing state-sanctioned forces to root out criminal gangs, Belgrade 
used its monopoly of power to wage a war in Croatia and Bosnia.
Belgrade was certainly aware of the legal and illegal aspects of šverc as well 
as the prospering businesses enjoyed by a segment of the population while others 
scraped by to make ends meet. It seems likely for legislators to have pushed for 
humane living conditions for all citizens in the Yugoslav rump state had it been 
for the unity of the socialist state as relentlessly propagated by Belgrade. Unity, 
however, was not the primary concern of leading representatives. Instead, politi-
cians instrumentalized nationalism to enrich themselves, as substantiated with the 
murky trade of cigarettes.
Misha Glenny stated the “gigantic marketplace for smuggled cigarettes” could 
only function the way it did due to the “approval of the government in Belgrade, 
which meant Slobodan Milošević himself signed off on it.”37 In addition to gov-
ernmental involvement in the cigarette smuggling business, the trade was so 
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lucrative that even tobacco companies, including Philip Morris and R. J. Reyn-
olds, joined the scheme.38 It is interesting to remember that Milošević, in his effort 
to present his government as a responsible agent to the international community, 
adjusted his rhetoric on the war toward the end of 1993. Milan Milošević stated:
In this new media projection, it was the radicals and extremists who were 
the war-crime culprits. They were now referred to as ‘war-profiteers’ and 
‘criminals’.39
The effects of this policy were quickly propagated through the paper. On Feb-
ruary 27, 1994, Novosti declared the “one-month long campaign ‘Borders 94’ ” 
heralded the dismantling of a smuggling ring. “Serbian smugglers, according to 
the paper, had used supply lines in Teslić (Bosnia) to smuggle goods to Muslims”:
Serbs sold weapons, munitions, flour, coffee, cooking oil, sugar, cigarettes, 
petroleum and gasoline to Muslims – their enemies. Their actions impover-
ished and broke Republika Srpska from within.40
Smuggling was not only a simple activity that rendered life bearable for ordinary 
citizens as demonstrated by this news clipping. Smuggling was a highly politi-
cized practice the regime sanctioned at the very least, or governed at most. Illus-
trative of this possibility is the paper’s free and positive reporting on the sale of 
goods despite international sanctions in 1993, while smugglers turned into a fifth 
column that aided the alleged enemy of the Serbian people in 1994. To be sure, 
the Serbs mentioned in the clipping smuggled goods behind enemy lines. Yet, the 
outrage in the article rings hollow considering that smuggling was an ordinary 
practice in 1993, while smugglers turned into vilified criminals that broke Repub-
lika Srpska from within in 1994. Moreover, criminals and paramilitary groups, 
including Arkan Ražnatović, the likely most infamous war profiteer with close 
ties to Belgrade, were known to smuggle counterfeit currency and looted goods 
while trafficking oil and drugs across enemy lines.41
It is with the benefit of hindsight that we know about war profiteering and coop-
eration between Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia. Glenny, for instance, documented 
weapons deliveries from Bulgaria and Romania to Bosnia and Croatia across Ser-
bian territory, while Bosnians, Albanians, and Croats sold oil to Serbia against 
extortionate prices.42 Andreas stated, “organized crime, business, and the secu-
rity apparatus became closely integrated to evade international sanctions, gener-
ate war profits, and carry out ethnic cleansing.”43 As such, the alleged outrage in 
the preceding news clipping is not only misplaced but also absurd given that the 
apprehended smugglers traded in cooking oil, sugar, and flour as well as, to be 
sure, weapons – while state-sanctioned paramilitary groups, including the Crvene 
Beretke and Tigrovi, pillaged villages and smuggled goods between Bosnia and 
Serbia under the protective cloak of Belgrade.
Citizens of Serbia not only paid the price for the faltering economy in form 
of exorbitant price hikes for comestible and elastic goods. Citizens also lost 
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money by way of state-sanctioned pyramid schemes.44 At the center of this heist 
were Jezdimir Vasiljević, known as Gazda Jezda (Jezda the boss), and Dafina 
Milanović. Both Vasiljević and Milanović as well as their respective institutions, 
the Jugoskandik and Dafiment Bank, superseded black-market exchange dealers 
on the street by luring citizens with high interest rates. R. T. Naylor explained that 
Belgrade needed hard cash to acquire strategic though high-priced and hard to 
come by goods under international sanctions. Encouraging the creation of state-
sanctioned banks that offered interest rates of up to “15 percent per month on Ger-
man Marks and Dollars” thus opened the possibility to soak up the sought after 
hard currency.45 After a falling out between Milanović and the regime, Milanović 
escaped Serbia while citizens flocked to the Dafiment Bank to demand their sav-
ings. Those savings, however, were inexistent. On February 5, 1994, Novosti 
reported:
Although it is objectively not easy to determine the strange path the money 
took out of the pockets from the citizens and into the banks of Dafiment, Inos, 
Stefani, and the vaults of other smaller banks, it is now evident that the finan-
cial chaos was also due in large part to the factual or non-factual competence 
of state institutions. True, the committee stated it tried to prevent the work 
of Gazda Jezda and Dafina, but they also gave up on it. Now the committee 
seeks to replace these institutions or powerful individuals who made these 
decisions.46
Assessing the sociopolitical and economic situation through this short overview 
of the Novosti paper illustrates that Serbia turned into an epitome for Donald Cres-
sey’s Theft of the Nation. Belgrade was no longer discernible from paramilitary 
groups, ‘businessmen’, and related individuals that characterized the sanctions-
busting years between 1993 and 1995. As such, I characterize the Yugoslav rump 
state as a “strong-weak” hybrid state, to frame it in Radniz’s words. Serbia was a 
powerful militarily state in possession of a large weapons arsenal and an extensive 
web of military and paramilitary personnel. And yet, the rump state proved eco-
nomically weak, seeing that Belgrade was unable or unwilling to curb the massive 
unemployment and hyperinflation rates.
It is further interesting to recall the news clipping in which Serbs provided 
Bosnians in Teslić with elastic goods and weaponry because these connections 
confirm that national and ethnic identifications wither when criminal organiza-
tion grow. Instead, as illustrated by von Lampe’s research on transnational crime 
networks, trust and the primary interest in turning a profit prevails.
In view of the deteriorating socioeconomic and political situation in Serbia, 
it comes as no surprise that citizens all over Serbia built and relied on solidarity 
networks.47 Diminishing enforcement capacities by the state, as suggested by Wil-
liam Haller and Alejandro Portes, left Serbian citizens to their own devices. As a 
consequence, the ‘frontier economy’ rendered economic exchanges dependent on 
private networks, which were freely reported in the paper.48 Discursive reporting 
by the paper in due process normalized šverc in a state that broke the social con-
tract between governing forces and the population.
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An analysis of ‘discursive qualifications’ about šverc 
in Novi Pazar
Overall, the paper discussed the terms ‘borders’ and ‘border crossings’ 179 times 
between 1993 and 1995. Most debates revolved around the topic of border clo-
sures and delays upon attempting to pass. On May 9, 1993, the paper informed 
readers that
the United Nations imposed new measures, stipulating that passenger cars 
may pass the border, while larger vehicles and trucks are subject to inspec-
tion. Only UNPROFOR trucks may traverse the border unhindered.49
At the time of this announcement, Novi Pazar was, according to the paper, already 
among the best-outfitted towns across Serbia:
The best-supplied city in Serbia is not, as you would expect, Belgrade – no – 
it is Novi Pazar. In the shops, mostly private, you can buy all the goods you 
desire, both domestic and foreign. The merchandise comes from all over and 
enters Novi Pazar via Turkey and Macedonia. For example, imported laun-
dry detergent is 30 percent cheaper compared to domestic laundry detergent. 
Rice, cooking oil, and all other foods can also be purchased, and are afford-
able. Clothing and footwear are similarly inexpensive: the best jeans cost 
between 15 and 20 German Marks, shirts cost around 20 German Deutsch 
Marks, and sneakers cost anywhere between 10 and 20 German Marks.50
The article continues to cite a “Novo Pazarski biznismen” who explained that 
people from all over Serbia came to Novi Pazar to obtain goods – sometimes up 
to 10,000 people. “The exchange rates were the best in all of Serbia, although 
increased financial inspections in the region slowed down commerce,” the biznis-
men explained.51 Despite financial inspections, however, Novi Pazar continued to 
attract shoppers and smugglers alike. Novi Pazar was thus indeed, as previously 
stated by interlocutors in Chapter 1, a successful and thriving town that seemed 
to prosper due to, or because of, international sanctions. Lyon similarly stated: 
“overnight, a new class of wealthy entrepreneurs – both Serb and Bosniak – 
sprang up, although many Serbs remained in low-paying state sector jobs.”52 Nev-
ertheless, Serbs and Bosniaks cooperated in their business dealings, as illustrated 
by Novosti. On November 19, 1994, the paper again reported Belgrade managed 
to cut off a švercerski lanac (smuggling ring) that connected Istanbul to Novi 
Pazar and Belgrade.53
By the end of 1993, the paper no longer engendered enthusiasm about the mar-
ket in Novi Pazar, but notified readers that
Novo Pazarci were known to have traded weaponry even before the war.54 
People of the Pešter highlands were especially prone to trading guns with and 
for the Albanian mafia. Weapons arrived from all over the world, including 
Austria, Turkey, and other ‘eastern’ countries.
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Assuming a rather sinister tone in the main article, too, the journalist reported:
Some peddlers turn into millionaires overnight. All of the goods are sold 
untaxed, which deprives the state of revenue. Serbs do not take part in this 
trade, because they do not have relations with people in Istanbul, where most 
of the goods on the market come from.
An interviewed trader, however, defended the merchants:
Customs officers and tax collectors should not bother us right now, because, 
owing to relations of the Muslim population, all of Yugoslavia is supplied 
with goods. But, we all pay our dues. It is not true that we easily enrich our-
selves, on the contrary. We spend our days and nights on wheels, and along 
the road, we have to bribe everyone – from the customs officer to the police-
men. At one border crossing, a drunken customs officer stopped 30 truckers 
from Novi Pazar. He then demanded we buy his boss a Mercedes. We all had 
to pitch in a thousand German marks. We cannot disclose the name of the 
customs officer or the particular border crossing, because we have to pass 
through there again. It is better to give a thousand marks, than to lose a full 
truck that is sometimes worth one hundred thousand dollars.55
“Most of the people who come to shop here don’t care that Turkey is among those 
states, which most often attack Serbia. Muslims,” the article continues, “commit 
an act of genocide in the Sandžak region: With the enormous revenues from šverc, 
they increase their property by way of buying out local Serbs.”56
One is left wondering about the overall accuracy of the coverage. On Septem-
ber 5, 1994, for instance, the paper claimed that Ugljanin (SDA), the political 
engineer behind the sought-after autonomy in 1993, paid locals for their contin-
ued loyalty. Ugljanin had fled Novi Pazar for Turkey in 1993 in fear of Serbian 
secret forces and allegedly bribed locals with up to 7,000 German marks to spread 
propaganda in favor of Bosnia, the SDA, and himself.57 Yet, why would one need 
to bribe individuals with 7,000 German marks when people became millionaires 
overnight, as propounded by the paper? Either the biznismen exaggerated the gen-
eral income among smugglers in Novi Pazar, the paper falsified the numbers, 
or the ousted politician offered no bribes. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in 
between.
Novi Pazar, as this side-by-side comparison of the two articles clearly dem-
onstrates, morphed from a prized market town at the beginning of 1993 into a 
pariah bazaar with a potential to dismantle the social fabric of Serbia. The paper, 
in other words, indicted the entire Muslim population for war profiteering: with 
the revenues from šverc, Bosniaks and/or Muslims sought to expel the Serbian 
population from the Sandžak region. It is ironic, of course, that the townspeople 
of Novi Pazar – predominantly Bosniak – enjoyed financial success as a result of 
the Yugoslav Succession Wars. The extraordinarily successful practice of šverc 
among this population, in other words, turned into an unintended consequence, 
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for it connected the Muslim and/or Bosniak population to Istanbul, as confirmed 
in the preceding clipping: “owing to relations of the Muslim population (with 
relatives in Istanbul), all of Yugoslavia [was] supplied with goods.” This connec-
tion, one might argue, reinforced the extreme nationalism of Belgrade that sought 
to enlarge its political territory.
It is significant to recall here the second segment of the previous section. Bos-
niaks narrated their loss of property after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire: 
the new government “took the properties from families. Then, they gave the land 
to the other people,” as narrated by Omar, for instance.58 Following the Succes-
sion Wars, Bosniaks felt as though Belgrade deprived the Muslim population 
of belonging to Serbia by renovating Orthodox heritage sites. In the preceding 
article, the paper claims Bosniaks “committed genocide” by purchasing Serbian 
property, thereby forcing the Orthodox population out of Novi Pazar. Šverc thus 
directly intersects with the making of historiography as Yugoslav successor states 
sought to redraw their respective political borders based on purported historical 
claims.
Serbian claims to ensure continued authority over territories, including the 
Sandžak region, appeared most often in connection with historicized events dating 
to the Ottoman past. “Serbian forces could stop the war in Bosnia immediately, 
but the Muslims do not wish for the war to end,” the paper reported in a clipping 
on February 5, 1994.59 Arguing the borders ought to remain as they currently 
appear on the battlefield, the paper documented a claim by Vojislav Šešelj that 
SDA60 members sought to “bring the war to ancient Raška. All Muslims who live 
in this country must be loyal citizens. There is no Sandžak as they claim, because 
we have thousands of soldiers who are ready to defend their homeland.” One 
might argue the government used the paper to send explicit warnings to locals in 
Novi Pazar. “This is old Raška,” the clipping reads, “and as such it will remain.”
The paper frequently discussed the SDA, the sought-after autonomy for 
Sandžak, and discursive portrayals of Muslims as ‘extremists’ in connection with 
Turkey proper. In an article dating to February 3, 1994, for instance, the headline 
stated “REBELLION FINANCED BY THE TURKS . . . formation of paramili-
tary forces financed by Turkey”:61
The Montenegrin ministry of internal affairs discovers the hellish plans 
(pakleni plan) of an organized uprising on a daily, or rather on an hour-by-
hour basis. The SDA planned an armed uprising in northern Montenegro and 
in those parts of Serbia, which Muslim extremists call Sandžak.62
This article illustrates the discursive qualities about Muslims of Sandžak most 
clearly. Characterizing Muslim citizens of Serbia as extremists was likely to sow 
distrust among the majority population of Serbia that was inundated by false prop-
aganda from the outset of the Succession Wars.
One must put this fear in perspective. There are an estimated 9 million people in 
Serbia, 100,000 of which are Muslims – both practicing and not. There is not only 
a great numerical imbalance one ought to consider in this alleged threat the paper 
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termed ‘hellish plans’. Serbia indisputably possessed a larger weapons arsenal 
and the manpower with which to quash the alleged threat, had there really been 
one. One might also argue that Belgrade, by waging a war against its neighbors in 
pursuit of expanding Serbian borders, ignited a self-fulfilling prophecy. Bosniaks 
would not have connected with the Bosniak émigré community in Turkey had it 
not been for the relentless propaganda spread through the news as well as govern-
ing institutions.
On March 4, 1994, the paper published an article under the title “Dreams of 
Greater Turkey.”63 Ankara, according to the article, used its superior geopolitical 
location to foster relations with Washington as American forces employed their 
forces to attack Iraq during the Desert Storm mission. Both Walker and Kirişci 
echoed this notion. Turkey indeed enjoyed a favorable geopolitical position fol-
lowing the end of the Cold War. “Ankara was not satisfied with this feat, but 
harbored dreams of greater Turkey,” the paper reported:
Imperialists of all right-wing parties seek to re-impose control over all areas 
previously under held by the Ottoman Empire, reaching from the Black Sea 
to the Caucasus, Central Asia, Macedonia, Kosovo, over the Sandžak, Bosnia 
and Albania. True, those are unrealistic dreams, but these topics nevertheless 
occupied Turkish policy makers.64
Of course, the irony lies in the fact that Belgrade supported the realization of 
greater Serbia by violent and political means when this article appeared.
Historiography served the purpose of substantializing territorial claims. On 
August 2, 1994, the paper reported ‘new’ findings about the history of ancient 
Ras.65 Stanko Ravić, a historian and publicist from the region, according to the 
paper, found that “ancient Ras – the capital city of medieval Serbia – was falsely 
believed to be located out of town.” Instead, Ravić asserted,
the capital of ancient Ras lay beneath Novi Pazar. Jovan Cvijić and Constan-
tine Jireček falsely, and without substantial proof, located ancient Ras outside 
the city limits of Novi Pazar. When the Muslims occupied Southern Serbia 
then, they built Novi Pazar on top of ancient Ras.
Serbia was unable to attack citizens within its own borders. An attack on citizens 
within Serbian state borders would serve as a valid pretext for an invasion of Ser-
bia under international law.66 Belgrade, in other words, was not able to ‘cleanse’ 
the Sandžak region of unwanted elements because doing so would have nullified 
Serbian state sovereignty. Instead, Belgrade embarked on a campaign to ensure 
Serbian state sovereignty over its territory by way of propped-up historical claims.
Synthesis
Serbia was a strong-weak hybrid state during the time under investigation. Unable 
to provide citizens with the most basic of goods, including toilet paper, soap, and 
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cooking oil, the state allowed for a flourishing of informal market practices. At 
the same time, Belgrade supported paramilitary and military offensives to enlarge 
Serbian territory beyond state borders. Two specific unintended consequences 
resulted from this hybrid governing structure.
First, Belgrade was unable to control the sprouting informal market activities 
while (at least) partaking in the illegal trade of cigarette smuggling. Novi Pazar, 
paradoxically, profited from this trade. Though the paper, and perhaps the biznis-
men themselves, might have exaggerated the profits of the smugglers, the rev-
enues resulting from the business of šverc were likely substantial. It is significant 
that locals initiated trade by way of contacts with relatives in Istanbul. Especially 
striking is the fact that the paper reported this feat by emphasizing that Serbs do 
not partake in this trade due to inexistent connections with Turkey. Regarding the 
increasingly negative reporting of the market in Novi Pazar in view of Belgrade’s 
efforts to portray Novi Pazar as the original Ras demonstrates Serbian determina-
tions to break with the inclusive past of SFRY. It comes therefore as no surprise 
that Bosniaks envisioned a sociopolitical and economic future in connection with 
the Turkish state. The paper played a critical role in this process. Serving as a 
mouthpiece for Belgrade, the paper illustrated to Bosniaks that they no longer 
belonged to the Serbian state. Bosniaks, moreover, deprived the state of critical 
revenue by withholding taxes, according to the paper. This is, of course, absurd 
given the extent of šverc that reigned all through the 1990s in all of Serbia.
Second, because šverc was evident in all of Serbia, and reported as such by the 
paper, the practice of smuggling across borders became normal. Smuggling was 
not a deviant form by which individuals made a living but necessary due to the 
exceedingly unpredictable economic situation in Serbia, especially during the first 
half of the 1990s. Belgrade proved unable to control the practice of šverc after 
1995.
Bosniaks in Novi Pazar, as this chapter illustrates, participated in an in- and 
out-of-state experience at the same time. Bosniaks were, like citizens in all of 
Serbia, involved in informal market practices. The paper, meanwhile, increas-
ingly depicted Bosniaks as a pariah that collaborated with Turkey, which regu-
larly attacked the Serbian state.
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5  Speaking about the practice 
of šverc
Gordana, an attractive, well-kept (Serbian) lady in middle age, receives me at the 
entrance to a beauty salon. Tucked away on an innominate back street, one would 
never know the place is there unless someone specifically received instructions 
about its existence. No sign announces the presence of this parlor to potentially 
interested passersby. The only give away is a bleached-out cardboard placard pic-
turing two women with 1980s hair. Standing beside the aged poster, Gordana 
receives me with a smile as I climb the stairs to the parlor. Once inside, I am 
engulfed in the smell of facial tonics, hot wax, and creams. Ladies, young and 
old, sip strong coffee in the small but neat waiting room and chat about their daily 
business, Novi Pazar, and their appearance. This parlor is like any other I fre-
quented anywhere in the world.
Gordana is all graceful smiles, though the depiction of her hometown packs a 
punch. Gordana is not registered as gainfully employed and thus works ‘under the 
table’. She does not, in other words, receive any social security benefits, and fre-
quently invokes her fear of old age. “I have no idea how to pay my bills when I grow 
old . . . when I am no longer able to work.” She earns approximately 300 euros per 
month. Her husband and son, too, earn about 300 euros monthly and contribute to 
settle the bills. Her son never finished his education and works odd jobs here and 
there. “He was never all that interested in finishing his education because the job 
prospects around here are grim. Sure,” Gordana continues, “he never liked going 
to school in the first place. Besides, people in Serbia can earn a lot more money by 
doing some job ‘under the table’.” She explained on another occasion: “Take this 
salon; it belongs to a girl that fled the war during the 1990s. She relocated to Novi 
Pazar. I am convinced,” Gordana maintains, “this girl is connected in some way. Her 
store is not registered, and no financial inspector ever shows up to review this place.”
Besides working in the salon, Gordana attends to clients in the privacy of her 
home. She usually receives one or two clients per day, though she is not registered 
as doing so with labor services. “Is this why all the stores around here taped the 
‘uzmite račun’ (request receipt) poster on their wall?” I asked Gordana. “Nobody 
will give you a receipt, she scoffed, nobody. Ok . . . if some inspector comes, or 
some tourists, or people like you,” she added consolingly:
But that’s peanuts anyway. The truth is this; there is a lot of money in Ser-
bia. Look at all the fancy cars everywhere, Serbia is full of Jeeps, BMWs, 
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Audis. . . . all the hotels and resorts are always full! These people are all 
doing šverz, and not the smalltime kind we are doing. No. Only the people 
with shady dealings (oni koji muvaju i muljau) have that much money. They 
started back in the 1990s. But they are still doing business. How else could 
they have that much money to afford houses and those kinds of cars? You 
cannot afford those kinds of things by simply doing a bit of šverc out of 
a clothing booth (gde malo prošvercuješ). These people fill their bags with 
other things, besides clothes and shoes, I mean. You simply cannot make 
that much money by selling shoes. If there were as much money in the shoe 
business, I would immediately quit this job to sell shoes! No, no. If you have 
a normal job, like me, nine to five, then you are nobody in this town, in this 
entire country. Take my neighbor, he is endlessly (beskrajno) in and out of 
jail, and every time he goes to prison, he comes out a wealthier man. When 
you go to jail, your net-worth grows. In this country, incarceration rewards 
you with a plaque of honor. Going to prison means you have earned your 
keep in certain circles.1
During the Yugoslav Succession Wars, šverc turned into an ordinary occupa-
tion. Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, informality is increasingly practiced on 
two levels; people like Gordana continue to perform legal tasks informally. Others 
engage in illegal business. What emerges in the case of Serbia then is an intersec-
tion between transnational practices and opportunistic crime. Portes and Haller’s 
concepts on informal economies and von Lampe’s paradigm of transnational 
crime illustrate that sanctions-busting was necessary before turning into a normal, 
everyday practice. Šverc further reveals the ongoing contestation over the main-
tenance of cultural values among the citizens of Serbia in Novi Pazar – Bosniak, 
Serbian, and Roma alike.
Understanding šverc as a practice that afforded agents with a degree of “sym-
bolic or normative anchoring,” šverc served as a sense-making tool by which 
Bosniaks reconnected with the Bosniak émigré community in Turkey.2 This nar-
rative was prevalent during earlier stages of the ethnographic study, though not 
exclusively. During later stages of this research project, informants increasingly 
voiced apprehension about the market. This twofold ambiguity about the market 
signifies a connection to, first, a fulfilling social obligation, namely the neces-
sity to supply the town of Novi Pazar (and Serbia) with goods. In turn, the social 
obligation nourished locals from the perspective of belonging when considering 
the re-established connection between the local and émigré Bosniak communi-
ties. Understood as such, the symbolic function of šverc served the purpose of (re)
producing a distinction between the Bosniak community in Serbia and Belgrade.
Second, šverc is associated with inimical normative behavior that is anathema 
to the symbolic function of (re)producing communitas between locals and Bosniak 
émigrés in Turkey. During later stages of my fieldwork, interviewees and inform-
ants suggested švercerci of all backgrounds embraced Milošević because traders 
got rich in the process. News media, too, took up this narrative. For instance, 
Sanja Kljajić, a reporter for Deutsche Welle, declared the “talk of brotherly rela-
tions” between the Turkish émigré and local Bosniak population a myth.3
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Evidently, šverc contains two normative components with at once virtuous and 
morally deplorable properties. Rouse, considering Stephen Turner,4 stated:
Actors share a practice if their actions are appropriately regarded as answer-
able to norms of correct or incorrect practice. Not all practitioners perform 
the same actions or presuppose the same beliefs, but some are subject to 
sanctions for actions or beliefs that are inappropriate or otherwise incorrect.5
Šverc was (is) both appropriate and inappropriate for the outlined reasons. It is 
significant that locals sanctioned šverc during earlier phases of the fieldwork, 
while predominantly connecting informal practices with the Milošević regime 
during later fieldwork stages. I will demonstrate this inherent ambiguity to answer 
the overarching question of how material encounters influence social relations in 
detached spaces in the following section. Two sub-questions inform this segment: 
how does the narrative about šverc change when probing into the actual practice 
of smuggling goods, and are informal material encounters connected to an ensu-
ing sense of anomia?
Filtering out how the two narratives differ will demonstrate that šverc cut(s) 
across ethnic, religious, and political boundaries. People do not divide into neat 
ethnic and/or national enclaves despite the rupture the Yugoslav Succession Wars 
brought about. Local and émigré Bosniaks, purportedly an ethnically homoge-
nous group, do not simply associate based on their common descent, and neither 
do Serbs. Instead, I will demonstrate that the everyday experience of living in a 
corrupted system trumps ethnicity.
Šverc as a narrated practice
For the most part, I conducted situational interviews during later stages of the field-
work to gauge and categorize statements given during autobiographic interviews. 
Who practiced šverc, what materials were smuggled, and do people involved in 
šverc divulge this information readily and freely?6 Informants at times welcomed 
the chance to talk about their experiences, whereas other interlocutors tired of 
sharing after some time. Senad illustrates both alternatives in his disparaging of 
the Milošević regime and the 1990s in general, while habitually talking himself 
into a frenzied rage when he started:
Now I have to talk about this again. . . . I’m just kidding . . . relax. ahm . . . 
the time of Slobo’s (Slobodan Milošević) regime during the 1990s, well, to 
tell you the truth . . . people usually only remember the positive things in life. 
I think that is human nature. They want to forget about the nasty things that 
happened here. They prefer to remember the positive things. But people in 
Novi Pazar have somehow an actual reason when they say their lives were 
great . . . they made loads of money . . . they had everything they wished for 
when Slobo was in power. Because that was a time when the town of Novi 
Pazar really flourished, because they smuggled goods. Everyone traded on 
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the market. All of Serbia came here to buy goods on the market, all of Monte-
negro. People in Novi Pazar earned up to 500 Deutschmarks at the time, and 
you were able to open businesses with that money.7
This excerpt is significant for Senad clearly places himself from without the per-
formance of šverc, and to some extent the experiences made by his compatriots 
during the 1990s. He uses descriptive terminology and emphasizes they want to 
forget, they prefer to remember, and they smuggled goods. Senad externalizes the 
market and signals his non-involvement during this situational interview in 2016. 
A direct comparison with a quote about the market from 2015 reveals insightful 
discrepancies with the previous statement:
I only sold a few things with my friends. We were kind of kidding around. 
We were kind of trying to fit in, it was more a kind of joking around instead 
of real work, even though, back then, those were serious earnings. I mean, 
you could literally, easy (original emphasis) earn 120 Deutschmarks just 
like that. That’s almost as much as 500 current Euros, more perhaps. People 
started whole businesses with 500 Euros then. The inflation was huge (origi-
nal emphasis), do you understand? And, the market was going every day. 
And like this, you go down to the market two, three times a week for a cou-
ple of hours, and make 500/600/700 Euros, eh, Deutschmarks. That’s a huge 
amount of money for those times.8 But me, I only did that with friends, kind 
of. I went to Bulgaria once with some aunt, to buy something on the market 
there. . . . I didn’t know how to do that. I am not really a merchant. I am . . . 
I mean, people carried enormous bags across the border, and I took two puny 
bags with me . . . and then, I turned out to be the most suspicious person on 
the border! Those guards on the border saw something white, and assumed 
I am smuggling drugs across the border.9
Even more glaring is the discrepancy between the first autobiographic interview 
in 2012 in which Senad unambiguously stated: “I am educated, but even I sold 
coffee on the market between 91–93.” As such, there is a clear regression in the 
narrated involvement between the first autobiographical, and subsequent two situ-
ational interviews in 2012, 2015, and 2016.
Senad, a candid interlocutor in and out of the field, adjusted his narrative about 
his own involvement in the market. One can draw two conclusions based on 
the apparent reversion; first, Senad iterated a common narrative that accurately 
described the 1990s from his perspective. During the Succession Wars, individu-
als traded on the market informally. Even the newspaper echoed this sentiment as 
illustrated in the previous chapter. Šverc was state sanctioned, served the purpose 
of “symbolic . . . anchoring,” and was, above all else, normal.10
In the previous excerpt, Senad states: “We were kidding around. . . . we kind 
of tried to fit in, it was more a kind of joking around.” The fact that Senad and his 
friends tried to fit in, as he calls it, reveals that locals acquiesced to the apparent 
status quo in which a majority of people made a living by informal means. This 
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finding correlates with the survey data, according to which 57.3 percent strongly 
agreed and 17.1 percent agreed with the statement of knowing someone who had 
worked on the market during the 1990s. Every other person knew someone who 
worked on the market, at the least.
As is the case with interviews, however, the questionnaire data in Figure 5.1 
exhibits crucial inconsistencies. Of the respondents, 74.4 percent at least agree 
with the statement of knowing someone who had worked on the market. Mean-
while, 71.4 percent strongly disagree with the statement “I worked on the market 
during the 1990s.” Two scenarios might explain the potential numerical disparity 
here: first, questionnaire participants overestimated how many of their acquaint-
ances worked on the market; second, contributors conceivably shied away from 
disclosing their own involvement in the market. In light of the retraction apparent 
in the interview passages with Senad, one might argue the latter. Interview data 
and casual conversations with informants corroborate this option as interlocu-
tors predominantly emphasized the large-scale involvement on the market during 
early stages of the ethnography. “Everyone worked on this market,” as Senad and 
other interviewees repeatedly emphasized. As such, the high number of those who 
divulged to know someone who had worked on the market during the 1990s testi-
fies to the commonality of šverc at the time. Interviewees and questionnaire data 
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Pazar came / come from Turkey
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Figure 5.1 Transnational connections with Turkey
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appropriately regarded as answerable to norms of correct or incorrect practice.”11 
Because Rouse positions the learning and emulation of habits at the intersection 
of individual agency and maintenance of cultural values, one may postulate that 
locals “view(ed) the organization of informal enterprise as a normal part of life 
and involvement in the underground economy as a justifiable form of resistance,” 
to put it in Portes and Haller’s words, incipiently.12
Conclusion two is therefore more likely; interlocutors do not like to disclose their 
involvement in the market. Senad squarely acknowledged his involvement in the 
market at first, though points to his being aware of the informality and/or to some 
extent illegality thereof. This is especially noticeable when he states: “those [guys] 
saw something white, and assumed I am smuggling drugs across the border.”
Locals, in taking the argument one step further, are not comfortable to divulge 
their personal involvement in the market because they knew their survival mecha-
nism implicitly propped up the Milošević regime financially. A short conversation 
I had with Senad illustrates this perception:
ME: Would you say this market was good or bad for the town?
SENAD: I say it was good, yes, in a way. But, it was only good for Novi Pazar, 
not so much for the rest of the Sandžak region. The other towns in Sandžak 
did not have that possibility. For Milošević, it was good because the people 
of NP could somehow penetrate the sanctions, the blockades from the side 
of Turkey and Bulgaria, and sometimes from the side of Hungary. People 
from Serbia and Montenegro came here to Novi Pazar to buy stuff with their 
private cars and buses and took the goods back to their towns where they re-
sold what they had bought here. This means that about 250 buses descended 
on Novi Pazar daily! In addition (original emphasis) to private cars! Only to 
buy merchandise! This was good for Milošević because they penetrated the 
sanctions, and the regime allowed for this to happen. There was no regular 
economy . . . the system did not function. From time to time, Milošević sent 
his people to Novi Pazar to collect money (da reketiraju) from those peo-
ple who owned workshops. This means (znači) they went from workshop to 
workshop to collect a sort of tax. But this was no regular tax, it was extortion. 
It was all under the table, and the sum they took was completely random. Of 
course, it kind of matched the size of the workshop’s income. Still, this hap-
pened randomly. These people would come whenever they needed money. 
Perhaps every two to three months, or perhaps once in every four to five 
months. For us, this was good because we did not pay regular taxes. People 
employed for instance (lupam) 50, 100, or even 500 workers, but, according 
to official numbers, there were only about two or so workers employed in the 
workshops. All of the salaries were paid under the table. No taxes.13
I asked Senad the same question three years later, to which he replied:
This (market) was good for the state, the regime, and Milošević. They liter-
ally robbed the state, plundered it. And they were under sanctions, do you 
understand? This means all of the official business conducted here was šverc. 
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The government was under sanctions, and Novi Pazar was some sort of a door 
through which to bring in goods . . . ehm . . . illegally . . . by doing šverc. What 
I mean to say is this, they all smuggled. Do you understand? Half of Novi Pazar 
was a flea market (buvljak) back then. This means the market started here, and 
reached all the way up to the municipal building, and back down toward the 
Raška river. I am telling you, about 70 percent of all the people from Novi Pazar 
worked on this market back then. Whoever was able to do anything ended up 
working on the market. Those who did not travel to Turkey told others who did 
what to buy for them, for instance coffee, or anything, you know. Then, you go 
there, buy a bag, take it to the market, measure the quantity in kilos, and sell it 
to customers on the market. The government tolerated this. And what did they 
do, they came here from time to time, when Slobo (Milošević) decided to send 
his goons, to collect their so-called taxes, they literally racketeered. This was 
no ordinary tax, they racketeered the market, the workshops. They also seized 
goods, took it from us. They would come here, and just kind of size up some-
one’s company based on the size and the workers there, and come up with some 
mystery number the owners would have to pay, say 200,000 Deutschmarks, 
300,000 Deutschmarks . . . and that’s how he sent them two or three times per 
year. That was lucrative for the state, not the state, of course, but for Slobo and 
his people who lined their pockets, do you understand? But it was also good 
for our people here. Do you understand? If we had to pay taxes here, had to 
pay insurance for the workers, to register them and so on, that would have been 
really very expensive. But this way, the earnings were bigger. There could be 
for instance 200 workers who worked in a workshop, but registered were only 
two. People saved money by not paying social contributions for employees. 
Life was great here, it was a great life here in Novi Pazar back then.14
Both statements are similar in form and tone. And yet, it is significant that Senad 
insinuates that Slobo – as he used to call Milošević during our interviews and 
casual conversations – was a criminal who racketeered the state for financial gain. 
Locals know this and emphasized trading with the émigré Bosniak community in 
Turkey as a symbolic anchor, as opposed to highlighting their forced cooperation 
with the regime.
Three specific quotes stand out as notable in these interview passages. First, 
Senad states the trade “was only good for Novi Pazar, not so much for the rest of 
the Sandžak region.” Recalling that nearly all Bosniak and/or Muslim families 
have kin in Turkey, one is left wondering about this apparent asymmetry. One 
possible answer might be the geographical location that favored the flourishing 
of this market – Novi Pazar was (is) better accessible compared to the rest of the 
other five municipalities on the Serbian side of the Sandžak region.15 The Kombi-
nat, too, was in Novi Pazar, as was the existing market infrastructure. Therefore, 
Novi Pazar primarily served as a trading hub, while functioning as a centralizing 
force for the unity of Bosniaks in Serbia. Novi Pazar, in other words, consti-
tuted an economic powerhouse much as the town preserved the narrated unanim-
ity of the Sandžak region. External threats, including the war in Bosnia as well 
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as nationalistic posturing and threats emanating from the paper, contributed to 
this rallying around the flag reaction. Bosniaks, in other words, gravitated toward 
Novi Pazar for economic, and later symbolic reasons. As such, isolating šverc 
from the sense-making account provided in Part II allows for the possibility to go 
beyond narratives of kin and ethnic unity to examine these inconsistencies.
Ethnic and/or national solidarity respectively, second, was not the raison d’être for 
the Milošević regime or the local and Bosniak and/or Muslim community. Instead, 
it served as a means to an end – personal enrichment for Belgrade and survival for 
the Bosniak community. Senad explained that šverc was “lucrative for Milošević 
and his people who lined their pockets. But it was also good for our people here.” 
Both communities profited from this market for which cooperation was necessary – 
coerced and/or willingly. Location, moreover, was crucial, too. One might therefore 
postulate the emerging market resulted due to a geographically auspicious location 
and involuntary cooperation with the Milošević regime in addition to kin-relations.
Third, Senad estimated a nearly identical number of participants who were 
active on the market: “70 percent of all the people from Novi Pazar worked on 
this market.” Senad thus echoes questionnaire results and corroborates the earlier 
assertion that interlocutors highlighted symbolic anchoring that produced a dis-
tinction between local Bosniaks and the Belgrade regime, as opposed to ‘coopera-
tion’ with the government. Leijla’s daughter, more to the point, stated:
It was like this through all the wars here. Our countries (naše zemlje) fall 
apart . . . Srebrenica . . . everything. And ours (naši), cooperate with them 
(glavu uz glavu sa njima), and traaaaade, loooot . . . they created empires! 
Economic empires. But how can you explain that to people. . . ? The way it is 
now . . . unfortunately . . . it has always been . . . still. . . . This means you can 
always find someone, some group to manipulate, to poison.16
It is with this argument in mind by which one recognizes the extent of the two 
narratives illustrated in this book. Šverc indisputably heralded a reconnection 
between local and émigré Bosniaks in Turkey. Yet, this connection was not built 
on universal kin relations alone but was also constituted due to pragmatic choices 
the government, in part, enabled so long as Belgrade profited therein.
Practicing šverc
A conversation at the local NGO contextualizes the aforementioned findings fur-
ther. The local NGO is a meeting place where like-minded people gather to talk 
about job opportunities, the government, and upcoming projects. An array of people 
frequented the locale during my time in the field, most of whom had opinions about 
the government, the market, and Turkey they cared to share. One attendee explained 
upon my inquiry as to how one goes about when seeking to smuggle goods:
To put it in the simplest, and most logical way possible, we had a leg up on 
everybody else in Serbia because we could call our relatives in Istanbul or in 
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the other cities. Perhaps they themselves had nothing to offer, but they could 
ask around (da se raspitaju) for good prices for windowpanes, textiles . . . 
anything, anything we could sell. This is why the government let us do our 
thing here – they needed us (mi smo njima bili potrebni).17
It is interesting to note the specific commodity this interlocutor mentions: win-
dowpanes. Considering that Serbian citizens bought windowpanes on the market 
in Novi Pazar, one can reaffirm a segment of the population benefited during the 
sanction years. Purchasing windowpanes is useless, in other words, unless one 
builds or renovates a house. While this observation seems tangential, one ought 
to recall the segment of the population in Serbia that lost their savings, jobs, and 
livelihood at the time. Building and renovating houses stands in stark contrast 
to the former. At any rate, this field note further relates that locals in Novi Pazar 
served as middlemen, able to provide potential merchants with initial contacts and 
access to merchandise before traveling to Turkey to obtain goods.
Building upon interviews from 2012 through 2015, I sought to learn about the 
actual doing of šverc in subsequent interviews between 2015 and 2016. By 2015, 
in other words, I had moved from coding how locals narrated šverc to analyzing 
“the basic social process”18 that guided practitioners to bring the inherent con-
tradictions that surround narratives of šverc to the surface.19 Settings such as the 
one above were valuable because of the ready possibilities to question potential 
interviewees and casual interlocutors about the details concerning šverc in view 
of transnational family relations.
During one such episode, I met Saleh, a polite young man in his mid-thirties. 
After a few casual conversations, Saleh told me about the family business his 
father established during the 1990s. His family initially roasted coffee they had 
imported from Turkey. “Our house basically turned into a workshop where we 
roasted coffee for the market in Novi Pazar,” Saleh explained, thereby confirming 
Asem, who stated that people often turned their homes into workshops during the 
war. Saleh was a boy back then, though distinctly remembers the collective family 
effort during the war years. “We all wore those huge coats so that we could stuff 
coffee into our pockets on our way to the market, and money on our way home. 
I remember . . . I remember, there was a lot of money everywhere . . . in all of our 
jackets . . . the pockets, the pants . . . everywhere. . . (svuda).”
ME: How did this market work?
SALEH: I usually went to the market with my parents. My younger sister also 
came with us, and the both of us were there, in these huge crowds . . . there 
were always huge crowds of people. A lot of people came from all over Ser-
bia. Thousands. Especially every Tuesday and Sunday, those were the official 
market days.20
ME: How did your family get the goods here, and how did you grow the business?
SALEH: My father had a great idea, he bought his own minivan, to import things 
from Turkey with it. There was a lot of money in that business. He trans-
ported things from Turkey for certain people (za odredjenje ljudi) from Novi 
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Pazar. There was a lot of money in that business. . . . After some time, he 
bought another van, then he bought a trailer, and his business grew gradu-
ally. He transported more and more things, and went to Turkey more often, 
twice a week even. Later . . . he later sold the vans, bought a big lorry, and 
continued to do business with Turkey. I went with him a few times, and he 
brought this jeans material, and other things, but mostly textile, because peo-
ple bought this material from Turkey either to produce goods, or to peddle 
them wholesale. There were big profits in that business . . . I mean huge. 
It was all normal, and it kind of went on like this for quite some time. My 
father bought another truck, and even expanded his business. Then he bought 
another truck, and on and on until we had kind of a small freight company. 
All of that fascinated me.21
Saleh and his family were set to leave for Germany when the Succession Wars 
started but decided to stay for a range of reasons, including his grandmother’s 
old age. The Yugoslav Succession Wars were thus perceived as a clear rupture 
that locals sought to escape. Instead of escaping, however, Saleh and his family 
began to do business. During our numerous casual conversations, Saleh repeat-
edly explained, “I had a nice childhood, because of this business, we were never 
left wanting for a thing.” Conversations and interviews about the specificities of 
market practices filtered this very experience of liminality to the surface: locals 
appreciated the market for its protective properties though were aware of poten-
tial liabilities, including the legal and ethical risks, as well as the potential bodily 
harm during the first half of the 1990s. In Asem’s words:
This was basically that concept during those difficult war years in Serbia. . . . 
This economy saved us. Simple. We were independent from this terrible eco-
nomic situation that reigned all over Serbia. But we knew they [Belgrade] 
would go to Kosovo, and we, as Muslims, we knew we were in a dangerous 
situation for the war might have spilled over into Sandžak . . . when we were 
surrounded by tanks.22
Juxtaposing these statements yields remarkable insight; Asem and Saleh 
describe memories that took place during the same time frame. If one were to 
separate the statement given by Saleh from the situation described by Asem, 
one might assume Saleh describes the simple success story of his family busi-
ness. Especially intriguing is how Saleh portrayed his childhood. He was 
never left wanting at a time when want loomed large. Traveling to Turkey 
and standing beside his family members on market days was as normal for 
Saleh as it was to carry large wads of cash knowing that tanks surrounded the 
city, as illustrated by Asem. Saleh, one might argue, was born into a system 
in which informality served formal functions – a system that was governed by 
trial and error.
It is fruitful to use an analogy introduced by Diane Vaughan here.23 Vaughan, 
reflecting on Bourdieu, illustrates the normalization of deviance by way of 
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depicting an anomaly during flights by NASA (US National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration):
The first decision to fly with an anomaly justified others; . . . The immedi-
ate social context was important to their construction of risk. . . . having an 
anomaly was not in itself a signal of potential danger, but in fact the norm. 
When the first unexpected booster anomaly occurred, a cause was identified, 
a corrective action taken, and the boosters defined officially as an “Accept-
able Risk” for the next launch.24
Applying Vaughan’s example of flight to the problem at hand, one might argue 
that locals decided to fly with the anomaly that was the broken Yugoslav sys-
tem – that is, locals examined their social context to find solutions to remedy the 
economic and social malady. For this, Bosniaks called acquaintances and kin to 
locate goods for the market in Novi Pazar, which in turn required people who were 
willing to risk the drive across increasingly scrutinized borders. Because Belgrade 
and Yugoslav citizens variously penetrated the sanctions regime, for instance, the 
UN initiated a Sanctions Assistance Mission to monitor the shipment of goods 
coming to and leaving the Yugoslav rump state.25 Saleh’s father is a case in point 
here. He grew his one-man business into a trucking company for the import of 
goods from Turkey with great success. Not only does this example demonstrate 
that local businessmen thrived under international sanctions. Instead, the financial 
success resulting from this anomalous economic and social situation justified the 
construction of further risks. Evading international monitoring missions, bribing 
border guards, and additional acceptable risks encountered along the way became 
the norm, as the following excerpt demonstrates:
ME: How did smugglers get those goods across the border? I mean, did the border 
guards check the vehicles?
SENAD: The border guards, well, the border guards were bribed. The border 
guards in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Turkey were all bribed. That is how it 
was. I mean, look, it was easy back then. Now, those merchants that were 
successful, those who traded, they cooperated directly with the state. They 
imported whole convoys full of things, lorries. And they traded, but not only 
with Turkey. The Turks did not care (pa Turke baš briga). They just sell stuff. 
I mean, what, you go there, give them cash, and take your wares. Nothing 
special. . . . What I mean to say is that these family relations were, above all 
else, and this is perhaps a bit simplistic, but these family relations helped. If 
I had no one there, no family members, I have to look for someone. I don’t 
know where I am at, but the people who live in Istanbul know, and they 
can help you to prepare the terrain. They provide you with goods, facilitate 
the job. And this is why it was easier for us who had family relations there, 
compared to others who did not, like those people in Kragujevac, Čačak, and 
Kraljevo. It would have been hard for them to go to Turkey, because they 
have no one there. Isn’t it. Ehm . . . and that is why we had an advantage, in 
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the beginning . . . in the beginning, we had a big advantage, do you under-
stand, that is how it was.26
Again, one is able to draw a correlation between the discourse presented in the 
previous chapter and the events as narrated by Senad. Locals indeed bribed the 
border guards on their way to Turkey as reported in the paper, which indicates a 
degree of cooperation across national, religious, and ‘ethnic’ affiliations. Trust 
surpassed ethnic affiliation as the necessity of protecting one’s business magnified 
the necessity of collaboration.
Trust was a crucial precondition for the continued success, as emphasized by 
interlocutors. One had to trust the middlemen locals called in Turkey, truckers 
relied on the effective and continued use of bribing customs officers, and locals 
required trusting truckers who brought the ordered goods to the market. Frontier 
economies thus develop an internal logic that is shaped by, and in turn shapes 
social relations. In the case of Novi Pazar, the ability to call acquaintances and 
kin facilitated access to goods. External and internal events – transnational and 
national – defined the further course of social relations which, as illustrated in the 
previous excerpt, included the regime: “Those who traded . . . cooperated directly 
with the state.” Consequently, the successful continuation of this frontier econ-
omy hinged on the unintentional and/or intentional cooperation with Belgrade. An 
excerpt of Saleh’s portrayal of the 1990s illustrates this most clearly:
I don’t know how to explain this, but I distinctly remember. . . . I remem-
ber at some point, our things were taken from us. We were suddenly no 
longer allowed to import goods from Turkey, this was the reason we were 
given. There was no concrete reason. But we kept on working, people kept 
importing goods from Turkey. But then, I remember, the government confis-
cated our products, along with our truck at the border. My dad’s trucks were 
impounded. . . . I don’t know how many trucks they took . . . but they put 
them somewhere . . . and I remember that Mihalj Kertes used to be the head 
of the border control agency back then. His name was often mention in con-
nection with the Zemun Clan. I know he was implicated in everything that 
happened during the 1990s, and in the beginning of the 2000s . . . but I don’t 
know much else about that. But I know that all of my dad’s friends men-
tioned his name . . . Mihalj Kertes . . . Mihalj Kertes. . . . He did all that . . . 
decided . . . he was in charge of all that.27
Mihalj Kertes (Bracika), former customs administration director for the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia between 1993 and 1995,28 is variously connected to crimi-
nal machinations in the academic as well as popular literature. A WikiLeaks cable, 
for instance, designated Kertes a close associate of Milošević and Stanko Subotić 
(Cane), the latter of whom is labeled “as a leader of the smuggling group.”29 In 
all, the cable designates eight leaders that headed smuggling groups, two of whom 
include Mira Marković and Marko Milošević.30 “Most of these groups,” accord-
ing to the cable, “operated under the patronage of Milošević’s secret services and 
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their illegal profits were used for financing the regime and the accumulation of 
personal wealth.”31 Miloš Vasić, author of Atentat na Zorana,32 and contributing 
writer to Peščanik, Vreme, and B92, echoed the WikiLeaks cable. Discussing šverc 
in a Peščanik article, Vasić states one cannot mention the name Kertez without 
also talking about Jovica Stanišić, Badža Stojičić, Arkan, Hadži Struja, Milorad 
Vučelić, Marko Milošević, and Vanja Bokan.33 These individuals are known for 
their involvement in the underground economy as well as the atrocities they dealt 
as they looted villages during the Succession Wars in Bosnia. As such, it comes 
as no surprise that locals seek to emphasize connections with the Bosniak émi-
gré community in Turkey over their unintentional cooperation with these crimi-
nal groups. Saleh, though indicating incomplete knowledge about Kertes, knew 
about the role Kertes played in the 1990s. This is especially evident in his citing 
the Zemun clan, one of the most infamous criminal gangs in Serbia during the 
1990s.34 And yet, people nevertheless had to make a living, as testified by Saleh:
That was really hard, when they took away our trucks . . . and we, we were 
literally. . . . everything was on stand-by in our family. But then we learned 
about the whereabouts of the trucks, learned where they had taken the goods 
and all that, but nobody dared to do anything about it. That was during 
Milošević’s time. He knew exactly what was going on. He knew who was 
doing what . . . all of that . . . ahm, and then . . . after a couple of months, 
I mean, they wanted to see what had happened to those trucks . . . and some-
one had discombobulated all the parts. The trucks stood on cinder blocks, 
without tires, without anything inside them.35
Following Portes and Haller, one can identify two of the three typologies that 
categorize informal activities in Novi Pazar. First, locals indeed “increased man-
agerial flexibility to reduce labor costs.”36 Local workshop owners employed 
hundreds of employees but registered two, for instance. Directors thus increased 
their earnings as Belgrade compelled managers to pay a random tax in lieu of 
registering employees. Second, šverc was organized around “capital accumula-
tion . . . through mobilization of [their] solidarity relationships, greater flexibility, 
and lower costs.”37 This is what Woodward called the modus vivendi: Bosniaks 
in Novi Pazar turned to “alternative social networks,” their relatives in Turkey, to 
acquire goods.38 To be sure, one might question the effectiveness of the bureau-
cratic apparatus in Serbia during the war years. And yet, judging by interview data 
and casual conversations in the field, managers appreciated the low labor costs: 
“People saved money by not paying social contributions for employees. Life was 
great here, it was a great life here in Novi Pazar back then.”39
The economy in Novi Pazar was informal, and not a criminal endeavor par 
excellence. Relying on the data collected in the field, most people traded in elastic 
goods, such as textiles, coffee, and cigarettes. Yet, deliberating the underlying 
connection to and/or dependence on the criminal netherworld that was tied to the 
Milošević regime, one must point toward the intersection of criminal foraging 
as defined by von Lampe40 and informal practices that sustain(ed) the political 
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and social stability in Serbia as defined by Portes and Haller. Given the under-
lying cooperation between locals and the Milošević regime, the third criterion, 
“activities . . . taking place outside the pale of state regulation,” is not met. Though 
agents procured goods from without the purview of state regulation, merchants 
depended on the state for the successful continuation of šverc, as demonstrated 
with the example given by Saleh. Recalling Belgrade’s desire of divesting the 
regime from the tainted business of šverc, Milošević sealed the borders in 1994. 
Saleh’s father serves as a case in point here. Even if he did not cooperate with the 
state directly, his enterprise prospered only so long as the state profited from such 
businesses in social, financial, and political terms.
Another facet came into view upon repeatedly querying interlocutors about 
the practice of trading with kin in Turkey. Senad stated: “the Turks did not care 
(pa Turke baš briga) with whom they traded, they simply sold goods.” Situa-
tional interviews and repeated meetings with interlocutors allowed for clarifica-
tions and a reevaluation of initial statements. Asem, too, reassessed the relations 
between Turkey and Novi Pazar upon my inquiry about the specificities of trading 
practices:
ME: Did the people in Novi Pazar mostly import jeans material because they had 
personal connections with family members in Turkey? I mean, did this trade 
start because of personal partnerships between Novi Pazar and Turkey?
ASEM: This is how it came about (znaš kako), I think, Turkey, what Turkey does 
as a state, you know, they perceive us as consumers. We don’t even count for 
one thousandth of their capacity. This means, we are not really that useful 
as consumers for their market in some strategic sense. They have some big 
customers, huge companies that sell their goods all over the world. They are 
focused on those customers. What we do is look at what the big companies 
do, look at the trends. For instance, Zara. So, we look at the colors, the cut, 
and then we order perhaps one thousand, or even twenty thousand meters 
from a certain material. But then you have Zara, and they order three million 
meters of the same material. We are just peanuts for their market . . . but still, 
this is great for us, you know? We can hire people, give them a job, we are 
able to create a value, to sell goods, and to earn money this way.41
During our first interview, situational interviews, and casual conversations, Asem 
often emphasized family connections as a key element that saved the Bosniak 
community during the war years. Trading, as emphasized by Asem, served the 
purpose of connecting with kin and shielded locals from experiencing the eco-
nomic hardship other citizens of Serbia experienced. In contrast to earlier narra-
tives in which he stressed family and kin relations, Asem describes the connection 
between Turkey and Novi Pazar as a business connection in the previous excerpt. 
Turkey, in other words, no longer appeared primarily as a symbolic anchor during 
later conversations and interviews but as a place of transaction. Asem’s choice 
of words is especially intriguing here. He uses the word ‘Turkey’, thus implying 
a distance that characterizes a transnational business transaction that is void of 
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personal connections. To be sure, personal connections still enabled locals to do 
business, yet the sense-making properties evolved into a secondary narrative upon 
repeated inquiry about the actual practice of trading.
Three possible developments might explain this shift in emphasis. First, during 
the initial fieldwork phase, I recorded autobiographical interviews. Interviewees 
narrated life events as they chose. During latter fieldwork stages and after initial 
coding between 2012 and 2014, I identified šverc, Turkey, transnational family 
and trade relations, and rupture as key concepts by which to understand how social 
relations transformed in Novi Pazar. I therefore asked questions pertaining to 
emerging key concepts, which might have shaped subsequent conversations with 
interlocutors. Second, when we first met, Asem was employed, drove a sleek car, 
and appeared at our meetings in nice suits. Always courteous, welcoming, and an 
excellent source of reliable insider knowledge, he lost his job during latter stages 
of the fieldwork, which influenced not only his frame of mind but also his will-
ingness to disclose information at times, as well as his overall disposition toward 
Turkey. During latter stages of the fieldwork, Turkey began to cooperate with the 
Serbian state and routed investment through official channels, as documented on 
the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) website, for instance.42 
It is in this example that we can see most clearly that transnational relations occur 
between two states, as previously emphasized by Faist. They do not, in his words, 
transpire on a “magic carpet of a de-territorialized space of flows.”43 Adapting this 
statement to the argument at hand, one might argue the Turkish and Serbian states 
co-opted existing transnational kin relations to legitimize cooperation and access 
to their respective markets. However, this argument lies beyond the scope of this 
book. What remains is the fact that a range of interlocutors increasingly voiced 
their view of relations with Turkey as transactional. An excerpt from a situational 
interview with Daud is illustrative of this perception:
ME: How did these family connections help? Did émigré Bosniaks in Turkey 
donate goods for the market in Novi Pazar, or how did this work?
DAUD: A gift from a Turk (Turčin da ti da džabe)?! He will lease it to you, he 
might give you a loan, but you will have to pay him back. You know what 
my grandfather used to say? “Why were the Turks not the first to land on 
the moon? Because there was no money up there (laughs). . . . there was no 
money on the moon. . . (laughs).” Had there been money, the Turks would 
have been the first ones to go up. Eh . . . for free . . . no way! Ok, he will give 
you something if he trusts you, if he knows you, but you have to pay it back. 
But without paying the money back, no chance.44
Like Asem, Daud narrates the connections between Turkey and Novi Pazar from a 
transactional perspective when asked about the specificities of the trade.
A third option is Asem’s overall disillusion with the Serbian state – a disillusion 
harking back to the rupture that came about the Yugoslav Succession Wars, and 
the subsequent dislocation of the Bosniak (Albanian, Roma, Hungarian, etc.) pop-
ulation from the Serbian state. It is instructive to recall that Asem felt connected 
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to the Yugoslav state as he grew up. He no longer, however, recognizes the state 
he once called home. Transnational relations with the émigré community thus 
offered much needed respite and relief and the potential for financial autonomy 
from the Serbian state. Yet, it became increasingly clear that Novi Pazar would 
remain within the sovereign state borders of Serbia. Turkey now cooperated with 
Belgrade, and the local community, too, had already changed beyond recognition. 
According to an excerpt from 2012:
Today, if you are a good student, you are seen as a nerd. Being good at school 
is no longer in. Now, you have to be bald, unemployed, you have to be a 
troublemaker, to argue with professors . . . that’s what is in now. . . . There are 
a few who also want to advance, but there are not enough of us here. There 
are not enough intellectuals here, with real knowledge, educated people with 
diplomas.45
Asem, as this excerpt demonstrates, was critical of the state from the outset. Yet, 
during our initial interviews and casual conversations, Asem displayed a spirit of 
optimism. His job imbued him with a sense of security and autonomy, which he 
lost at a later stage of the fieldwork. Again, this might seem tangential. Yet, given 
the reliance on oral testimonies, ethnographers must take contemporary circum-
stances into account when analyzing the sayings and doings of interlocutors.
Anomia
Emela and I sit in a cafe bar and sip our lemonades as she tells me about a bar club 
(kafana) that is located behind her house:
There are a bunch of girls there. I can always hear a noise (galamu) coming 
from inside that place, but nobody ever asks what is going on there. My hair-
dresser is located close-by, and the lady who fixes my hair also cuts the hair 
of the girls who live in this place.
Emela is a tall, very well-educated and progressive (Bosniak) lady, always dressed 
in the latest fashion and bent on leaving Novi Pazar for good. “The other day,” 
Emela explains,
my hairdresser told me about those girls . . . there is this one girl from Prije-
polje, she must be really pretty (izuzetno lepa djevojka). The hairdresser told 
me this girl is held against her will, that she is being forced to work as a pros-
titute. They are giving these girls drugs to sedate them. All those girls start 
out looking nice, but then they start to look really bad . . . after some time.
Emela looks into the distance, and we sit in silence for the next couple of min-
utes. The afternoon sun beats down relentlessly. The air-conditioning inside the 
café bar is equally relentless. Both of us are wearing sweaters inside as the sun 
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swelters outside. Emela breaks the silence and picks up where she left off a couple 
of minutes earlier:
There are several establishments in Novi Pazar that purport to be hotels, but 
in reality, these places are bordellos. In Novi Pazar there are only a few places 
where you can go, the Hotel Atlas, Tadj, and perhaps the Oxa. But even they 
rent out rooms by the hour. It is difficult to go after those guys, because some 
policemen, judges, and politicians protect the owners of those establishments. 
I think they are connected to this trade, the trafficking of humans.46
A report by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
published in 2008, found that victims of trafficking in Serbia often come from 
neighboring towns or even the same town in which they are trafficked.47 Accord-
ing to the human rights report published by the Council of Europe, 296 trafficking 
victims were officially recognized between 2013 and 2016.48
“The worst thing,” Emela tells me,
is that black marketeering (krijumdjiranje) became normal for me. I know 
that this or that guy did this or that job in the 90s. . . . they made a ton of 
money (gomilu para). They live like kings now. It is normal for me to know 
that this or that guy has shady deals or deals with illegal substances. Every-
body knows! Those are public secrets (to su javne tajne).
Emela throws her hands up in the air and exclaims, “I don’t care about them 
anymore. And that,” she says emphatically, “is what is wrong with this place. The 
new normal is the old abnormal.”49
The trial and error system that started in earnest during the 1990s, I contend, 
laid the basis for the rising anomia, seeing that society lost its power “to regulate 
[the] social equilibrium by setting the acceptable level of social restraint.”50 An 
excerpt from an interview with Ekrem serves as an indicator here:
If you look at all of Serbia, you will notice that everyone in this society 
(celo ukupno društvo) took a wrong turn. Those people who try to live nor-
mally . . . there are only a handful that remained normal. They all want 
something sensational; they all want to be, I don’t know . . . they generally 
worship the wrong idols. Idols are those people who used to be criminals 
during the 1990s. . . . Why? Because people think they are cool. They had 
the best cars, the most beautiful girls, and everyone wanted to be with them, 
be like them. . . . Everything some normal boy or girl wanted back then, they 
had. This means, all the things these people did were presented as though 
they were normal, legal. This Arkan guy was a criminal, who knows what 
he did . . . he indirectly ruled Serbia. He had a nice house, right next to the 
Red Star stadium so he could watch the [soccer] games from his home. . . . 
He got married to Ceca. She was . . . I don’t know, the most sought-after 
woman in Yugoslavia, I think. . . . I mean, there are those who like that. . . . 
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So, people around here looked at them, and thought, aha, Arkan has all these 
things. . . . O.k., I will be like Arkan, and the girls started to look and behave 
like Ceca. . . . I think only a small percentile remained normal.51
Robert Merton, deliberating “socio-cultural sources of deviate behavior,” stated:
The dominant pressure of group standards of success is, therefore, on the 
gradual attenuation of legitimate, but by and large ineffective, strivings and 
the increasing use of illegitimate, but more or less effective, expedients of 
vice and crime. The cultural demands made on persons in this situation [pov-
erty] are incompatible. On the one hand, they are asked to orient their conduct 
toward the prospect of accumulating wealth and on the other, they are largely 
denied effective opportunities to do so institutionally.52
Merton’s deliberation on anomia is highly fruitful because one recognizes the 
social structure in Serbia was not deviant, but normal. In other words, deviancy 
was built into the very institution of the Serbian state. Racketeers collected ‘taxes’ 
from shop owners who smuggled goods – counterfeited and otherwise – border 
guards were bribed, and local idols included Arkan, a war-criminal,53 and his (now 
widowed wife) Svetlana Ceca Ražnatović, a turbo-folk singer who is frequently 
connected to criminal machinations in Serbia.54 What started as a trial-and-error 
system, in other words, transmuted into a normal organism of expectations that 
carried legitimate “prospect(s) of accumulating wealth” by illegitimate means, 
however legally. Senad, in describing the general atmosphere in Novi Pazar dur-
ing the 1990s, explained:
I mean, you could get drunk here, enjoy and throw out money by the fistful if 
you wanted to . . . some people simply made so much money in such a short 
time that they had no way of developing a sense of boundary, their sense of 
normal got lost. They thought it would go on like this forever. because all this 
happened, the black market developed. These people simply did not think 
ahead. They threw money out with both hands, spoiled their children, educa-
tion was no longer deemed necessary.55
Interlocutors, albeit narrating the past, often connected the period of the 1990s to 
the present. Illustrative of this is that interlocutors repeatedly argue the value of 
education declined in the 1990s, a characteristic that also pervades the present. 
Gordana serves as an example here, speaking about the past, she related her son, 
too, decided to discontinue his education to ‘work under the table’ at present see-
ing that a person that works in “a normal job . . . nine to five[, then you are] is (a) 
nobody in this town, in this entire country.” Other interlocutors concurred with 
this sentiment, echoing Gordana’s and the above assertion that “education was no 
longer deemed necessary: diplomas can be bought. If you know the right people, 
you can get employment. . . . I feel like having a diploma is just important for 
the bureaucracy.”56 This correlates with questionnaire data, according to which 
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51.2 percent strongly agree and 30.6 percent agree with the statement that career 
advancement in my country depends on who I know (Figure 5.2).
Education, it seems, is secondary in this system that evidently values connec-
tions over merit. Present circumstances thus factor into the answers and percep-
tions interlocutors relate to researchers. One might argue, therefore, interlocutors 
see no difference between the past and the present – that is, the sociopolitical 
system as described by Ekrem did not change substantially since the 1990s.
During my time in the field, Senad used to say:,
We have a saying here in Novi Pazar; ‘para nema ni babu ni majku’ (money 
has neither a grandmother nor mother). The criminals and the politicians have 
always worked hand in hand, without political support, the criminals could 
not have functioned the way they did.57
Interlocutors, as demonstrated with this statement, and illustrated in the question-
naire data, distrust(ed) Serbian governing institutions, and perceive politicians as 
self-serving rather than serving the electoral body in Serbia:
Political parties. . . . All that matters is if they are Serbs, Bosniaks, Hungar-
ians or Croats. Everything is decided by nationalists. Not because they are 
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in my view not a nationalist, even though some would like to call him that. 
He was using (original emphasis) the nationalist wave, but he was above all 
a criminal individual, a bandit, a crook! He stole from the population. This 
horrible inflation did not come from nowhere! The war did not simply come 
out of nowhere. The way I see it, there was no national, religious, or any other 
reason except that some criminals saw the opportunity to make a lot (original 
emphasis) of money. Of course, the war was (original emphasis) a war for 
those people that fought and lost relatives etc. But for those that made money 
off of it, the war was a welcome opportunity to make money. The war was 
generated so that they could steel as much money as possible.58
Judging from the data collected in the field, this distrust is rooted in the 1990s 
and the connection between the criminal netherworld and the Milošević regime. 
Senad even declares the Milošević regime as criminal instead of nationalistic. He 
often, for instance, used the word magla (fog) to describe the regime’s tactics of 
duping Serbian citizens into believing in external threats, fifth columns, and other 
perils that might menace the Serbian people. The previous chapter might serve as 
a case in point here. Other interlocutors agreed with Senad. Ekrem, for instance, 
stated:
I don’t know, I think this area here serves the purpose of generating profit, 
when somebody needs it. When somebody wants to make a profit, all he 
needs to do is make some waves, to (da malo zaljulja), create some unrest, to 
then make a profit, here, on this territory.59
The reason for this, according to informants, is that Novi Pazar still serves as a 
channel through which goods are smuggled. Saleh explained:
The ’90s still influence the present. There are a lot of consequences that influ-
ence our lives here . . . perhaps there are some . . . some people perhaps 
don’t believe they do, but the ’90s influence the present for sure. Sure, in 
the past couple of years, Novi Pazar is not a merchant town anymore, not 
the way it used to be during the ’90s, and there are no longer that many 
people who come to shop here, to trade, and do šverc. But there are some 
other forms. . . . today, people don’t smuggle coffee anymore, they don’t 
smuggle jeans material . . . cigarettes . . . all that . . . instead . . . there are real 
criminals now. I don’t know what sort of channels they use . . . but most of 
the shipments come through Novi Pazar . . . some of the goods stay here in 
town, others go on. . . . I mean, we are here in close proximity to Kosovo, 
Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia. I mean, Serbia . . . there is this connection 
between Serbia, Turkey, and Bulgaria . . . it’s all connected, and all those 
countries I mentioned are all involved in this smuggling business . . . and . . . 
I mean . . . this all started back in the ’90s. Those people who started out back 
in the ’90s have necessary connections to continue this job. I think this will 
continue forever here. Look at the history of this town. This town was not 
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built to be lived in, it was built for trade (on nije planiran da se živi u njemu, 
samo da se trguje). It was built for people to come here, meet, and trade. . . . I 
am convinced that every person that grew up in this town has trading in their 
blood (svi koji su porasli u ovom gradu imaju trgovinu u krvi). Take anything, 
the tiniest of things, and people from here will be able to trade that thing, to 
make some sort of a deal. I believe this, and I was proved right many times 
over in my life. Myself, presently, I mean . . . I sell a few things, I trade. . . . I 
am a merchant, and sell merchandise. . . . I know this will always exist within 
the people who are from Novi Pazar. This is why, yes, the ’90s influence the 
present, but it has always been like this in this community.60
Synthesis
The practice of šverc is highly ambiguous because, as illustrated in the previous 
three chapters, smuggling might be considered both inappropriate and appropri-
ate. Inquiring about the actual practice of šverc draped the overarching question 
of how material encounters influenced the social relations in Novi Pazar with yet 
another layer of ambiguity as informants connected informal practices with the 
Milošević regime during later fieldwork stages. Material encounters, examined 
from the perspective of actual smuggling activities, thus brought to the fore that 
šverceri were only able to smuggle goods so long as the government profited from 
this trade. Merchants were, according to the data retrieved in the field, considered 
to be connected with the regime, however involuntary.
Examining the practice of šverc revealed that, because merchants were unable 
to trade from without the purview of the state, informal trading merge(d) with the 
practice of transnational organized crime in which governing forces were impli-
cated. During the 1990s, in other words, one is no longer able to distinguish gov-
erning forces from transnational organized crime practices or informal trading that 
sustained ordinary citizens. Šverc pervaded all levels of society. It is interesting 
to note here that, because smuggling was widespread and indeed indispensable, 
trading necessitated ‘interethnic’ cooperation, seeing that Serbia required trading 
partners from neighboring countries, including Croatia and Bosnia, as well as 
non-adjacent states, such as Turkey. On the surface then, one might argue, Bel-
grade fostered an extreme-nationalist campaign for propaganda purposes. Below 
the surface, Belgrade depended on the continued cooperation with these very indi-
viduals and/or states it otherwise denounced and persecuted. Ordinary citizens 
thus perceive Milošević – and everyone connected with this regime – as criminal 
and consequently untrustworthy.
Ordinary citizens were suspended in midair – dependent on the affability of 
the state to continue with business affairs, knowing the state might at some point 
criminalize their endeavor, as demonstrated by Saleh. Empirical data suggests that 
locals were only able to business so long as the state permitted the trade. Between 
1991 and 1994, šverc was a celebrated practice, seeing that smugglers managed 
to import the most mundane of goods, including coffee, soap, and toilet paper in 
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addition to drugs and weapons, as illustrated by the Večerne Novosti paper. After 
1994, the state discontinued the possibility to trade informally, though data sug-
gests that a segment of smugglers continued to do business. As such, the assump-
tion that informal trading is only possible if connected to the state is plausible. 
The line between necessity and excess, ordinary and devious, became blurred. 
Informal material encounters thus led to an ensuing sense of anomia in the case of 
Serbia. Significantly, it was the government, Belgrade, that heralded this instabil-
ity that led to the absolute breakdown of social norms. As a consequence, locals 
(Bosniaks, Serbs, Roma, etc.) find themselves unable to trust governing institu-
tions to this day.
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Conclusion
The practice of šverc – or material encounters across detached spaces – consid-
erably influenced the social relations between and among Bosniaks, Serbs, and 
Roma in Novi Pazar. Before reflecting on my concluding remarks on how this was 
the case, I must iterate that šverc is and was practiced in all of Serbia during the 
wars, and indeed in all of Yugoslavia even before the Yugoslav Succession Wars 
started. It was, however, not my intent to analyze the continuity of prewar smug-
gling connections among and between supranational and adjacent states. Instead, 
it was my intent to learn from informants how šverc during the Yugoslav Succes-
sion Wars affected the everyday lives of Bosniaks within the Yugoslav rump state 
and how informants make sense of these connections. Based on empirical data 
gathered in the field, I examined the overarching question of how transnational 
practices affected social relations in southern Serbia through the prism of šverc. 
By adopting a grounded theory approach to my fieldwork, I learned from inform-
ants how informal trading practices influenced their everyday lives in the Sandžak 
region – specifically in Novi Pazar – between 1991 and 1995. Inquiring about the 
informal market in Novi Pazar produced two dominant narratives that I analyzed 
in different parts of the book.
In Part I, I considered the first narrative strand as a sense-making tool through 
which Bosniaks not only connected with historiographic events but also came 
to identify with the greater diaspora scattered in various Southeastern European 
states and Turkey. This narrative strand is, in other words, a mnemonic tool by 
which locals understand and interpret their social position within the Yugoslav 
rump state and Serbia, respectively, but crucially their social position within a 
transnational context.
Narrative memory transmission is a significant aspect within this first narra-
tive strand because elders serve as vehicular units by which younger generations 
learn about a past they did not experience. Crucial is that younger generations 
identified with the past as told by their grandparents as opposed to their parents. 
Because history turned operational again, present circumstances as experienced 
by younger generations mirrored those of elders who experienced and/or served 
as a link to the bygone Ottoman Empire – a link that served as a strong sym-
bolic anchor for informants in the region. Connections with the émigré commu-
nity in Turkey represent a crucial and a very tangible connection with this past. 
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Transnational networks between the local and the émigré Bosniak community in 
Turkey, in other words, carried the unofficial (non-state-sanctioned) history of the 
Ottoman Empire into the public sphere, even in the absence of any given individ-
ual’s lack of concrete connections with the Bosniak émigré community in Turkey.
The aspect of a non-state-sanctioned history is couched into the architectural 
Ottoman remnants in Novi Pazar, whose dilapidating state serves as a very pub-
lic reminder of the social marginalization of the Bosniak/Muslim community in 
Southern Serbia; this is especially the case during the Yugoslav Succession Wars. 
Political entrepreneurs of all backgrounds used historic landmarks to ensure and 
conjure legitimate claims over Southern Serbia. A case in point is Stanko Ravić, 
a public historian who claimed the capital city of ancient Ras was built on top 
of Novi Pazar, for instance. Locals, therefore, view the state-sanctioned history 
with cynicism, which endows narrative memory transmission by elders with 
additional weight.
The salience of transnational material encounters across detached borders can 
only be understood against the backdrop of historical circumstances as understood 
by locals in – and to some extent since – the 1990s. Trading with and/or receiv-
ing aid from the émigré community in Turkey heralded a time-space continuum, 
a chronological continuity that imbued locals with a sense of communitas with 
fellow Bosniaks and/or Muslims wherever they lived. The practice of šverc was 
thus, seen from the perspective of the first narrative, not only a necessary means 
of survival and security. Šverc was an appropriate tool by which locals endured 
the economic downturn in Serbia that also served as a centripetal force for the 
ongoing memory construction and reconstruction among Bosniaks in Novi Pazar.
In Part II, I considered the second narrative strand that consisted of the actual 
doing of šverc: the practice of smuggling. Probing into the actual practice of 
smuggling goods brought to the surface that šverc cut(s) across ethnic, religious, 
and political boundaries and was practiced in all of Serbia. A recontextualization 
of smuggling practices based on the Večernje Novosti newspaper revealed that 
smuggling was not a deviant act but an ordinary way to earn a living. More than 
that, it was necessary due to the exceedingly unpredictable economic situation in 
Serbia, especially during the first half of the 1990s. As a consequence, the paper 
reported freely and amicably about the practice of šverc, individual šverceri, and 
where one could find the best markets for the acquisition of goods and black-
market exchange rates.
The paper proved to be a highly fruitful source by which to triangulate data 
obtained in the field. Especially intriguing is the inconsistent depiction of Bos-
niaks and/or Muslims in Novi Pazar compared to other residents in Serbia. 
According to the paper, Serbs did not partake in this trade in Novi Pazar, seeing 
that Serbs had no existing connections with individuals in Turkey. And yet, the 
paper regularly reported about the breakup of smuggling channels by which Bos-
niaks and Serbs cooperated, according to the paper, to the detriment to either the 
Republic of Serbia, Republika Srpska, or both. The paper, meanwhile, depicted 
Bosniaks as a fifth column and collaborator of Turkey, which regularly attacked 
the Serbian state. Most glaring is the contradiction relating to the accusation that 
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Bosniaks deprived the state of critical revenue by withholding taxes, seeing that 
šverc occurred in all of Serbia. Overall, one might consider Serbia as a strong-
weak hybrid state. Belgrade – which was increasingly undistinguishable from the 
criminal netherworld – was unable to provide citizens with basic goods such as 
toilet paper and soap, though it supported paramilitary and military offensives in 
Croatia and Bosnia. Consequently, šverc is highly ambiguous, depending on the 
angle from which one examines the practice.
Repeated inquiry about šverc increasingly stripped the practice of its sense-
making property. Instead of highlighting transnational connections as a symbolic 
anchor, the way interlocutors did during initial interviews, transnational connec-
tions increasingly appeared as transactional networks during later interview and 
fieldwork stages. Informants, moreover, progressively connected informal prac-
tices with the Milošević regime, and the regime itself as a criminal enterprise. It 
is here where one sees most clearly that ethnic categories fade away. Citizens who 
live in a corrupted system may find themselves compelled to make a living by 
informal means as well as by way of involuntary cooperation with regimes they 
otherwise despise.
Among the most inveterate unintended consequences is the sense of anomia 
that permeates all levels of society in Serbia, including Novi Pazar. Because Bel-
grade relied on smuggling activities and criminal networks during the 1990s, 
locals no longer trust the sociopolitical and economic process in Serbia. Distrust 
of governing institutions cuts across ethnic and theistic boundaries.
Theoretical implications address an encouragement of combining two (and 
more) seemingly incompatible theoretical approaches to study a phenomenon 
encountered in the field. To be sure, the practice turn in social sciences – examin-
ing the sayings and doings of agents in the field – might stand in seeming contra-
diction to a mnemonics approach, a method that purports to look inside the heads 
of interlocutors to glean relevant information. Combining the two paradigms, 
however, yielded remarkable insight. Not only was I able to study local attitudes 
toward šverc by doing so, but I also learned how individuals use narratives to 
make sense of their situation and how to compare insight gleaned from open-
ended, semi-structured interviews to results garnered from a practice-oriented 
approach.
Observing collective attitudes toward sociopolitical and economic events based 
on mnemonics is fruitful because one can learn to understand experiences from 
the point of view of interlocutors. Examining the same phenomena from the per-
spective of practice, meanwhile, might have prevented a skewed data set, seeing 
that informants narrate a self to resist another. As argued earlier, for instance, 
locals shied away from disclosing their own involvement in šverc though readily 
highlighted the significance of transnational connections with the Bosniak émigré 
community in Turkey. It took somewhere between three and four years, in other 
words, to learn about those narratives informants sought to resist at first.
In summary, transnational networks are seen as a solidarity chain that ena-
bled locals to make a living but also as a system of connections within which to 
cohere the transmutation of their existence in the former Yugoslav Republic. And 
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herein lies the irony: though Belgrade waged an extremely bloody war in Croatia 
and Bosnia, the internationally imposed sanctions affected all citizens of Serbia, 
including the Bosniak minority population that also experienced persecution by 
Belgrade. In turn, the market benefited all of Novi Pazar – Albanian, Bosniak, 
Serbian, and Roma alike – even the Milošević regime. At the most obvious level, 
the present study illustrates that international sanctions harm the most vulnerable 
people, in addition to the average citizen who may or may not support the actions 
of the ruling regime. International actors – specifically the five permanent, plus 
rotating members of the United Nations Security Council – thus not only impose 
but enforce an otherwise inexistent, and artificial, homogeneity upon the ‘nation-
state’ to rid the ‘international community’ of a rogue leader. One may argue the 
international community replicates the very nationalism it opposes by way of eco-
nomic warfare. In due course, those affected by the sanctions experience isolation 
and seek ‘aid’ elsewhere. Internationally imposed sanctions bear a maximum of 
unintended consequences, one of which is the creation of informal markets one is 
unable to contain long after the violence subsided.
Appendix – questionnaire
OVAJ UPITNIK JE POTPUNO ANONIMAN, I KORIŠČEN ZA UNIVER-
SITETSKE SVRHE
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS TOTALLY ANONYMOUS AND USED FOR 










 5. Mesto rođenja
Place of birth
 6. Grad u kojem trenutno živite
The city in which you currently live
 7. Koliko dugo već živite u tom gradu
How long have you been living in that city
 8. Koji je Vaš maternji jezik
What is your native language
 9. Državljanstvo Vašeg oca
Your father’s citizenship
10. Nacionalna pripadnost Vašeg oca
Your father’s nationality
11. Maternji jezik Vašeg oca
Your father’s native language
12. Državljanstvo Vaše majke
Your mother’s citizenship
13. Nacionalna pripadnost Vaše majke
Your mother’s nationality
14. Maternji jezik Vaše majke
Your mother’s native language
15. Verska pripadnost
Religious affiliation
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16.  Obrazovanje: a) Osnovna škola b) Srednja škola c) Viša škola d) Univerzitetske studije 
(MOLIM VAS DA ZAOKRUŽITE)
Education: a) Elementary school b) High school c) Higher education d) University 
(Please circle relevant answer)
17.  Da li ste zaposleni? nezaposleni, ili penzioner (MOLIM VAS DA ZAOKRUŽITE)
Are you employed? Unemployed, or are you retired (Please circle relevant answer)
Ocenite u kojoj meri se slažete, odnosno ne slažete sa sledećim tvrdnjama? (4) Potpuno 
se slažem (3) Delimično se slažem (2) Delimično se neslažem (1) Uopšte se ne slažem| 
Please evaluate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements 
(4) I completely agree (3) I partially agree (2) I partially disagree (1) I disagree
Ljudi su nagrađeni za 1 2 3 4
svoji rad
People are rewarded for 
their work
U ovoj regiji, ljudi 1 2 3 4
su cjenjene zbog 
svoje inteligencije i 
sposobnosti
In this region, people 
are appreciated for 
their intelligence and 
ability
Ako dolazim iz bogate 1 2 3 4
porodice, sva vrata su 
mi otvorena
If I come from a wealthy 
family, all doors are 
open to me
Napredovanje u 1 2 3 4
karijeri u mojoj 
zemlji zavisi 
od toga koga znam
Career progression in 
my country depends 
on who I know
U mestu u kojem 1 2 3 4
živim imam 
jednake šanse za 
napredovanje kao 
i ljudi u drugim 
delovima moje zemlje
In the place where 
I live, I have the 
same chance of 
advancement as 
people in other parts 
of my country
166 Appendix – questionnaire
(Continued)
Vlada je odgovorna za 1 2 3 4
neravnomeran razvoj 
regiona
The government is 
responsible for the 
uneven development of 
the region
Vlada čini dovoljno 1 2 3 4
da bi svi regioni bili 
jednako razvijeni
The government is doing 
enough to ensure that 
all regions are equally 
developed
Ocenite u kojoj meri se slažete, odnosno ne slažete sa sledećim tvrdnjama? (4) Potpuno 
se slažem (3) Delimično se slažem (2) Delimično se neslažem (1) Uopšte se ne slažem| 
Please evaluate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements 
(4) I completely agree (3) I partially agree (2) I partially disagree (1) I disagree
Zarađujem dovoljno 1 2 3 4
novca da izdržavam 
sebe/porodicu
I earn enough money 
to support myself/my 
family
Treba dva ili više radnih 1 2 3 4
mesta da bih sebe/svoju 
porodicu finansijski 
izdržavao
It takes two or more jobs 
to support myself/my 
family
Obično dobijam platu 1 2 3 4
preko bankovnog 
računa
I usually receive my 
paycheck via bank 
deposit
Obično dobijam platu u 1 2 3 4
gotovini
I usually get paid in cash
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Ocenite u kojoj meri se slažete, odnosno ne slažete sa sledećim tvrdnjama? (4) Potpuno 
se slažem (3) Delimično se slažem (2) Delimično se neslažem (1) Uopšte se ne slažem| 
Please evaluate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements 
(4) I completely agree (3) I partially agree (2) I partially disagree (1) I disagree
Život u Vašem gradu i/ 1 2 3 4
ili regiji
Life in your city and/or 
region
Život u Sandžaku 1 2 3 4
Life in Sandžak
Život u Srbiji 1 2 3 4
Life in Serbia




Vaša nacionalna 1 2 3 4
pripadnost
Your nationality
Vaš materni jezik 1 2 3 4
Your mother tongue
Vaša verska pripadnost 1 2 3 4
Your religious affiliation
Ocenite u kojoj meri se slažete, odnosno ne slažete sa sledećim tvrdnjama? (4) Potpuno 
se slažem (3) Delimično se slažem (2) Delimično se neslažem (1) Uopšte se ne slažem| 
Please evaluate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements 
(4) I completely agree (3) I partially agree (2) I partially disagree (1) I disagree
Trgovina na buvljak/ 1 2 3 4
pijaci u Novom Pazaru 
je snabdevala Novog 
Pazara sa robom 
tokom 1990-ih godina
The flea market/the 
market supplied Novi 
Pazar with goods 
during the 1990s
Trgovina na buvljak/
pijaci u Novom Pazaru 
je snabdevala Srbiju sa 
robom tokom 1990-ih 
godina
The flea market/the 
market supplied Serbia 
with goods during the 
1990s
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Ocenite u kojoj meri se slažete, odnosno ne slažete sa sledećim tvrdnjama? (4) Potpuno 
se slažem (3) Delimično se slažem (2) Delimično se neslažem (1) Uopšte se ne slažem| 
Please evaluate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements 
(4) I completely agree (3) I partially agree (2) I partially disagree (1) I disagree
Trgovina na buvljak/ 1 2 3 4
pijaci u Novom Pazaru 
je snabdevala Crnu 
Goru sa robom tokom 
1990-ih godina
The flea market/the 
market supplied 
Montenegro with 
goods during the 
1990s
Znam nekoga ko je radio 1 2 3 4
na buvljak/pijaci kao 
trgovac tokom 1990-ih 
godina
I know someone who 
worked on the flea 
market/the market as 
a trader during the 
1990s
Ja sam radio/radila na 1 2 3 4
buvljak/pijaci kao 
trgovac tokom 1990-ih 
godina
I worked as a trader 
on the flea market/
the market as a trader 
during the 1990s
Još uvek radim na 1 2 3 4
buvljak/pijaci kao 
trgovac u Novom 
Pazaru
I still work as a trader 
on the flea market/
the market as a trader 
during the 1990s
Većina robe koja je bila 1 2 3 4
prodata/koja se proda u 
Novom Pazaru dolazi 
iz Bugarske
Most of the goods that 
were sold/are sold in 
Novi Pazar come from 
Bulgaria
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Većina robe koja je bila 1 2 3 4
prodata/koja se proda u 
Novom Pazaru dolazi 
iz Mađarske
Most of the goods that 
were sold/are sold in 
Novi Pazar come from 
Hungary
Većina robe koja je bila 1 2 3 4
prodata/koja se proda u 
Novom Pazaru dolazi 
iz Turske
Most of the goods that 
were sold/are sold in 
Novi Pazar come from 
Turkey
Sledeće izjave su tačno ili netačno (označite odgovarajuće sa X) Tačno Netačno
The following statements are true or false (mark corresponding 
answer with an X)
Znam nekoga ko dovozi robu iz Bugarske
I know someone who brings in goods from Bulgaria
Znam nekoga ko dovozi robu iz Mađarske
I know someone who brings in goods from Hungary
Znam nekoga ko dovozirobu iz Turske
I know someone who brings in goods from Turkey
Ja sam dovozio/dovozim robu iz Bugarske
I bring in goods from Bulgaria
Ja sam dovozio/dovozim robu iz Mađarske
I bring in goods from Hungary
Ja sam dovozio/dovozim robu iz Turske
I bring in goods from Turkey
Dovozio /la sam robu uz pomoć jednog člana porodice/prijatelja koji 
živi u Bugarskoj
I brought the goods with the help of a family member/a friend who 
lives in Bulgaria
Dovozio/la sam robu uz pomoć jednog člana porodice/prijatelja koji 
živi u Mađarskoj
I brought the goods with the help of a family member/a friend who 
lives in Hungary
Dovozio /la sam robu uz pomoć jednog člana porodice/prijatelja koji 
živi u Turskoj
I brought the goods with the help of a family member/a friend who 
lives in Turkey
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Ocenite u kojoj meri se slažete, odnosno ne slažete sa sledećim tvrdnjama? (4) Potpuno 
se slažem (3) Delimično se slažem (2) Delimično se neslažem (1) Uopšte se ne slažem| 
Please evaluate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements 
(4) I completely agree (3) I partially agree (2) I partially disagree (1) I disagree
Verska pripadnost 1 2 3 4





affects my level of 
trust in potential 
business partners
Znanje jezika 1 2 3 4




Linguistic skills affect 
my level of trust in 
potential business 
partners









affects my level of 
trust in potential 
business partners
Ocenite u kojoj meri se slažete, odnosno ne slažete sa sledećim tvrdnjama? (4) Potpuno 
se slažem (3) Delimično se slažem (2) Delimično se neslažem (1) Uopšte se ne slažem| 
Please evaluate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements 
(4) I completely agree (3) I partially agree (2) I partially disagree (1) I disagree
Ljudi Vaše 1 2 3 4
nacionalnosti koji 
žive u vašem gradu 
ili regiji
People of your 
nationality who 
live in your city or 
region
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Ljudi druge 1 2 3 4
nacionalnosti koji 
žive u Vašem gradu 
ili regiji
People of another 
nationality who 
live in your city or 
region
Ljudi Vaše 1 2 3 4
nacionalnosti koji 
žive u Srbiji
People of your 
nationality who live 
in Serbia
Ljudi druge 1 2 3 4
nacionalnosti koji 
žive u Srbiji
People of another 
nationality who live 
in Serbia
Ljudi Vaše 1 2 3 4
nacionalnosti koji 
žive bilo gde u 
bivšoj Jugoslaviji
People of your 
nationality who live 
anywhere in former 
Yugoslavia
Ljudi druge 1 2 3 4
nacionalnosti koji 
žive bilo gde u 
bivšoj Jugoslaviji
People of another 
nationality who live 
anywhere in former 
Yugoslavia
Ljudi vaše 1 2 3 4
nacionalnosti koji 
žive bilo gde u 
svetu
People of your 
nationality who live 
anywhere in the 
world
Ljudi druge 1 2 3 4
nacionalnosti koji 
žive bilo gde u 
svetu
People of another 
nationality who live 
anywhere in the 
world
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Sledeće izjave su tačno ili netačno (označite odgovarajuće sa X) Tačno Netačno
The following statements are true or false (mark corresponding 
answer with an X)
Imam članove porodice koji su napustili ovu regiju, i emigrirali u 
Tursku nakon 1918
I have family members who left the region and emigrated to Turkey 
after 1918
Znam potomke tih članova porodice koji su napustili ovaj region da 
žive u Turskoj
I know the descendants of those family members who left this region 
to live in Turkey
Imam redovne kontakte sa članovima porodice koji žive u Turskoj
I have regular contact with family members who live in Turkey
Imam članove u mojoj široj porodici koji su napustili ovu regiju, i 
emigrirali u Tursku nakon 1918
I have members in my extended family who left the region and 
emigrated to Turkey after 1918
Znam potomke tih članova šire porodice koji su napustili ovaj 
regijon da žive u Turskoj
I know the descendants of those members of the extended family who 
left this region to live in Turkey
Imam redovne kontakte sa članovima šire porodice koja živi u 
Turskoj
I have regular contacts with members of my extended family who 
live in Turkey
Znam ljudi koji su napustili ovaj region da žive u Turskoj nakon 
1918
I know people who left this region to live in Turkey after 1918
Imam prijatelje u Turskoj
I have friends in Turkey
Ocenite u kojoj meri se slažete, odnosno ne slažete sa sledećim tvrdnjama? (4) Potpuno 
se slažem (3) Delimično se slažem (2) Delimično se neslažem (1) Uopšte se ne slažem| 
Please evaluate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements 
(4) I completely agree (3) I partially agree (2) I partially disagree (1) I disagree




Bivša Jugoslavija 1 2 3 4
Former Yugoslavia
Sovjetski Savez 1 2 3 4
The Soviet Union
Austro-Ugarska 1 2 3 4
The Austro-Hungarian 
Empire
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Ocenite u kojoj meri se slažete, odnosno ne slažete sa sledećim tvrdnjama? (4) Potpuno 
se slažem (3) Delimično se slažem (2) Delimično se neslažem (1) Uopšte se ne slažem| 
Please evaluate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements 
(4) I completely agree (3) I partially agree (2) I partially disagree (1) I disagree
Osmansko Carstvo 1 2 3 4
The Ottoman Empire
Potencijalno članstvo u EU 1 2 3 4
Potential EU membership
Drugo (molim Vas, 1 2 3 4
napišite):
Other statements (please 
indicate here):
_____________________ )
U prostoru ispod, molim Vas da nacrtate svoju domovinu i označite tri mesta koja 
smatrate najvažnijim. Ako ne želite da crtate, molim Vas da napišete imena lokaliteta, 
zemalja, ulica, ili šta god, koja Vi smatrate kao najvažnijim
In the space below, please draw your homeland and mark the three places you consider 
most important. If you do not want to draw, please write the localities, countries, streets, 
or whatever you consider to be the most important.
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